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ABSTRACT
This thesis is primarily concerned with the reaction of UK
investment analysts when confronted with window dressed
financial statements and its implications for stockmarket
information processing and efficiency.
Three associated empirical examinations are undertaken.
1) A detailed investigation of the prevalence of window
dressing in UK company accounts and the nature of such
exercises is conducted using a random sample of 100 sets of
accounts for large UK corporates. A substantial degree of
window dressing is identified. The analysis is developed
further to explore the relationship between extent of window
dressing and financial position of the firm although the
results are ambiguous.
2) To explore the importance of accounting information
generally to the investment analysis community, relative to
alternative sources, and the manner in which it is used to
drive investment recommendations a detailed content analysis
of a large sample of stockbroker circulars is conducted.
The results suggest the importance of accounting information
for market participants may be conventionally overstated.
Nonetheless the statistical findings, although significant,
are not very strong which may partially reflect the
heterogeneity found in the methods used by different
stockbroking firms in appraising shares. Further work is
required.
3) The main part of the thesis reports on a laboratory
experiment with 63 experienced stockbroking analysts drawn
from five of the top City houses. The analysts were required
to process company accounts and adjust for window dressed
items. We were forced to conclude that, at least at the time,
the research took place in early 1990, investment analysts
were neither very concerned by nor able or inclined to
correct for creative accounting. These findings are discussed
in detail and implications for different market theories
drawn.
The theories conclude that there may well be valid concerns
about the conventional role attributed to investment analysts
as information intermediaries in maintaining market
efficiency, particularly in the processing of and
disseminating complex accounting information.
14
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since the early research into the effects of financial
accounting information on the securities market by Ball and
Brown (1968) and by Beaver (1968), ideas on this subject have
evolved considerably. However, research into the impact of
accounting information on stockmarket pricing requires first
an underlying set of theories describing the relationship
between different classes of participant, how information
circulates and how equilibrium prices are reached.
Various theories have been postulated in the finance and
financial accounting literature. The most important for our
purposes is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) formulated
by Fama (1970). Since the end of the sixties, this hypothesis
15
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has become unavoidable in any study into way in which
accounting information is used by the market.
The EMH is normally presented in three different versions:
the weak form, where no excess return can be earned through
the study of past prices, the semi-strong form where no
excess return can be earned by the analysis of publicly
released information and, finally, the strong form which
posits that all information is immediately impounded in
security prices and that, therefore, no excess return is to
be earned in any way even with inside information (Fama,
1977; Foster, 1986).
If universally accepted, this theory would have a major
influence on the production of accounting information. In
such a case published financial statements become of
secondary importance since all the information they contain
is already impounded in the market price of securities at the
moment they are released. Therefore, on this basis,
information published in financial statements can have, at
best, only a confirmatory role (Hines, 1982), and, at worst,
no role at all.
On the other hand, there is a continuing debate about the
need for accounting standards and the process of standard
16
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setting, and the biased presentation of accounting numbers,
albeit still in accordance with promulgated standards, that
is often termed creative accounting or window dressing
(Griffiths, 1986; Jameson, 1988). If accounting standards are
relevant and window dressing really matters to the market,
accounting numbers and the way they are produced are in fact
very important and the so called 'mechanistic hypothesis'
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) may be the correct description of
market behaviour.
Whichever theory proves to be the better description of
stockmarket behaviour, there are many market participants who
believe in the mechanistic hypothesis: company managers
(Hines, 1982) who manipulate accounting information,
accountants who discuss the accounting standards, and
financial journalists who claim to be scandalized by the
window dressing of financial statements. All believe that
market participants have a functional fixation on profit and
possibly other accounting figures (e.g., gearing) and
consequently that any manipulation of these figures can
mislead investors. In such a case, the standard setting
activity becomes crucial.
Rapid circulation of information underlies the efficient
market hypothesis, but a correct interpretation of this
17
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information is an equally important condition (Fama, 1977).
Certain commentators, however, believe that the efficient
market hypothesis cannot be applied literally. The correct
and accurate interpretation of financial accounting
information requires a certain level of accounting knowledge.
It is possible, however, that this information is not equally
spread among all market participants (Lee and Tweedie, 1977,
1981). If such is the case, even in its semi-strong form, the
applicability of the EMH would be seriously limited, and the
question of information manipulation would arise again.
Thus, the present thesis focuses on window dressing of UK
company financial statements and how such window dressing may
influence security market pricing through its potential
impact on market participant behaviour.
If window dressing exists, it is first because managers
believe it can influence the users of firms' financial
statements. Managers will wish to project an image of their
company which conforms with their view of what the market
should be expecting and would find acceptable. Window
dressing is designed to improve the company's image
(Belkaoui, 1989) and, consequently, there are, at least, two
situations where window dressing may be expected. The first
is where a company experiences a deterioration in its profit
18
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performance or key ratios (e.g., gearing) and tries to
improve its image by manipulating the relevant accounting
numbers. The second situation, widely commented on in the
literature, occurs when a firm experiences a sudden and
disorderly growth and wishes to make itself look more stable.
This is the smoothing hypothesis as developed and tested by
some researchers e.g., Copeland and Licastro (1968) and
denounced by journalists as the main objective of most window
dressing attempts (Griffiths, 1986).
A distressed company will window dress its numbers to
increase profits and reduce gearing (Belkaoui, 1989), while
a company growing too fast will reduce its profit, for
example by making various provisions. Consequently, the
direction of the modification in the profit number may
indicate which type of company we are dealing with. We may
thus be able to hypothesise a relationship between positive
window dressing and weak and/or deteriorating financial
health. In this context, the issue of how window dressed
financial information reaches the market and might possibly
mislead participants is of fundamental research interest.
As investment analysts play the key role in transmitting
market sensitive financial information about firms to the
market and in interpreting this information for those who may
19
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have difficulty in doing it themselves, (Lee and Tweedie,
1977, 1981), we focus our attention in this thesis on the
intermediating role of financial analysts in the stockmarket.
If, theoretically, investment analysts play an important role
in decoding and disseminating financial information among
stockmarket participants, their ability and propensity to
fulfil this task adequately are far from proven. On the one
hand, financial analysts may be limited in their ability to
interpret correctly such financial information perhaps
through lack of training in the use of accounting numbers.
Alternatively, they may be more involved in predicting
security prices and selling shares than trying accurately to
predict the 'true' profit number.
The potential response of stockbroking analysts when
confronted with window dressed financial statements is thus
of particular relevance to a study of their intermediating
role.
However, as a preliminary issue, we need to know if
companies' financial statements are important in the day to
day work of financial analysts. As a more appropriate
alternative to asking them directly their opinions on this,
the reports they produce for their own clients, stockbroker
20
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circulars, may be analyzed scientifically for evidence of the
actual relevance in practice. Such content analysis may also
tell us what is important to financial analysts in
differentiating between a company rated a buy, a hold or a
sell recommendation.
Chapter two discusses accounting information as a kind of
message in the communication process. A definition of the
concept of window dressing is then proposed allowing the
concept to be incorporated operationally in competing
theories about market behaviour. The different incentives for
window dressing financial statements will then be explored in
some detail.
Chapter three applies our definition of window dressing to
the analysis of 100 sets of financial statements. The
observed level of window dressing is then compared with the
financial situation of the firm as expressed by the Z-score
measure of financial health (Altman, 1968).
Chapter four describes the results of an extensive content
analysis of stockbrokers' circulars. After discussing the
principles of content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980; Bardin,
1977), the chapter applies these to a large sample of
circulars, to identify the key information sources driving
21
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the brokers' recommendations and their relative importance,
and to explore the relationship between content and
recommendation. The goal is a discriminant function making
possible the classification of other circulars on the basis
of their content.
Chapter five discusses the results of direct experiments with
stockbroking analysts exploring their response to window
dressed financial statements. Analyst behaviour in this task
is analyzed and commented upon and implications relevant to
the role of financial information intermediaries are drawn.
Finally, in chapter six, Summary and Conclusions, the three
main components of this research are summarised and the
implications the results may have for our understanding of
stockmarket functioning and the behaviour of participants and
for the orientation of further research are reviewed.
22
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ACCOUNTING INFORMATION AND MARKET
PARTICIPANTS
2.1 THE NATURE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
Accounting information is a subset of all possible
information circulating in the stockmarket about a company.
However, it is difficult to evaluate the importance of this
category of information to market participants relative to
other types of information.
It has become fashionable within the financial world to
pretend that published financial statements are useless
because of their lack of timeliness and the belief that the
information they contain is already impounded in the share
23
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price. However, as we shall see later, accounting information
is widely used, as well as relevant to security market
pricing.
The communication of accounting information is subject to the
same rules as other kinds of communication; so, to study how
financial accounting information is communicated to the
market and to recognize the biases likely to occur during the
process, it is useful to examine the communication process
itself.
2.1.1. Accounting Information and the Communication Process.
The communication process is complex in nature, with many
different components at many different levels. The physical
elements of the process are usually described in a
communication theory text, for instance McGuire (1973), as:
SOURCE 	 > MESSAGE 	 > RECEIVER
CHANNEL
Thus, a source is trying to send a message to a receiver, and
for this purpose, uses a channel.
24
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This simple schema requires development to describe the
complexity of the communication process. Jacobson (1963) adds
additional functions to this basic model:
EMOTIVE: when the source expresses his feelings
CONATIVE: when the communication process is directed
toward the receiver (e.g., giving a direct
order)
REFERENTIAL: when the communication, or a part of the
communication process, is entirely devoted
to the transmission of information. In a
thesis, for example, the referential
function will be largely dominant.
POETIC: when the form is more important than the
content (e.g., poetry).
PHATIC: this function refers to the part of the
communication devoted to the maintenance of the
contact. It is particularly audible during a
telephone call when the listener will say "ya"
or "hum" to indicate that he is still there.
25
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METALINGUISTIC: this is the part of the communication
which is about the communication itself.
For example, the translation or
explanation of a term, etc...
Any communication will involve more than one of these
different functions; however, depending on the nature of the
communication, e.g., academic paper, short story, etc., the
emphasis may reside in one or in a few of these functions.
This is always a matter of proportion. If we say that a
scientific communication is more referential than a poem, it
is a question of degree. In the same way, a poem will use
more or less the poetic function as form or content are
viewed as more important.
If the addition of such functions brings verisimilitude to
the model, they are not enough to make it complete. There are
many other factors related to the three main components of
the model. In fact, the list could be almost endless. Some
examples of other factors (e.g., McGuire, 1973) may be:
SOURCE: - personal mental universe
- personal cultural universe
- level of language
- perception of self
26
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- perception the source has of the receiver
_ etc.
CHANNEL (vehicle, medium)
- type: verbal or written
- noise
- etc.
MESSAGE:	 - intrinsic complexity
- coding
- etc.
RECEIVER: - personal mental universe
- personal cultural universe
- level of language mastered
- perception of self
- perception of the source
- etc.
Therefore, a message is never a straightforward object sent
by a source and taken, as is, by a receiver. The distortion
commences with the source who consciously or unconsciously
changes the raw message sent. It continues through the
channel which, by nature of the medium and the format of the
communication, adds noise to and modifies the message. It
27
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ends with the receiver who, in the light of his or her
decoding abilities, personal history, and environment in
which he or she is operating, decodes, interprets and
understands the message.
Professionals in the use of the communication process have
devised ways of influencing and of conditioning more than of
informing. For example advertisers have developed such
skills. Dyer (1982) recognizes that words have associated
feelings and that the choice of a word is meaningful.
"When we choose a word we do more than name an
object, person or situation, we also convey feelings
about what we are describing. What you feel or your
attitude towards what you describe is an important
part of meaning." (Dyer, 1982, p. 140)
Accounting communication cannot avoid this general pattern
and thus the laws of communication in general apply equally
in the accounting arena.
However, accounting communications are not only referential.
Gibbins (1976) concluded that the empirical evidence he
gathered supported the hypothesis that accounting reports
have some of the characteristics of persuasive messages:
accounting reports do not only have the purpose of informing
readers, but also to persuade them to act (probably to buy
28
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shares in the company or at least not to sell those they
already have).
Consequently, we believe that the annual report and accounts
can be studied as a communication instrument.
2.1.2. Accounting Communication and the Annual Report
Accounting information, for external use, is generally
contained in the annual report. This does not mean that much
of this information is not known before the release of the
annual report. Accounting information is disseminated through
many channels: directly from finance directors to analysts
and stockbrokers, by the publication of preliminary
announcements and by any other public information released by
companies. However, the only complete set of accounting
information provided by the firm, complete both in that there
will be no other more complete version and that it will be
physically possible to keep it for future reference, is the
annual report. Beveridge (1963) is typical in believing that
the annual report is the most important document representing
the company to its financial public.
As compared to some years ago when the annual report
contained only a short narrative section and some limited
29
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financial statements, the situation has greatly evolved.
While the accounting information presented has become more
complex and voluminous, sections have been added or have
gained in size. Newman (1984) noted this important
transformation:
"The increased complexity of the accounting
information has been accompanied by the growth of a
new section: 'Notes to the accounts' from a typical
two pages in 1967 to at least twelve pages in 1982.
The directors' report has likewise been expanded
since 1967 to reach commonly twelve pages. At the
same time there has been a trend since the early
1960s to reduce the content, scope and length of the
chairman's statement parallel to an increase in
'Review of operations' sections. (Newman, 1984, p.6)
This increased complexity of the straight accounting section
has led the report preparers to develop another section, easy
to grasp, destined for the unskilled reader. Through time,
this 'Review of operations' has become more carefully
structured and more colourful.
The original stewardship and financial reporting to
shareholders purposes of the annual financial statements have
also been modified. The annual report, which contains such
accounts, has many different uses and many different users.
Reilly (1987) found many other uses for the annual report,
e.g., for "upgrading internal morale, for marketing products
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and for establishing name identification." In fact, companies
use their annual reports and accounts as a marketing tool for
their products to their clients and even to their own
shareholders. A shareholder of a company being part of a
large conglomerate may not be aware of all the products he
has indirectly invested in. Readers other than shareholders
are also added as targets. Randall (1972) reported that the
number of copies of the annual report printed by a company is
far greater than the number of its shareholders, implying
that the traditional 'reporting to shareholders' use may
altogether have being replaced by other purposes.
"The annual report has become a multi-purpose
document. It is used to influence the investment
community, as an acquisition tool, as a community
relations aid, as a sales medium to persuade
stockholders to buy company products, and as a public
relations door-opener when dealing with foreign
businessmen and governments. Moreover, corporate
recruiters almost invariably give copies of the
latest annual report to students interested in the
company. To fulfill all these purposes, companies as
a general rule print two or three times as many
annual reports as there are stockholders." (Randall,
1972, p.62)
These changes in the form, content and purpose of the annual
report and accounts are not formally acknowledged by
companies and, officially, the report is still the medium
through which management accounts to shareholders for what
has been done with their investment.
31
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Therefore, if the annual report and accounts is being used
for persuasive purposes in addition to its original goal it
is even more likely to be manipulated and subject to window
dressing.
2.2. WINDOW DRESSING OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The previous section suggested that managers will tend to use
the annual report as a tool to influence investors rather
than just to inform them in a straightforward manner.
This persuasive influence may be carried on through window
dressing of the accounts as well as through filling the
report with glossy pictures and triumphant texts.
For our purposes here, the term window dressing does
not encompass anything illegal. Window dressed
accounts still comply with the letter of the law and
accounting standards, although they may not
necessarily present fairly the financial situation of
the company.
Consequently, we must establish a distinction between window
dressing and fraud. This is not such an easy thing to do.
32
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Belkaoui (1989) quotes the Michigan Law Review defining fraud
in these terms:
"Fraud is a generic term, and embraces all the
multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise,
which are resorted to by one individual to get
advantage over another by false representations. No
definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a
general proposition in defining fraud, as it includes
surprise, trick, cunning and unfair ways by which
another is cheated. The only boundaries defining it
are those that limit human knavery." (Belkaoui, 1989,
p.61)
The difference between an accounting fraud in the form of
forging invoices and a farfetched interpretation of an
accounting standard is clear. However, such abuse of SSAPs,
even kept within the limits of a literal or legalistic
interpretation of the standards, is prone to lead to an
untrue and unfair view of the financial situation of the
firm. Moreover, a judge may decide that compliance with GAAP
is not in itself a sufficient guarantee of a true and fair
presentation of the financial situation of the company
(Briloff, 1976, P. 15.). In such cases even the application
of a standard correct to the letter may be inappropriate and
therefore constitute a fraudulent presentation in the sense
of Belkaoui. FRED4 recognises this possibility when proposing
to reflect the substance of transactions instead of their
form. This implies that the accounting and legal analysis of
a transaction could be in conflict. However, the law requires
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the accounting treatment to depart from accounting standards
when the 'the true and fair view' cannot be reached otherwise
(Gibbons and Freedman, 1991).
In the same spirit, the EC Council, in its Fourth Directive
requires the obligation to give a true and fair view to be of
overriding importance (Davies, Paterson and Wilson, 1992,
p.3). However, any departure from generally accepted
accounting principles in order to produce a true and fair
view must be justified.
For Belkaoui (1989) such behaviour is typical of companies
facing "economic crisis as well as by those motivated by a
misguided opportunism."
Many commentators have written about window dressing or
creative accounting in the UK, but even here it is difficult
to find a useful definition of it. In Griffiths (1986) we
find that all financial statements are manipulated, that
accounting has become propaganda and that facts are neglected
in financial statements:
"Such phrases as 'cooking the books', 'fiddling the
accounts' and 'corporate con trick' may raise
eyebrows where they cause people to infer that there
is something illegal about this pastime. In fact this
deception is all in perfectly good taste. It is
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totally legitimate. It is creative accounting."
(Griffiths, 1986, P. 1).
However, the author gives no indication on where to draw the
line between what is correct and what is not.
Smith (1992) describes a large number of window dressing
schemes in detail and analyses the accounts of over 200 large
UK companies to measure their prevalence, but he never
attempts definition of creative accounting.
Jameson (1988) tries more fairly to define creative
accounting. For him, it is a bad use of the legitimate
flexibility accounting standards must possess to cope with
the great diversity of situations that have to be accounted
for. It is a "cynical manipulation" arising from the fact
that accounting may allow "legitimate differences in
accounting measurement and interpretation." Finally he
defines creative accounting as follows:
"Creative accounting is not against the law. It
operates within the letter both of the law and of
accounting standards but it is quite clearly against
the spirit of both. It should also be remembered that
creative accounting is not necessarily practised only
by dishonest and corrupt accountants and crooked
company directors. This is one of the aspects that
makes it difficult to deal with. It is essentially a
process of using the rules, the flexibility provided
by them and the omissions within them, to make
financial statements look somewhat different from
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what was intended by the rule. It consists of rule-
bending and loophole-seeking. (Jameson, 1988, P. 20).
Window dressing is generally viewed as having as its
principal purpose to mislead users of accounts. However, for
our purposes we require a more operational definition. Morris
(1988) lists the items in financial statements potentially
distorted by such practices but fails to indicate precisely
to which extend each element of the accounts can be window
dressed and how. Morris and Breakwell (1975) were equally
more inclined to describe the impact window dressing of
financial statements may have on the assessment of investment
opportunities than to study the methods of window dressing
and the extent to which they are used. Other researchers have
been concerned by the problem of income smoothing which is
ordinarily defined in terms of a reduction of the variability
of profits.
Therefore, if we wish to identify a priori window dressing in
a set of financial statements, we only have the concept of
true and fair view to work with. Lee (1982) provides some
very general and non- exceptionable guidelines for the choice
of accounting policies having the best chance of producing a
true and fair view:
1- they must be legally prescribed
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2- they must be believed to be appropriate in the
particular industry and applicable in the company in
question
3- they must be used consistently from one financial
year to the next
4- they must not conflict nor be incompatible with
prescribed or accepted concepts ( going concern,
matching, revenue realisation, etc.).
Hopkins (1984) senses the impossibility that a single method
will lead to a single view that will be true and fair. He
believes that "truth and fairness are subjective." For
Hopkins (1984), in the UK, the compliance with standards does
not guarantee that the presentation will be true and fair.
The fact that financial statements are audited is a poor
guarantee of truth and fairness. In the US, Briloff (1976)
reports a judgment saying that fairness is separated from the
application of GAAP and must be tested for separately by the
auditor.
"In a word, "present fairly" was a concept separate
from "generally accepted accounting principles" and
the latter did not necessarily result in the former."
(Briloff, 1976, p. 11)
Briloff also reports other cases where the fairness of the
presentation is dissociated from the strict compliance with
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GAAP. For example, Judge McMahon declared in a judgment in
1974:
"Compliance with generally accepted accounting
principles is not necessarily sufficient for an
accountant to discharge his public obligation. Fair
presentation is the touchstone for determining the
adequacy of disclosure and financial statements.
While adherence to generally accepted accounting
principles is a tool to help achieve that end, it is
not necessarily a guarantee of fairness." (Briloff,
1976, p. 12).
This situation seems to be evolving along the same lines in
the UK. Previously, if compliance with the Companies Act was
not enough to give a true and fair view, additional
information was to be given in the accounts or in the notes
to the accounts. No conflict between the true and fair view
and the law was considered important enough to override the
legal requirements. However, the position has now changed
since the CA 1981. If compliance with the Companies Act is
inconsistent with a true and fair view then the accounts must
depart from the strict legal requirements in order to present
such a true and fair view. In 1983 Hoffman and Arden gave
counsel's opinion for the ASC stating that compliance with
accepted accounting principles would be a prima facie
evidence that the accounts are true and fair (Davies,
Peterson and Wilson, 1992). Radcliffe (1990) studied court
decisions on cases involving the choice of accounting
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treatments. He concluded that no accounting principle had
acquired the status of a binding legal precedent in
determining the true and fair view. The only possible
conclusion at this point would be that the situation is still
evolving and no definitive conclusions can be drawn for the
time being. We may in any case view much of this hypothetical
argumentation as largely of theoretical interest only.
The Argyll consolidated accounts constitute an example of the
reverse situation: the Department of Trade, adopting a
strictly legalistic (form over substance) argument, required
the group to demerge a subsidiary acquired after the balance
sheet date because the presentation of the financial
situation was not legal, even if the auditor's report pointed
to the breach and still concluded that the accounts were true
and fair (Ashton, 1986). In this case, fairness was not
enough and the financial statements had still to comply with
GAAP. The problem is that this compliance was judged by the
auditor as likely to lead to unfairness of presentation.
The true and fair doctrine is therefore an integral part of
the relationship between the directors and the auditor. It is
a tool, even if a poor one, to help the auditor in
recommending accounting treatments placing economic substance
over legal form (Parker and Nobes, 1991).
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Flint (1982) argues that the true and fair view is a concept
existing through consensus between parties. Despite the fact
that no precise and complete definition has been provided by
the legislators the concept has existed in law for many years
and preparers and users of financial statements seem to know
what must be done to comply with it. Consequently it can be
viewed as something akin to a religious dogma that people
understand and believe but are unable to explain.
Therefore, we must agree with Rutherford (1985) that the true
and fair view doctrine "lacks a settled and widely accepted
explication and is unlikely to achieve one in the near
future."
Even very inconsistently characterized, the true and fair
view is the only guideline we have to define window dressing
or creative accounting. Earlier on, we derived our own
definition of window dressing which can be restated in
substance as: window dressing occurs when an interpretation
and use of an accounting standard, although complying to the
letter of this standard, is likely to produce a view of the
financial situation which is unfair and/or false. In the
next chapter, before searching for window dressed items in
financial statements, we will derive from this general
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definition some guidelines applying to specific items in the
accounts.
Having produced an operational definition of window dressing,
we must now ask ourselves: does window dressing actually
matter? The efficient market hypothesis, for one, argues that
window dressing should have no impact on the market price of
shares. However, there is another view of the stockmarket in
which window dressing may play an important role. The next
sections debate the relative importance of window dressing of
financial statements according to different market behaviour
hypotheses.
2.2.1 Window Dressing and the Efficient Market Hypothesis
In essence window dressing constitutes a biased choice and
interpretation of accounting principles and methods in a
particular situation. Therefore if we wish to analyze the
relationship between the phenomenon of window dressing and
the efficient market hypothesis, we have to do this through
consideration of the influence that accounting methods and
procedures might have on the efficiency of the market.
The semi-strong form of the hypothesis is of most relevance
here. Fama (1970) stated that the efficiency of the stock
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market depends on the fact that prices fully reflect the
available information. Each form of the hypothesis will then
be defined in regard to a particular set of information. For
the semi-strong form (Foster, 1986) "The information set is
publicly available information."
The hypothesis makes the distinction between what is
considered information and what is not. Basically,
information may be defined as data that produces a change in
the expectations of subjects about the outcome of an event.
For our purposes, the relevant outcome is the future market
price of a security, the information is the data contained in
a set of accounts, and the subjects are market participants:
investors, analysts, stockbrokers, etc.
The expectations of market participants seem to be based on
an evaluation of the future cashf lows of the firm (Abdel-
Khalik and Keller, 1979). Therefore, any accounting
information which is not relevant for the estimation of
future cashf lows should not impact on the market price of
securities and consequently should not be considered as
information at all.
Profit has an ambiguous role in such a system. On the one
hand, because it incorporates adjustments having no effect on
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the cashf low, the profit figure will contain little
information. However, since cashf low may not be directly
observable, profit is often used as a proxy. Consequently
profit, as a measure of cashf low, will likely be targeted for
window dressing purposes.
Beaver (1968) and May (1971) provide evidence demonstrating
that security prices respond quickly to announcements of
annual and quarterly earnings. But such earnings figures,
even if released in advance, are accounting numbers which do
not automatically indicate the level of cashf lows.
On the other hand, a major part of the share price movement,
at least for the bigger companies, seems to occur even before
the preliminary announcement (Ball and Brown, 1968). This
finding emphasises the importance of alternative methods of
communicating accounting information and also the possibility
that other factors may be influencing security prices more
than the earnings figures themselves.
These early researches were based on assumptions that may
have been useful to work with but are obviously not
realistic. Such assumptions as the free and costless
circulation of information along with the absence of
transaction costs and of income tax are difficult to sustain
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and must be addressed if we want to reach a more realistic
model of market behaviour.
In addition, the impact of both different accounting
procedures and changes in accounting standards on market
pricing has been quite extensively explored. According to
theory, since cashf low is the only important element for the
market and as accounting method choice normally has no effect
on cashf lows, accounting procedures should have no impact on
the market.
Baskin (1972) tested the proposition that a change in
accounting policies could have an impact on market prices.
Such a test is problematic because many changes are only
usually known when the annual report is released. Assuming
investors can understand the impact of such a change on the
company's reported numbers, Baskin found no significant
effect which led him to the conclusion that investors are not
misled by accounting manipulations. This finding however may
also lead to other conclusions as lack of market reaction can
be due to many reasons. Baskin started with the efficient
market hypothesis as a framework and finished with it. But if
we start with the 'mechanistic hypothesis' (Foster, 1986),
such results could equally be interpreted as indicating that
as investors may not read financial statements carefully,
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they may be unable to observe the consequences of accounting
manipulations on profit figures.
Harrison (1977) tested for market reaction to discretionary
and non-discretionary accounting changes. He used two matched
groups of firms. He found that the market seemed to react
negatively to discretionary changes, but only very slightly.
The sign of these results, interestingly enough, appeared to
be independent of whether profits were increased or decreased
by the changes. However, we should note that such results may
be swamped by a possible very high positive abnormal return
at the preliminary announcement stage.
Kaplan and Roll (1972) explored the impact of two different
accounting decisions on market price viz:- the methods
employed both to account for investment credit and for the
related depreciation change. They found minimal long term
effect.
Kaplan and Roll's (1972) data was re-analysed by Cassidy
(1976) who processed it in a different manner thereby
eliminating the problems encountered by the former authors.
He found that no effect was produced by the change in
depreciation method and concluded that his findings were
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consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Obviously
these tests used the capital asset pricing model paradigm.
Duncan and Moores (1988) tried to assess the relevance of CCA
(current cost accounting) information. They found that their
subjects using CCA information made fewer decision errors
than those using only historical cost information. Taken at
face value, their results may suggest CCA supplementation has
an effect on the market as it modifies investment decisions.
Investors can apparently decode such information.
However, we should note that their conclusions may not be
totally generalizable as they used students as surrogates for
investors. Such final year undergraduate accounting students
possess some accounting knowledge far superior to that of the
average investor (see Lee and Tweedie, 1977 and 1981). Also
since these results go against the findings of a large number
of other researchers, we are suspicious about their research
methodology.
Firth (1981) compared the effect on the market of the
principal standardized forms of information released by
companies:
1- preliminary announcements (PA)
2- annual report and accounts (ARA)
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3- annual general meeting (AGM)
4- interim results (IR)
All these events seemed to have an impact, even if of
different amplitude, on the market except for the annual
general meeting:
"The volume of shares traded and the number of deals
transacted for weeks PA, ARA, and IR were found to be
significantly greater than for the average of the
remaining 48 weeks. As in the abnormal returns
analyses, the AGM week was not associated with any
exceptional behaviour." (Firth, 1981, p.526)
Firth's study used a classical design. He calculated a normal
return based on 48 non-event weeks; he then compared the
returns per weeks where particular information was released
to this benchmark and explored for differences. Incidentally,
a week event study is less precise than a day to day one
since other information releases may occur during the week
and have an influence on return variability.
On the other hand, Foster, Jenkins and Vickerey (1986) found
"no unusual price variability" at the release of the annual
report to shareholders.
Their findings are inconsistent with those of Firth. However,
the latter's study leaves some questions unanswered.
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One of the principal questions raised by the Foster et a/
study concerns the specific week in which they found the
largest abnormal returns. This week is situated 17 weeks
before the release of the annual report and thus cannot
normally include the preliminary announcement. Therefore,
what is the event occurring during this week? They do not
comment on this finding even if it is the most important
element of their study.
Rippington and Taffler (1993) reexamined the same four events
as Firth (PA, ARA, AGM, IR), but using daily data. He used
three pricing models: the market adjusted return model (naive
model), the market model and the capital asset pricing model.
Rippington and Taffler found only a negligible degree of
market reaction in aggregate around the annual report release
and the annual general meeting suggesting that the
information released then had been anticipated by the market.
In the case of the annual report, as it is a complex and
multi-faceted document, they were reluctant to generalize
their results based on the aggregated reaction alone
acknowledging the fact that some companies may disclose in
their annual report some price sensitive information while
others do not. In fact, a more detailed (by section) analysis
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of the annual report and accounts effect produced evidence of
the presence of incremental information reaching the market
via the annual report release in certain firm cases.
Generally, the statement of Anderson and Meyers (1975) that
the market reacts to information that is "conceptually
irrelevant, incorrect or misleading," which seemed so
iconoclast in 1975, may appear more easily acceptable today.
Market efficiency is not the only hypothesis describing
market behaviour. There is another competing hypothesis that
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Foster (1986) term the
'mechanistic hypothesis' and that Archibald (1972), among
others, call the 'naive investors hypothesis.'
2.2.2. Window Dressing And The Mechanistic Hypothesis
According to the naive investor hypothesis, investors and
market participants demonstrate a functional fixation on the
profit figure. The manifestation of the profit figure which
is particularly focused upon is the earnings per share
figure, calculated from the profit after tax but before
extraordinary items. This functional fixation may, to a great
part, reflect the problem many market participants experience
in decoding financial information. If this is true, there is
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the potential for such market participants to be misled by
window dressed accounting numbers.
The new Financial Reporting Standard 3, Reporting Financial
Performance directly attacks this issue. Users who are
functionally fixated rely on aggregated numbers. FRS3 seeks
to eliminate this blind dependency.
"It will no longer be credible for those analysing
financial statements to alight on some aggregate
number presented in the accounts and without due
consideration of its components, deem that to be the
sole indicator of a company's performance. Unusual
items must be assessed, the effect of acquisitions
and disposals must be evaluated, and the changes in
the value of a company's assets must be considered,
before its underlying performance can be understood.
The Board believes that FRS3 will lead to more
sophistication in the assessment of a company' s
performance and will bring benefits all round." (FRS3
Press Notice of the ASB, 1992)
Hand (1990) defines the functional fixation hypothesis as
follows:
"It implies that investors do not properly unscramble
the information contained in a firm's financial
statements and, therefore, arrive at biased
assessments of the probability distribution of its
future cash flows. It predicts that the relation
between a firm's accounting earnings and its stock
price is a purely mechanical one and that investors
can be systematically misled by firms' accounting
methods and choices." (Hand, 1990, p. 741)
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Hand presents the mechanistic hypothesis (assessment of
future cashf lows based on profit figures) and the functional
fixation hypothesis (literal interpretation of income
numbers) as two different forms of investors behaviour. We
see them rather as two different aspects of the same process
1) focusing on the profit figure, and 2) taking this profit
figure at face value.
Hand defines sophisticated investors as "mutual fund managers
and other institutional stockholders." Following Lee and
Tweedie's research (1981), it may be difficult to view such
groups of investors as necessarily being really
sophisticated.
Hand tested the extent to which investors can be viewed as
unsophisticated by using a methodology involving the
reannouncement of the accounting gain arising from a debt-
equity -swap. He concluded, on the basis of his results, that
"the extended functional fixation hypothesis has some
empirical support." However, his test was of limited scope
and the author was even surprised with his own conclusions.
Trinic (1990) criticized Hand for having omitted transaction
costs. Such costs will impact on the conclusion of any such
study; however, most of the empirical evidence supporting the
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efficient market hypothesis has ignored consideration of
transaction costs.
Another anomaly was documented by Harris and Ohlsen (1987 and
1990). In their 1987 paper, they wanted to demonstrate that
investors in the oil and gas industry have a functional
fixation on the book value of companies since the book value
was the best explanatory variable for market price. This is
surprising when we consider that historic cost accounting is
applied in this domain.
Their 1990 paper, although pointing to investors failing to
interpret and use financial information appropriately does
not conclude that functional fixation applies to the use of
book value measures of oil and gas firms.
"In fact, the results suggest that the market does
not pay adequate attention to the available measures
derived from the annual report, including book value
of oil and gas properties." (Harris and Ohlsen, 1990,
p.766)
Trinic (1990) also criticized the Harris and Ohlson study on
the basis that the period they covered (1979-1984) was
obviously one of great price increases and that, had they
taken the 1984-1988 period, they would have experienced
negative returns from their trading rules.
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Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) conducted an experiment
to evaluate the degree of bias contained in equilibrium
market prices. They concluded that there were different sets
of information in the market at the same time, and that the
market price reflected a hypothetical set of information
situated somewhere between the no bias and the total bias
situations. They concluded that the market situation reduces
such biases although it does not eliminate them completely.
Therefore, there is no definitive conclusion yet on the
question of investor functional fixity on any particular
accounting number. We need to wait for more evidence to be
able to reach even some preliminary conclusions about the
real behaviour of security market participants in this
context.
The belief that creative accounting can mislead investors and
distort market pricing is consistent with the mechanistic
hypothesis rather than the efficient market hypothesis.
In the UK, the mechanistic hypothesis was indirectly
investigated by Lee and Tweedie (1977, and 1981), who studied
the ability of ordinary and institutional investors to
interpret accounting information. They found that the limited
ability of both groups of market participants to properly
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decode accounting information opened the possibility of
manipulating such information in order to produce an effect
on security prices.
A sub-version of this way of thinking would be the myopic
hypothesis (Foster, 1986, p. 443) which suggests that the
market takes a short term view on profits. Such a short term
perspective will give preparers of financial statements an
incentive to present attractive short term profit figures
without being concerned about their long term trend. Casual
empiricism would appear to support the shortsightedness in
market participants behaviour based on the normally short
time horizon covered by analysts' forecasts and the decrease
in forecast accuracy as the period covered is extended.
In consequence, investors may lack accurate information on
company performance in the long term and therefore, will tend
to focus on short term investment strategies.
This situation opens the way for short term window dressing
by companies in order to bolster the price of their shares.
Whatever theory of market behaviour we subscribe to, we have
to acknowledge the fact that, successful or not, window
dressing exists.
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2.3. THE STOCKMARKET AND COMPANY MANAGEMENT
Attempts to mislead the market via window dressing certainly
exist, and one reason is that at least some parties believe
they are able to influence market prices appropriately.
A UK survey by 3i (1990) shows that the majority of the
responding firms' finance directors (81%) believe they can
influence the share price of their companies.
Respondents were from a sample of 681 companies selected from
the top 750 UK quoted manufacturing and non-manufacturing
companies.
Table 1 lists the ways proposed by finance directors of
sample companies as prone to influence the market value of
their firms.
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Table 1
Ways of Influencing Share Valuation
No
effect
Some
effect
Strong
effect
Acquisitions 1.9 49.3 47.8
Talking to investment analysts 5.8 52.2 42.0
Disposals 5.8 57.5 34.8
Financial restructuring 8.2 67.6 18.8
Dividend policy 10.1 48.8 40.1
Buying-in shares 17.9 69.6 10.1
Advertising and other PR activities 26.6 62.3 10.6
We see that personal relations with financial analysts are
seen as an important way of influencing security prices. We
can also deduce from this that investment analysts are
perceived by company finance directors as having an influence
in the security pricing process.
In addition, 91% of finance directors also believed the
investment community (The City) to be "too focussed on
short-term earnings and share price performance."
Other studies also show that managers do not believe in the
efficient market hypothesis and that they see profit numbers
as very important information in the pricing process.
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Mayer-Sommer (1979) investigated the understanding and
acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis by different
sets of market participants: finance controllers, CPAs,
academics from the AAA and members of the Institute of
Chartered Financial Analysts.
This investigation, conducted by way of questionnaire,
produced some disturbing results with 66% of the controllers
and Big Eight partners not understanding the efficient market
hypothesis. Academicians followed with a 50% level of lack of
understanding while financial analysts stand at 35%.
Acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis by someone who does
not understand is of no value. From those who understood the
hypothesis, Mayer-Sommer separated those who accepted it from
those who rejected it. Of the financial analysts covered, 65%
understood the hypothesis and 45% (of those 65%) accepted it.
Of the controllers and firm accounting partners, about 33%
understood it, but only 10% (of these 33%) accepted it.
The conclusion is obvious. Directors who do understand the
hypothesis do not believe in it and therefore may be more
prone to believe in the functional fixation hypothesis and
try to window dress their financial statements in order to
modify the perception of their firm's profitability.
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From Hines' research (1982), it seems that not only directors
but shareholders also may believe in the possibility of
generating abnormal returns from annual report and accounts
information.
Hines concluded that if the annual report and accounts do not
contain information that leads to action by investors, it
does not necessarily mean that this information is not
pertinent if correctly analyzed and used in due time. Hines
proposes a multi-phase model of the market with different
categories of information being used differently depending on
the phase. This conclusion is based on the heterogeneity of
investors "with respect to their investment objectives,
expectations, abilities, evaluative methods and horizons."
2.3.1 Reasons for Window Dressing Financial Statements
Some observers and commentators on the security market
believe that investors prefer companies which exhibit a
steady growth pattern in their profits rather than a company
with greater variability in earnings streams although more
profitable on average.
Therefore, smoothing the profit figure, mainly the earnings
per share, is potentially a very good reason for using
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creative accounting devices and manipulating accounting
information.
Many researchers have explored the smoothing hypothesis.
Dopuch and Drake (1966) found no evidence of any smoothing
behaviour in their study of the gains and losses on sale of
securities but they reported different results in the case of
dividends deriving from investment in non-subsidiary
companies. However, the authors postulated no model allowing
comparison of actual reported profits with the expected
"true" figures.
One method to arrive at an expected level of profitability is
to follow the Martingale pattern. This posits that, in our
case, last year's profit best predicts the current year
(e.g., Copeland, 1968; Copeland and Licastro, 1968). Copeland
and Licastro (1968) focused specifically on the effect of
dividend income as a smoothing device, and were unable to
provide evidence of any successful smoothing behaviour,
contrary to Dopuch and Drake.
However there are a number of studies in the literature
exploring smoothing behaviour in different areas which
suggest such activities do take place. Dasher and Malcolm
(1970), for example, provide of the existence of smoothing
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behaviour associated with pension costs, extraordinary items
and dividend income. The same year, White (1970) found that
companies with high earnings variability and declining profit
trends have a tendency to use available accounting choices to
smooth their results. However, White had the methodological
problem of having to determine the optimal (i.e. most
desirable) method to fairly present the accounting numbers in
question in the first place before being able to compare this
best choice with the actual treatment adopted by the
companies in his sample. Such a methodology may have value
but may be open to bias.
Similarly, Barefield and Cominsky (1972), Biedleman (1973),
Ronen and Sadan (1975) and Barnea, Ronen and Sadan (1976) all
conclude smoothing exists with many different accounting
instruments. In contrast with Copeland and Licastro (1968),
a number of these studies adopted a sub-Martingale prediction
model, i.e. Martingale with a trend.
However, income smmothing studies are in conflict with others
directly focused on profit behaviour per se which conclude
that the profit number generally follows some kind of sub-
Martingale or Martingale (random walk) pattern, e.g., there
is no significant autocorrelation between different measures
of profitability on a multi-period basis (Foster, 1986, pp.
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239-240). Such research leads us to the conclusion that
profit cannot be predicted from one year to another. However,
if next year's profit is unpredictable or if the best guess
is current year profit, how can there be a significant number
of companies successfully smoothing their profit figures?
This paradox is generally not considered.
When Eckel (1981) "revisited" the income smoothing
hypothesis, he concluded that there was no evidence of
successful artificial (or classificatory) smoothing. However,
he used a novel methodology assuming reasonably that sales
cannot be smoothed artificially, for this is fraud, not
window dressing. Eckel compared the variances of sales and
profit over 20 years exploring for consistent differences and
therefore the existence of some artificial smoothing of the
profit number. See also Imhoff (1978) who found similar
results using a related methodology.
Albrecht and Richardson (1990) point out, however, that Eckel
limited his study to four industries only, and that Imhoff
restricted his sample to companies with high sales
variability, correlated, one must assume, with a high degree
of economic uncertainty. Therefore, they argue that both sets
of null results may have been obtained by chance.
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Ma (1988) found strong evidence that banks use loan
provisions to smooth profits and similarly Brayshaw and Eldin
(1989) suggest that some UK companies use their foreign
exchange difference account to smooth profits.
Albrecht and Richardson (1990) employ the distinction between
'core' and 'peripheric' industries. Core industries comprise
companies in "hard" sectors i.e. heavy industry, highly
specialised, mechanised, computerised and unionised,
producing long term assets and having high profit margins.
Peripheric companies are concentrated in "soft" sectors, or
light industry, e.g., food and textiles, all labor intensive,
lowly unionised and having low margins.
Albrecth and Richardson argue that companies in the
peripheric industries might be more inclined to smooth their
sales and their profits. This is effectively the conclusion
reached by Belkaoui and Picur (1984).
Albrecht and Richardson used the Eckel comparison of
variability of sales and profit as their working method,
avoiding problems of defining expected income. They noted the
existence of smoothing behaviour in their sample. During the
period 1974-1980, they classified 26% of companies in
aggregate as smoothers while during the more economically
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difficult period of 1980-1985, they identified 40% of
companies as smoothers. However, they found no difference in
smoothing behaviour that could be linked to the type (core or
peripheric) of industry.
In summary we may conclude that on a meta-analysis basis
there would appear to be some evidence of smoothing by firms.
However we may note the paradox that a significant degree of
smoothing of the profit figure is inconsistent with the
finding that profit follows a Martingale process.
2.3.2 Other Possibilities
If smoothing is an important reason for window dressing it
may not be the most important one. The "myopic hypothesis"
seems not to be reserved for investors but may equally relate
to managers. In fact, if stockbrokers and analysts encourage
investors to make frequent transactions in accordance with a
short tern view of the market, the remuneration structure for
directors and senior managers may equally encourage them to
present a good picture for the current year, postponing
reporting problems to some future year. In addition typically
bonus and indexed remuneration systems may encourage managers
to report all problems in one single year, taking all
potential losses and even provisions in the same year,
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allowing inflated profits to be reported with consequent
bonus payments for several years ahead.
Following the "big bath" accounting theory (Walsh, Craig and
Clarke, 1991), companies may tend to assemble all the clouds
in one big storm (one year) to clear the sky for many years
to come.
Window dressing is particularly useful in such circumstances.
It can be used to increase the profit by capitalising bad
quality assets such as development expenses for a period of
years (or interests, Smith, 1992) and then it can be used
again to reduce the profit further more in the clearing year
(the year of the big bath), to create all kind of provisions
which will be used to regularise future profits.
In the first part of this chapter, we established that window
dressing may exist and is believed to impact on investment
analysis.
In the following section we explore which participants in the
capital market may be affected by such informations
manipulations and to what effect.
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2.4 MARKET PARTICIPANTS
Texts on finance and accounting tend to consider the
stockmarket as being a single entity. We often hear
statements such as: the market has integrated this
information, the market knows that..., etc.. But we can
legitimately raise doubts about the uniqueness and
homogeneity of the stockmarket.
In fact, we find many participants in the securities market:
- large private investors
- small private investors
- institutional investors
- stockbrokers
- companies (issuers of shares)
- financial analysts
- financial journalists
- etc.
It is unlikely that all these different groups of
participants will exhibit the same knowledge, the same
appetite for information and the same ability to interpret
it. Consequently, it is relevant to draw distinctions among
these categories of participants.
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2.4.1 Shareholders and the Annual Report and Accounts
Private shareholders are often called ordinary shareholders
in distinction to institutional shareholders. Their
importance in the equity of UK companies continues to decline
despite privatisation. They are more and more replaced by
institutional shareholders. Table 2 taken from The Stock
Exchange Quarterly of April-June 1992 highlights this trend.
Table 2
Proportion of Equity Belonging
to Private and Institutional Shareholders
Year	 Private	 Institutional
Shareholders	 Shareholders
63 54% 15%
69 47 20
75 37 33
81 28 45
89 18 41
This situation is due partly to the importance of pension
funds which are now true economic forces in their own right.
Private shareholders, despite their decline in importance,
are a prime consideration in the development of the narrative
section of the annual report even if this 'solicitude' is not
necessarily attributable to totally honest motives.
The growth of the narrative section may be seen as a
palliative for the difficulties experienced by many
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shareholders confronted with increasingly complex financial
statements. Effectively, market participants do not all
possess the same ability to interpret financial accounting
information, even if a correct interpretation of financial
information is a necessary condition for markets to be
efficient (Fama, 1977).
The lack of interpretative ability of private shareholders
confronted with this increase in complexity, leads to a
parallel disinterest in the annual report and accounts.
Parker (1981) quotes a survey made by Georgeson and Co., a US
firm specializing in investors relations. It appears that
stockholders do not read the annual report and accounts in
any depth.
- 26% surveyed gave the report from six to fifteen
minutes of reading time
- 40% surveyed devoted five minutes or less to the
reading of the report
- 15% surveyed did not read the report at all
In five minutes or less shareholders barely have time to look
at the pictures. Between five and fifteen minutes, they may
have had enough time to read superficially the chairman's
report and to look at the profit figure, but that is all.
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Thus, at least 81% of all shareholders in this study did not
appear seriously to review the annual report and accounts.
The readership of the annual report and accounts among
shareholders seems very low. While Lee and Tweedie (1977)
reported some already disappointing rates, Abbas (1977)
presented far lower ones, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Annual Report Reading Habits
Lee & Tweedie	 Abbas
	
%	 %
Thorough	 41	 5
Brief	 54	 53
Not at all	 5	 42
The differences are possibly a matter of definition; however,
all researchers seem to imply low readership for the annual
report and accounts among private shareholders.
Facing such a reaction, preparers of annual reports and
accounts have two possibilities: 1) try to attract the
attention of Parker's 81% of shareholders who do not read or
read very superficially by a transformation of the report's
presentation and content (as the form and content of accounts
is mandated from the regulatory bodies, opportunities to
increase shareholder attention need to be concentrated on the
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narrative parts) and 2) address the report to other market
participants, namely financial analysts and stockbrokers. In
practice, both solutions have been tried. As the typical
stockholder is a highlights reader (Foy, 1973) and that the
annual report "has to compete with magazines and newspapers,"
some changes have been introduced.
Efforts to attract ordinary shareholders' attention have been
reflected in the introduction into the report of colours,
photographs, drawings, easy-to-read texts, short subjects and
big titles as in magazines and newspapers. Some companies
have even prepared reports which were exactly on the magazine
model: Peugeot 1985 and Burton in 1986 and 1987 are good
examples of this tendency.
But, it would be wrong to say that the message is still the
same in this new presentation. It is impossible to simplify,
cut, remodel a message, change the focal point and still
leave the content intact. Therefore, from a short somewhat
straightforward message addressed by the directors to the
shareholders, the narrative part of the annual report is now
filled with irrelevant photographs and triumphant speeches on
the development of the company.
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While the narrative section is being manipulated in such a
way, the financial statements become more and more difficult
to decipher. The addition of notes and the increased
complexity of accounting standards are also a reflection of
the increasing complexity of business activities. Too often
now, accounts are considered to be readable by specialists
only (Parker, 1981):
"Neilson and Lind have suggested four possible
reasons why corporations do not try to reach the
average investor:
1- the annual report is little more than a set of
financial statements embroidered with a text and
pictures for window-dressing;
2- small investors are less sophisticated than the
professional investor and therefore demand less in
terms of information;
3- the annual report is seen as primarily an investor
relations vehicle designed to appease security
analysts and
4- a basic technical format has been established for
annual reports in general and corporations are more
concerned with meeting technical standards than with
the ability of the annual report to communicate
effectively to its intended audience." (Parker, 1981,
p. 37.)
However, we must be careful when interpreting such
statements. Readability is normally evaluated by the reading
ability of the least skilled or lowest common denominator. As
an example, Jones (1988) uses the following kind of
readability scale:
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READING	 TYPICAL KIND
EASE SCORE*	 OF MAGAZINE
	
0 - 30	 scientific
	
30 - 50	 academic
	
50 - 60	 quality
	
60 - 70
	
digests
	
70 - 80	 slick fiction
	
80 - 90	 pulp fiction
	
90 - 100	 comics
* Jones index is adapted from the Flesch index.
We see that there is a relationship between the kind of
subject and the facility to be read. It is probably
impossible to express complex subjects in an easy-to-read
form. We must therefore be careful about criticisms of the
readability of financial statements. Not everything can be
expressed in the comic form even if there are some attempts
to express financial statements in a proximate manner with
"cartoon faces" or "pictus" (Smith and Taffler, 1984).
Jones (1988) also suggests that the readability of the annual
report has declined steadily since 1952. However, his
conclusions are based only on a single company case study.
But what is still important is that he concluded that
complexity was not related to the financial situation of the
company as might have been expected. Therefore, we may have
reason to believe that complexity increases to express an
increasingly complex economic reality.
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However, we believe that the proposition that annual reports
and accounts are more difficult to read now may be accepted
mainly in the case of the financial statements. Consequently,
if the interpretation of accounting information has always
been a problem, over the years this situation must have
deteriorated rather than ameliorated.
2.4.2. Ability of Shareholders to Interpret Accounting
Information.
Lee and Tweedie (1977) found a gap between what private
investors believe they understand in financial statements and
what their answers show about their level of understanding:
"While over two-thirds (68%) of respondents stated
that they understood accounting information, tests on
various aspects of the reporting process revealed
that actual knowledge was well below the respondents'
perception of their comprehension. Indeed, under half
of the shareholders knew (i) the usual method of
valuing plant and machinery in the financial
statements (47.9%) ; (ii) where responsibility for
financial statements lay (41.2%) ; and (iii) the
approximate nature of accounting incomes and values
(40.2%) . In only one of the four test of
comprehension of the reporting process (that
concerning the present objectives of annual financial
statements) did a majority (59.3%) of the respondents
show that they understood present practice." (Lee and
Tweedie, 1977, p. 9)
The understanding of financial statements is relatively low
among private shareholders. In fact Lee and Tweedie conclude
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that the chairman's statement is the only part of the annual
report that can be said to be understood by private
shareholders generally.
Institutional shareholders may be barely better than ordinary
shareholders at interpreting accounting information. And,
like ordinary shareholders, they, too, believe they
understand the financial information much better than they do
in reality. Lee and Tweedie (1981) produced the results
provided in Table 4 for their sample of institutional
shareholders.
Table 4
Actual Understanding of Terminology Used Widely
in Reported Financial Statements
Level of	 Depre- Equity Current	 Accrued
understanding Profit ciation capital assets Reserves charges
%
Reasonable 15 23 29 56 50 45
Vague 47 70 60 33 12 03
Poor or none 38 7 11 11 38 52
100 100 100 100 100 100
If we calculate a mean for each level of understanding across
all the items tested, we obtain:
Reasonable 36.3%
Vague 37.5%
Poor or none 26.2%
In an efficient market perspective, the profit figure is
often used as a proxy to estimate cashf lows. In any other
market theory, the profit figure is very important in
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assessing an investment opportunity. However, we see that
only 15% of institutional investors have a reasonable
understanding of the reality covered by the term profit. We
also can note that balance sheet elements are far better
understood than profit and loss accounts ones. In fact, Lee
and Tweedie did make that kind of comparison:
Table 5
Actual Understanding of the Nature of Individual
Parts of the Annual Financial Report
Level of Chairman's Director's Profit Balance Auditor's Funds
underst. report	 report
	
& loss sheet report	 state
account	 ment
Reasonable 85 29 57 74 65 23
Vague 11 31 28 15 18 13
Poor or none 4 40 15 11 17 64
100 100 100 100 100 100
The chairman's report is the most widely understood part of
the annual report and accounts. As we have seen above, the
balance sheet is better understood than the profit and loss
account and the funds statement which provides information on
the cashf lows is understood poorly or not at all by 64% of
the respondents.
Obviously, a study like this one is prone to be criticized at
many levels. We may, for example, express surprise at the
balance sheet, apparently being better understood than the
profit and loss account. Briston (1977) based his criticism
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mainly on the way Lee and Tweedie had defined a 'sufficient'
understanding or a 'thorough' reader. In their response, Lee
and Tweedie (1978) tried some of the alterations suggested by
Briston and concluded:
"Despite the changes in definition suggested by
Professor Briston, our measurement of shareholder
understanding has been shown to be sufficiently
robust to withstand alteration; the overall
conclusions emanating from the study are identical no
matter whether Professor Briston's definitions or our
own are used." (Lee and Tweedie, 1978, p.298)
Whether we take Lee and Tweedie's results at face value, or
even adjust them for Briston's methodological considerations
the conclusion remains that private and institutional
shareholders are not very good at decoding financial
accounting information.
Lee and Tweedie's conclusions could imply some serious
limitations to the efficiency of the stockmarket since, as
pointed earlier, fast circulation and correct interpretation
of the information are necessary conditions of market
efficiency.
However, there are other market participants whose role is
interpretative and through their actions can serve to render
the market efficient. Participants such as financial
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journalists, and perhaps, more relevantly, investment
analysts and in particular stockbroking analysts, may be the
key information intermediaries.
2.5. THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT ANALYSTS
Investment analysts working for stockbroking firms occupy a
privileged position in the stockmarket. They receive
information directly from companies and from several other
sources. On the other hand, they are in direct contact with
investors, particularly large institutional investors. The
analyst plays an essential role in the circulation of
information and allocation of funds in the capital market:
"The financial analyst plays a key role in this
capital allocation process. As a security analyst he
studies and selects industries and companies
interacting with the economist who provides the
general economic framework. As a portfolio manager he
integrates the work of the economist on the outlook
for business and the financial markets with the
securities recommendations of the analyst to make
portfolio selections. These roles are independent and
each contributes a necessary element to the
investment decision. (Norby, 1975, p. 5).
For Cohen et al. (1987) investment analysts constitute the
means whereby the stockmarket can be said to be efficient:
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"It is the thousands of trained security analysts who
are the eyes and ears of the efficient market. It is
the industrious, probing investment analyst who
ensures that relevant information and even rumour and
hypothesis are quickly reflected in the current
price, and who by their collective weight and chain
reaction to prospective trends helps to determine the
future price." (Cohen, 1987, p. 135)
Market efficiency depends on the activities of investment
analysts. As such we focus on security analysts in this
research and their capacity to obtain, interpret and
disseminate information.
There has been an apparent increasing tendency in the bull
markets prevailing until recently for analysts to rely on
company handouts and discussion with key officers rather than
detailed analysis of financial statements. Finance directors
are aware of the dependency of analysts on them. The 3i's
survey quoted earlier, (Table 1), suggests that finance
directors believe they can influence the market valuation of
the company they work for.
The way investment analysts process what accounting
information they do use is equally important here. They may
seem to take it at face value. They no more (if they ever
did) interpret such received information, they appear to just
help it to circulate from one point to another. However,
their filter role is essential for market efficiency. Thus,
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it is important to understand their working methods and
procedures.
2.6. THE WORK OF INVESTMENT ANALYSTS
The number of methods of analysis available to investment
analysts is theoretically limited in number: fundamental
analysis, technical analysis, economic modeling and intuitive
analysis, etc... (Arnold and Moizer, 1984, Firth, 1977).
However, in practice, any combination of such approaches may
be used.
The most frequently used method may be fundamental analysis.
Arnold and Moizer (1984) found that:
"The principal share appraisal technique used by all
interviewees was fundamental analysis. None of those
interviewed mentioned that they used technical
analysis, in the sense that they examined charts
(i.e. graphs of share price against time) in order to
spot various patterns or to identify particular
resistance levels. However, the respondents did
reveal that they compared graphs of market price,
price-earnings ratio and dividend yield for the
company being appraised with the corresponding plots
for the Financial Times All Share Index, thus
indicating that they were perhaps using some of the
principles of technical analysis." (Arnold and
Moizer, 1984, p. 197.)
This method of analysis seems to revolve around the notion of
a 'real' price/earnings ratio calculation and its comparison
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with the actual ratio to identify companies that are under-
or over-valued and therefore that can be recommended for
buying or selling to clients.
However, as pointed out by Arnold and Moizer, the evaluation
of a future P/E ratio is a very subjective operation. Arnold
and Moizer (1984) were unable to find significant
similarities among analysts and concluded that no one seemed
to use a formal model to estimate this ratio.
Cohen et al. (1987) used the questionnaire survey method to
investigate the preference of analysts for the methods they
used. They found the same spectrum of methods employed as
Arnold and Moizer ranging from the sophisticated integrated
economic models to simple rules of thumb to guess the next
year's earnings per share or price/earnings ratio. However,
75% of their respondents concentrated on three variations of
the same basic method:
1) building an estimate of future earnings
2) the simpler current multiplier - actual vs. normal
3) multiplier and growth comparisons between the
stock assessed and its group or industry.
The methods which use present value formulae were ignored by
analysts. Cohen et al. concluded that there is a "wide gulf"
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between theory and practice in the domain of financial
analysis.
Arnold and Moizer also noticed the dependency of analysts on
companies' managers. Investment analysts such as Johnson
(1966) believe that management is of prime importance,
probably the most important variable in security evaluation.
For him, it is the management that will make the success or
the failure of a firm.
No doubt this is a serious argument, however, the assessment
of the quality of management is based on few tangible
elements and, in fact, resides more in the domain of feelings
and impressions than anything else. Therefore, serious biases
of judgement may arise. The same Johnson (1966) for example
relates:
"Thus before I had even entered the company's
offices, I had received a favorable impression of
management. The president had alerted his security
officer at the gate to expect and to admit me. By the
time I had driven from the gate to the parking lot
and had entered the administrative building, the gate
security officer had telephone the receptionist
advising her of my arrival so that when I entered the
front door the receptionist greeted me by name, took
my hat and coat and immediately escorted me to the
president's office. (...). Perhaps consideration of
such seemingly trivial things may appear without
justification but an analyst's ultimate evaluation of
a company - and its management - are predicated upon
impressions received while visiting the company."
(Johnson, 1966, p. 511.)
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Not only do analysts believe that management is an important
variable for investment evaluation purposes but they
critically depend on them for information. Inevitably there
is the tendency to take management's interpretation at the
same time as the information itself. This consultation of
management method may sometimes even replace all other
evaluation procedures. Arnold and Moizer, for example report
about one of their stockbroking firms interviewed:
"The two partners interviewed indicated that their
firm had established the trust of managements in a
number of companies and so they could gauge the
standing and future prospects of a company from these
sources without having to go through the time-
consuming process of detailed analysis. Indeed, the
earnings forecasts used were often the results of the
discussions between the brokers and company
management and they tended to follow the company's
own predictions." (Arnold and Moizer, 1984, p. 198.)
This absence of objective criteria for evaluating quality of
management and consequently the future of companies leads to
a situation where plant visits and business lunches become
the most preferred methods of analysis. Such methods, as
pointed out by Taffler (1984) can lead to analysts revising
their forecasts in the 'good' direction.
Analysts may also possibly use technical analysis. This
consists broadly of extrapolating the future behaviour of
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stock prices from an analysis of past prices only. The
fundamental assumption is that recurrent patterns in stock
price behaviour exist and can be used to predict future
prices (in violation of weak form market efficiency).
Gniewosz (1990), in his Australian study into the way
financial analysts work, followed his subjects for a long
period observing what they were doing during their working
time. He concluded that his analysts did not statistically
extrapolate the time-series of past share price movements,
implying that they did not use technical analysis very
extensively.
He also concluded that evaluation of the future prospects of
a firm was related to future expectations about the
performance of the economy in general, about the industry
forecasts at a more disaggregated level and only in third
place with company specific factors. Analysts, he observed,
seem also to believe in a kind of global psychological state
of the market which leads to equivalent items of news being
interpreted in different ways depending on the particular
market state prevailing. Examples of such states of mind are
illustrated by analysts believing they are in a bull market
or a bear market.
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Day (1986), using a protocol analysis, limited her study to
the use of financial statements by investment analysts.
Because of the nature of the methodology and associated
limited number of subjects (15) as with Gniewosz, care must
be taken in generalising from their conclusions. It is
interesting to note that her analysts asked for a more
informative chairman's report. This may suggest a desire for
company management to interpret its financial statements
directly for them, as such interpretation is the basic
content of the chairman's statement.
Biggs (1984) also conducted a protocol analysis of the
information processing of financial analysts. Inevitably his
sample is also relatively small (11 subjects). However, he
found 7 out of his 11 analysts made their investments
evaluation entirely using historical data. Only 4 out of the
11 tried to evaluate the future value of the earnings
indicators they had chosen. The historical data which were
most popular were financial ratios. Biggs found a relative
uniformity in the data processing behaviour of the analysts,
focusing mainly on the same elements and calculating
essentially the same ratios.
Norby and Stone (1972) suggest the factors influencing the
market value of an enterprise are its financial statement
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content, the level of interest rates, the supply of
investment funds, the perceived ability of the management,
the particular industry in which the firm is located and its
prospects for the future. Among these factors Norby and Stone
rank accounting information in first place. The importance of
accounting information to stockmarket analysts is a key issue
in our research here. We have seen that many researchers and
commentators believe some form of accounting number
manipulation exists. We have also seen that investment
analysts play a central role in making financial and
particularly accounting information circulate. The next
important issue is whether accounting information has any
importance for investment analysts. If accounting information
is irrelevant the question of window dressing becomes very
secondary.
2.7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Investment analysts are arguably the most important
processors of financial information for stockmarket purposes.
Their potential sources of information are numerous. Often,
financial statements are considered as latecomers among them.
Personal contacts and the preliminary announcements
anticipate the accounting information released in the
published accounts.
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Many researchers have addressed the question of the relative
importance of financial statements among the different
sources of information available for analysts. Foster (1986)
ordered the results of Chang, Most and Brain (1983). Other
research focusing on the same question includes Arnold and
Moizer (1984) (AM), and Lee and Tweedie (1977) (LT). We also
asked the same question to our 63 participating stockbroker
analysts. Table 6 provides the ranking of information sources
made by analysts and reported by these different studies.
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Table 6
Sources of Information
Comparative Ranking
ALL
UK
AM
UK
LT
UK
CMB
US UK NZ
Direct company contacts and visits 1 3 3 3 1 3
Preliminary announcements and
annual accounting statements 2 1 1 1 2 1
Interim statements 3 2 2 4 4 2
Previous work and market data
already collected 4
Annual report content other
than financial statements 5 4 5
Trade journals and newspapers 6 5 4 8 5 7
Statistical /macroeconomics
forecasts 7 6 6 - - -
Subsidiaries' accounts 8 - - - - -
Companies' PR/press reports 9
- - 6 6 4
Charts services 10 - - 5 8 8
Other broker's circulars 11 7 - - - -
All = all subjects in our sample (Stockbroker analysts)
AM = Arnold and Moizer (1984) (Stockbroker and bank analysts)
LT = Lee and Tweedie (1981) (Insurance, pension funds, bank, investment
and unit trusts and stockbroker analysts)
CMB = Chang, Most and Brain (1983), (NZ = New Zealand)
Chang, Most and Brain rank the annual reports (financial
statements and narrative sections like the chairman's
report), in first place in the US and in the second place in
the UK. In our study, we drew a distinction in our
questionnaire between the accounts and narrative. Our results
86
CHAPTER 2 ACCOUNTING INFORMATION AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS
seem to indicate that financial statements are far more
important as an information source than the rest of the
annual report. However, the chairman's statement comes first
both for ordinary and institutional investors in Lee and
Tweedie, (1977 and 1981) suggesting these user groups focus
on different information sources to financial analysts.
Table 6 serves to emphasise the primary importance of
financial accounting information to the work of investment
analysts. However, when asked to explain how they use annual
accounting reports, analysts are in conflict. Day (1986), for
example, reports that her respondents found no price
sensitive information in financial statements, using the
accounts as a reference document. We often hear about the
confirmatory role of financial statements. It is difficult to
believe that such a limited role will produce such a high
ranking in terms of importance.
On this question, Zeghal (1984) proposes that financial
accounting information may have two roles: anticipatory and
confirmatory. Interim reports, as they are more timely and
feed into the ultimate annual statements may be used to build
and correct investor expectations about annual earnings. The
annual report then serves to confirm such expectations.
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Chambers and Penman (1984) found that the absence of a
significant relationship between reporting lags and the
variability of stock returns may be indicative of the
existence in the accounts of some specific information not
provided by other sources.
Ou and Penman (1989) find that "accounting earnings and some
of its components capture information that is contained in
stock prices." In addition they find that other information
contained in financial statements to be somewhat successful
in predicting future stock returns. They argue their results
thus attest directly to the usefulness of financial
statements for investment purposes.
Any book on investment or portfolio management will include
a chapter on financial statement analysis (e.g. Higgins,
1984, or Johnson, 1971). Financial statement analysis is
supposed to be "the most obvious source of information about
a company" following Cohen, Zinbarg and Zeikel (1987, p. 94),
and such financial statements are "the source data for the
most basic investment calculations" Christy and Clendenin
(1982, p. 357).
88
CHAPTER 2 ACCOUNTING INFORMATION AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS
2.8 SUMMARY
The two principal competing hypothesis relating to capital
market we have consider in this chapter weight differently
accounting information. The EMH sees financial statements as
a source of information among others while the 'mechanistic'
hypothesis places a greater emphasis on it.
However, the question as to whether accounting information is
used or not by investors is not yet answered. However, in
light of the preceding discussion, there is a strong
presumption that it is. Therefore the quality of this
information, in term of precision and completeness, must be
of some importance.
This is this quality of the accounting information, highly
doubted lately by many commentators (Griffiths, 1986,
Jameson, 1987, Smith, 1992) that, in practice, we will
investigate in the next chapter in order to determine the
amplitude of the problem before looking, in later chapters,
at its potential effect on market participants.
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CHAPTER 3
WINDOW DRESSING IN UK FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL SITUATION
OF THE FIRM
This thesis seeks to test the effect that window dressing of
financial statements may have on the way investment analysts
assess companies' earning power and financial health.
However, any such investigation is predicated on the
existence of window dressing and how serious the problem is.
In the last chapter we discussed, in general terms, why
financial statements might be window dressed and the contexts
in which such manipulations are likely to happen. In this
chapter we explore the degree of window dressing present in
UK company accounts. After exploring the relationship between
the concept of true and fair view and window dressing, we
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analyse 100 sets of financial statements drawn from 50 UK
listed companies for window dressed schemes present.
As we saw in Chapter two, in stockmarket terms the goal of
window dressing is to enhance the image of the firm among
investors. Therefore, we might expect the degree of window
dressing to increase as the financial situation of the firm
deteriorates. (Other reasons, which we do not explore further
here may be such things as anticipated rights issues,
takeovers, etc...)
To establish a correlation between window dressing and the
financial situation of the firm, it is necessary first to
quantify both elements in a way that permits comparison.
In the first section of this chapter we consider the
relationship of the true and fair view with creative
accounting and this is followed by a review of possible areas
in a firm's accounts amenable to window dressing. Section 3.3
describes in detail how the 100 sets of accounts are to be
scrutinized for accounting creativity. The next section
describes our firm sampling procedure, hypotheses and measure
of financial health. Section 3.5 presents our results and
these are discussed in section 3.6. A summary section
completes the chapter.
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3.1 THE LIMITS OF WINDOW DRESSING: THE TRUE AND FAIR VIEW
AND THE AUDITOR
The concept of the true and fair view is integral to any
consideration of window dressing. This is because financial
statements might lead to a biased view of the firm, despite
being drawn up in accordance with GAAP (generally accepted
accounting principles) and accounting standards, due to the
possibilities open to management to select accounting
policies.
The true and fair view concept is both an asset and a
liability at the same time. It is an asset in the sense that
it allows accounting standards to be more general and
consequently to be applicable to a wider range of situations.
It is problematic in that these more general standards can
then be used to allow an unfair view of the financial
situation of the firm.
The question of determining if the set of standards and
procedures used in a particular set of financial statements
is likely to provide a true and fair view is normally
answered by the auditor who is supposed to apply his judgment
to this situation. Consequently, if the auditor does his job
correctly, the degree of generality of accounting standards
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should cause no problems and a true and fair view will
result.
As the "guardian" of the true and fair view, if the auditor
is not a rampart against window dressing, it may be due to a
failure in his work.
Auditors are potentially involved in many conflicts of
interest. They are appointed by management (even if it is on
behalf of the shareholders) and their remuneration is fixed
by the board they have, in effect, to judge. In addition,
management remuneration may also depend to a certain extent
on the auditor's report. As argued by Watts and Zimmerman
(1979), among others, part of the directors' remuneration
figure may depend upon the firm's reported profits, which are
a function, to an extent, of the accounting procedures
selected. The auditor attests to the fairness of these.
Auditors are consequently under pressure from their clients
who are not easy to identify in agency terms:
"Thus, there is pressure to please directors (often
mistakenly referred to as clients, whereas it is the
shareholder who elect the auditors) in order to avoid
losing audits. If the auditor is to resist (...) a
specific rule book may provide a better prop than a
vague injunction to provide a true and fair view."
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1979)
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The accounting profession is in an invidious position.
Professional accountants as a group make standards, apply
these as financial directors, audit the financial statements
as auditors of firms and are responsible for the application
of sanctions against their peers if there is a complaint. If
this situation does not provide potential for conflict of
interest, then what does?
Briloff (1976), in the USA, shows how the auditor may go
along with the application of unacceptable accounting
procedures so the real situation of the firm is not apparent.
Citron and Taffler (1992) in the UK and Kennedy and Shaw
(1990) in Canada have demonstrated the failure of auditors to
qualify the audit report for going concern purposes when
necessary.
On the other hand, the auditor's work is not easy. He is
required to comply with a notion that is vague and ill-
defined and often has limited power in practice. Published
financial statements are the responsibility of management,
auditors have only their report in which to express, in a
predetermined form, their opinion on these accounts.
The "expectation gap" in general may not be attributable only
to a perception of failure by the auditor to act
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independently but also to the weakness of the accounting
standards the application of which he has to verify.
But, whatever the cause, the result is the same: window
dressing of financial statements is possible despite these
being fully audited and accompanied by a clean audit report.
The fact that a set of financial statements is audited with
no adverse comment does not necessarily mean that they may
not mislead.
3.2 DETERMINING OUR WINDOW DRESSING SCHEMES
UK accounting standards are generally relatively easy to
apply. They are often presented in such a way that many
opportunities are offered to those who decide not to comply
with the spirit of the SSAP's. Such freedom is the essence of
flexibility but also of window dressing which becomes a
matter of opinion and as such judgment. Considerable care
needs to be taken in arriving at operational definitions of
window dressing.
The first stage in determining the extent of window dressing
schemes in UK published accounts is to generate a list of
such potential schemes. Our starting point was a detailed
review of texts on window dressing and creative accounting
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(books and articles). Next an analysis of an arbitrary pre-
sample of company accounts was undertaken to relate the
potential abuse of standards as reported by financial
journalists and other observers to the actual accounting
treatments used. Finally a number of accountancy firm
technical partners were interviewed on the relative
importance of the 19 different schemes identified and the
extent to which they could be transparent to skilled
financial analysts.
Structured interviews were conducted with the principal
technical partners of five of the Big Eight UK accounting
firms. These interviews took place at the end of 1988 and
each lasted for around one hour. Table 7 provides the list of
areas focused on during these interviews.
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Table 7
Themes of the Interviewes with Technical Partners
of UK Big Eight Firms
- window dressing of financial statements in general
1- deferred taxation
2- pension schemes
3- extraordinary items
4- tangible fixed assets and current assets accounting
5- merger and acquisition accounting
6- accounting for intangible assets
7- capital and reserves
8- foreign currency
9- off balance sheet financing
- other related subjects they want to talk about
Several different issues were raised in connection with each
of these topics and alternative accounting treatments
discussed. The structured questionnaire employed is presented
in Appendix 1 together with the technical partners'
summarised responses to the issues raised. Obviously we
cannot say that these are necessarily representative opinions
of the accounting profession or even of technical partners
in general as our interviewees were only five in number and
not chosen at random. However as they represent five out of
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the then Big Eight firms, their opinions are important and we
are grateful for their contribution to this research.
Based on the technical partners' responses we had no evidence
of any unanimity on the particular accounting issues
discussed here. When there was agreement on a particular
accounting treatment this was on a specific issue only and
was far from being general. However their responses to
questions relating to the importance and prevalence of window
dressing were relevant and we are able to obtain an overview,
perhaps, of the range of opinion among advanced
practitioners. Table 8 tabulates their responses on a 5
points ordinal scale.
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Table 8
Responses of Technical Partners to Questions Regarding
Window Dressing in General
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1- Problem of w.d. not an not 	 moderate serious very
issue	 serious	 serious
ANSWERS	 2	 2	 1
2- Quality of	 very	 good	 fair	 bad	 very
analysts	 good	 bad
ANSWERS	 1	 2	 1	 1
3- Investment	 never	 rarely sometimes often almost
analysts can be	 always
misled
ANSWERS	 1	 2	 1	 1
4- The market can never	 rarely sometimes often almost
be misled
always
ANSWER	 2	 1	 1	 1
The wide diversity of views demonstrated, will be noted. Our
small sample of technical partners appeared only consistent
in viewing window dressing as a problem. Their views on the
quality of investment analysts were mixed (Q2). There was
some indication they believed (Q3) that analysts were more
easy to fool than the market as a whole (Q4) which may be
considered paradoxical when related to the discussion on the
role of investment analysts in increasing market efficiency
in Chapter two.
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In addition there was disagreement on the issue of the
benefits of generally applicable standards relative to more
tightly defined standards as with the more restrictive rules
in the United States or to a lesser extent, in Canada.
Certain of the respondents argued that the laxity of the
current rules permits controversial practices and therefore,
at the very least, more filters need to be installed to
eliminate or at least reduce such undesirable uses of
accounting possibilities.
All respondents provided examples to the interviewer where
the strict application of a SSAP lead to a false and unfair
view. However in one or two cases these atypical examples
were then generalised and implicitly used to justify other
less obvious and straightforward accounting choices.
General agreement existed on the seriousness of window-
dressing in principle and on the general limits of the true
and fair view concept when applied to particular cases,
however our respondents were not united when possible methods
to stop window dressing were explored. This only serves to
emphasize the complexities of the issues invoked.
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3.3 AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF THE RETAINED WINDOW
DRESSING AREAS
Our study is entirely based on accounting standards as they
were at the end of 1987 and the beginning of 1988. Since that
time, standards have evolved due, inter alia, to such factors
as 1) the end of the bull market and the present economic
depression, which leads investors to focus more on the
financial position of the firm, its accounting numbers and
how they are produced, and 2) a concern among accountants
themselves that the flexibility of accounting rules had led
to serious abuses and controversial practices in a number of
high profile companies.
This section lists the elements of the financial statements
to be analysed in the accounts sampled, how they are
generally treated in the UK and what we define to be
acceptable and unacceptable practices for analysis purposes.
1- Deferred Taxation
British companies use the liability "method" which is
required by accounting standards. This means that an
adjustment is made to the deferred taxation provision each
year to give the best assessment of the future liability as
at the balance sheet date.
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Therefore, not all timing differences will be provisioned, as
in the US for instance. Firms following the "positive"
approach will provision only for those differences that are
considered as having a reasonable probability of becoming a
direct liability in the foreseeable future. However, many
companies choose to take a "negative" approach which consists
in not provisioning for timing differences which are not
likely to crystallize within a reasonable time horizon.
Differences between the two methods arise in uncertain cases
which are not provisioned in the former method but which are
provisioned in the latter one.
Tonkin and Skerrat (1987), in their survey of UK accounting
practices, found both methods of provisioning. Their findings
are presented in Table 9 which is taken from their book.
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Table 9
Deferred Taxation Accounting Policies in 1987
Large
listed
Medium
listed
Number of companies 150 (150) 150 (150)
Accounting policy states that
provision made for timing
differences:
only to the extent that it is
probable that they will
crystallize
except to the extent that it
is probable that they will not
crystallize
66
29
(49)
(41)
62
32
(45)
(51)
in full 4 (9) 5 (3)
99 (99) 99 (99)
No policy disclosed 1 (1) (1)
No deferred tax disclosed (-) 1 (1)
100 (100) 100 (100)
Note: comparative figures from 1986 are shown in parentheses
There is no real difference between their large and medium
size listed companies, however, there is a move between 1986
and 1987 towards the positive method.
Although revaluation of tangible fixed assets, which is
common in the UK, could, in theory, lead to a timing
difference, in practice this liability will not crystallise
while the business continues as a going concern. Therefore,
most companies elect not to provision for this event. In this
study, to remain as conservative as possible, we will not
consider revaluation of tangible fixed assets as an issue. In
the UK, there are two main kinds of reversible differences,
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amortisation vs. capital allowance and accounting vs. fiscal
provisions. For analysis purposes we take an arbitrary lower
limit of balance sheet provision for deferred taxation of 25%
of total reversible differences, below which firm estimates
are likely to be highly questionable.
A 25% minimal provision on timing differences might lead to
a great deal of protestations from practitioners. However, a
100% provision is mandatory in many countries and such a
minimum rate of 25% is quite conservative. We do not consider
the possibility of totally eliminating deferred taxation, as
many practitioners have often proposed, as it is not
currently possible under GAAP. Consequently, we restate every
provision on timing differences below 25% at the 25% level.
2- Pension Contributions
The fundamental goal of the standard settlers in this matter
is as stated by Johnson and Patient (1985):
"The ASC continues to believe that the objective in
accounting for pension costs should be to charge the
costs of pensions against profits on a systematic
basis over the service lives of employees of the
scheme" (Johnson and Patient, 1985, p. 269).
If a surplus is discovered in a fund, it can be used by the
company. Frequently, at least a part of this surplus will be
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used for a contribution holiday. The surpluses are really
accidental and, if there are many companies with such
surpluses at the moment, this is attributable to
exceptionally high investment returns in the recent past, now
being reversed. Therefore, this situation is extraordinary
and must be considered in this way. The situation of
comparability with previous years must also be taken into
account. In our analysis we treat a pension contribution
holiday as an extraordinary item and adjust for its effect on
earnings per share.
3- Extraordinary Items
The first problem relates to the difference between an
extraordinary and an exceptional item. Exceptional items are
included in the profit before tax and consequently in the
calculation of earnings per share while extraordinary items
are excluded from such calculations, (SSAP 6). (But note the
recent FRS3 standard does away with such considerations.)
Following Johnson and Patient (1985), exceptional items are
supposed to:
"(b) Fall within the company's ordinary activities,
but are exceptional by virtue of their size and their
incidence. Examples of such items are abnormal
provisions for losses on long-term contracts, and
significant adjustments of prior-year taxation
provisions." (p. 229).
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Criteria are normality of item plus abnormality of size.
In the case of extraordinary items, we have three basic
principles:
1- the amount must be material,
2- the situation is expected not to be recurrent either
frequently or regularly,
3- and must be outside the ordinary activities of the
company.
These principles are not that difficult to follow. However,
the examples that are provided in SSAP 6 may lead to
confusion and open the door to window dressing if they are
treated as principles and not only as examples.
"(a) The discontinuance of a significant business
segment, either through termination or disposal;
(b) the sale of an investment that was not acquired
with the intention of resale, such as investments in
a subsidiary and associated companies;
(c) profits or losses on the disposal of fixed
assets;
(d) provision made for the permanent diminution in
value of a fixed asset because of extraordinary
events during the period;
(e) the expropriation of assets;
(f) a change in the basis of taxation, or a
significant change in Government fiscal policy."
(SSAP 6)
The first element is among the most ambiguous of all.
Obviously, for a company, the closure of a significant
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business segment is something which happens rarely and which
is extraordinary. This is different to the normal activities
of such a firm with many small subsidiaries which may be
added to, disposed of or closed on a regular basis. We must
agree with Johnson and Patient when they state that "items
that are extraordinary in one company will not necessarily be
extraordinary in another" (1985, p. 231).
For instance, what is the closure of a significant segment of
business in the case of Guinness which had in 1987 over 300
subsidiaries. The sale of some of these subsidiaries cannot
necessarily be equated in any sense to the closure of a
significant segment of business.
Tonkin and Skerrat (1987) give a list of the extraordinary
items they found in their survey of accounting practices.
Table 10 is taken from their book.
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Table 10
Extraordinary items, Differing interpretations
of definitions in 1987
Exceptional Extraordinary Total
Number of items 	 215
Number of companies
	
300
Average items per company	 1
(314)
(300)
(2)
384
300
2
(610)
(300)
(3)
1208
300
3
(1418)
(300)
(5)
%
Foreign currency
(%) % (%) n n
differences	 11 (12) 3 (19) 255 (260)
Goodwill & intangibles
	
4 (6) 2 (26) 185 (141)
Discontinuance, reorgani-
sation and redundancy	 24 (22) 73 (76) 195 (258)
Profits and losses on sales
of fixed assets, investments
businesses or subsidiaries 11 (32) 59 (66) 220 (332)
Revaluation of tangible
fixed assets	 2 (1) 16 (6) 102 (155)
Provisions for losses on
non-fixed assets & long-
term contracts
	 37 (8) 53 (83) 43 (12)
Redemption of loan stocks 	 33 (-) 50 (68) 6 (19)
Employee incentive schemes 90 (95) 5 (5) 20 (22)
Research & development
	
100 (90) - (10) 24 (20)
Insurance and legal
liabilities	 20 (36) 80 (64) 10 (11)
Taxation	 - (21) 63 (74) 19 (19)
Prior year items: -change
of accounting policy 	 - (4) - (4) 28 (25)
-other	 20 (6) 20 (24) 5 (17)
Other	 45 (26) 38 (51) 88 (92)
18 (22) 32 (43) 1208 (1408)
(The numbers into parenthesis are for 1986)
This list, made from 300 companies, corroborates our findings
about the content of extraordinary items in the financial
statements of UK companies. We also can see that
extraordinary items are nearly twice as numerous as
exceptional items: in 1986, extraordinary items represented
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1.94 times the proportion of exceptional items and in 1987 it
was 1.79 times. Therefore, we can imagine that the natural
tendency of a firm's management when facing an item of an
unusual amplitude is to argue it is extraordinary in nature
even when, in truth, exceptional, particularly if it is a
debit item.
Table 10 also shows how the same items are presented both as
exceptional and extraordinary as might be expected
considering different situations pertaining. This situation
follows the vagueness of SSAP 6 on this question. Therefore
the extraordinary items' section of the profit and loss
account provides a field day for those who want to window
dress their financial statements. This realisation would
appear to be the motive for FRS3 which limits considerably
the potential abuse of the extraordinary item category (see
chapter 2).
Following the above observations and a detailed analysis of
our pre-sample firms, a list of acceptable and not acceptable
extraordinary items was drawn up for subsequent analysis.
The following are considered valid extraordinary items:
1- the discontinuance of a significant business segment
2- the expropriation of some assets
109
CHAPTER 3 WINDOW DRESSING IN UK FINANCIAL STATEMENTS...
3- a change in the basis of taxation
4- a provision for the diminution of value of land
5- normally, the cost of a failed takeover
6- remittances from foreign subsidiaries retained by the
local government.
However, the following items, all treated as extraordinary in
at least one set of sample accounts, are not considered as
valid extraordinary items:
1- sale of investment in subsidiaries or associated
companies when not a significant segment of activity
2- provision for diminution in value of a non-current asset,
except land
3- closure costs (except if related to the discontinuance of
a significant business segment)
4- provision for losses on disposal of assets
5- anticipated loss on disposal of certain operations
6- restructuring costs in general (same restriction as 1)
7- rationalisation costs (same restriction as 1)
8- costs incurred by subsidiaries on their acquisition by
the company
9- profit or loss on sale of investment properties or any
fixed assets
10- restructuring of subsidiary companies
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11- goodwill written-down
12- provision for diminution in value of investments
13- pre-production expenditures
14- foreign currency deficit arising on consolidation
15- compensation for loss of office
16- discontinuance of commercial activity when not a
significant business segment
17- loan stock issue costs.
This list is obviously not complete but reflects the kinds of
extraordinary items that can be found in UK company's
accounts. Correctly treated, in our view, items were found
very rarely in the sample firms while unacceptable items
appeared in many sets of financial statements and often for
many years in a row.
4- Tangible Fixed Assets Accounting
Depreciation is a very important issue. The issue must be
considered in two steps: first the principle itself must be
discussed, then the appropriate rate and method must be
considered.
In a going concern, looking at the depreciation number is of
key importance. Tangible fixed assets are not bought to be
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sold and will lose their value in the process of production.
Therefore, except for very special cases, assets must be
depreciated.
However, it happens that companies do not always amortize
their tangible fixed assets. Our pre-sample suggested that
the main area for concern resides in the depreciation of
freehold buildings and long leasehold property. Depreciation
of plant and machinery was less of an issue. Tonkin and
Skerrat (1987) provide a list of reasons firms give for non-
depreciation of buildings and long leasehold property. Table
11 is taken from their book.
Table 11
Fixed Assets: Reasons Given for not Depreciating
Freehold Buildings or Long Leasehold Property in 1987
Large
listed
Medium
listed
Total
Number of companies 150	 (150) 150	 (150) 300	 (300)
%
Reasons given for not depreciating:
Depreciation not material 1 (2) 2	 (-) 1	 (1)
Frequent revaluations 2 (-) 1	 (-) 1	 (-)
MV exceeds NBV 9 (1) 2	 (-) 5	 (-)
High maintenance standards 4 (4) 10	 (7) 7	 (5)
No reason given 1 (3) 4	 (5) 3	 (4)
17 (10) 19	 (12) 17	 (10)
(Note:	 comparative	 figures	 from the 1986's survey	 are shown	 in
parenthesis.)
Similar reasons were given by companies in our sample of 100
accounts.
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The question of the appropriate depreciation rate is more
difficult. One can argue for days on what is the best rate to
reflect underlying economic reality. In many cases, the
conventional 2% rate extends the depreciation over too long
a period in the currrent rapidly changing environment.
For our purposes, we correct for non-depreciation on the
basis of a 2% rate and adopt the usual straight line method.
However, the problem of split depreciation has been settled
in SSAP12 (revised). Johnson and Patient (1985) quote ED37,
the precursor of SSAP12 (revised) that:
"The accounting treatment in the profit and loss
account should be consistent with that used in the
balance sheet. Hence, the depreciation charge in the
profit and loss account for the period should be
based on the carrying amount of the asset in the
balance sheet, whether historical cost or revalued
amount. The whole of the depreciation charge should
be reflected in the profit and loss account. No part
of the depreciation charge should be set directly
against reserves." (Johnson and Patient, 1985, p.67)
It seems clear that split depreciation, even if not formally
named, is forbidden. The expression "whether historical cost
or revalued amount" is clear. Consequently, we have made
corrections for any split depreciation found in our sample.
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Methods for accounting for disposals are not uniformly
presented in financial statements. Often the required detail
on gain or loss is not provided. However, when presented, the
figure is usually correct. Therefore, there are no real
corrections to make from an accounting point of view, the key
issue is one of disclosure. However, anyone seeking to assess
the profitability of a firm must be aware of the possibility
that the firm may sell a large quantity of assets near the
end of the year to maintain its profit level.
5- Goodwill and Acquisition Accounting
At the time of our analysis, to avoid the intentions of
SSAP22, a company was able to structure an acquisition so as
to take advantage of SSAP23 and account for it as a merger,
thereby avoiding the need to recognise goodwill (ED47 and
ED48 were subsequently issued by the ASC in an attempt to
overcome such creative accounting). The acquirer is both able
to register assets at their market value using acquisition
accounting and reduce its equity by writing off share premium
against goodwill through merger relief.
However, the acquiror, if seeking to revamp its profit
number, will generally wish to include the profits of the
acquiree for the full year not just since the date of
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acquisition. Only merger accounting rules allow this.
Therefore, even if acquisition accounting "improves" the
balance sheet, the merger accounting is more flattering for
the profit and loss account. Therefore, some companies will
be interested in presenting an acquisition as a merger which
necessitates payment in shares instead of money. One method
to do so is the vendor placing where there is a distribution
of shares of the new entity to the shareholders of the merged
company, but there is also a third party (a bank normally)
which promises to buy the new shares issued to the
shareholders of the acquired company at a price previously
fixed. A vendor placing arrangement is an acquisition in
substance but takes the form of a merger.
Therefore, for analysis purposes, we
1- make sure, if goodwill is capitalised, that the
amortization value is appropriate (no rule) and taken
,
	 into account in the calculation of the profit before
tax figure.
2- make sure that no goodwill is written off against the
revaluation reserve.
3- make sure that no goodwill is written off against the
share premium account except when generated by the
same acquisition
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4- make sure that any goodwill, once capitalised, will
not be written off against reserves,
5- make sure that there is no merger accounting based on
a vendor placing or any scheme of that category.
6- Intangible Assets
The existence of intangible assets in UK financial statements
is relatively rare. Normally such items are passed through
the profit and loss account in the year in which they are
incurred. This situation applies to purchased goodwill,
rights, licences. However, brands are increasingly being
capitalised and not depreciated.
In this case, we must be sure that any amortisation or
subsequent write off is done through the profit and loss
account in the calculation of the profit before tax and that
any of these goodwill items are amortized as none can have an
infinite life (ED52).
7- Capital and Reserves
In the case of the share premium account we:
1- make sure that the share premium account is not used
for any other purpose save merger relief.
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2- make sure that the cost of issuing preferred shares
or debt is not deducted from the share premium
account.
In the case of the revaluation reserve, which is prone to
manipulation, we will consider as acceptable:
1- diminution due to exchange differences (on tangible
fixed assets previously revalued)
2- diminution due to the sale of tangible fixed assets
previously revalued
3- any increase due to a new revaluation surplus
However, we will consider unacceptable:
1- any split depreciation scheme
2- any decrease due to write off of goodwill
3- any other movement in this reserve.
8- Accounting for Foreign Currency
The appropriate treatment of foreign currency transactions
and translations in financial statements can be very
difficult to agree on. The only apparent trigger for special
analyst attention will be a change of accounting method which
usually leads to increased profit. Such changes, if they are
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not too frequent, are totally "legal", but a financial
analyst must not be fooled by their side effects.
Table 12 reports the results of Tonkin and Skerrat (1987) on
the methods used by UK companies for profit and loss account
foreign currency translation.
Table 12
Foreign Currencies: Translation Methods
Used for Profit and Loss Items in 1987
Large
listed
Medium
listed
Number of companies 	 100 (100) 100 (100)
%
Method used:
closing rate	 40 (49) 30 (49)
average rate	 48 (36) 40 (31)
policy not disclosed 	 9 (13) 15 (8)
97 (98) 85 (87)
No evidence of foreign operations	 3 (2) 15 (13)
100 (100) 100 (100)
Note: comparative figures from the 1986 survey are shown in
parentheses.
We generally note a move towards use of the average rate
method between 1986 and 1987 which, interestingly enough, is
towards the method which in our view is more likely to
produce a true and fair view.
It may happen that some companies decide to adopt the most
favourable method in any year. In this case they would
translate using the more desirable method first, then they
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make the calculation using their habitual method and finally
write off the negative difference directly against reserves.
Such treatment is not acceptable. A firm must be consistent
in its choice of methods which must be justified by some
intrinsic advantage of the accounting treatment itself and
not by the book profits it can generate.
In our analysis if such foreign currency translation is
accounted for on this split basis, the amount taken to
reserves is charged directly against profit.
9- Off-Balance Sheet Financing
There are many methods of off-balance sheet financing. One of
these is to exclude a subsidiary from the consolidated
financial statements. The most common reason given for such
a choice is the dissimilitude in activities. Normally, the
company is industrial or retail and the subsidiary is in the
financial sector. But, most of the time, the subsidiary
finances the firm's sales. Consequently the assets of the
subsidiary are the accounts receivable of the company and the
liabilities relate to the financing schemes for these
accounts. Such subsidiaries are an integral part of the
firm's business and as FRS2 now requires should be fully
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consolidated. To assess the real gearing ratio of a group, we
reconsolidate such subsidiaries in our analysis.
Another scheme, far more difficult to detect, is the non-
subsidiary subsidiary. If a company owns only 50% of the
voting shares of another and does not control the composition
of the board (ED 49, FRED 4), which is easy to manage (Smith,
1992), the latter may be accounted for not as a subsidiary
but as a related company with consequently no obligation to
consolidate. A well known example is Burton's 1988 accounts,
harshly criticized for using such a scheme at the time, when
all the relevant information was disclosed in a note to the
financial statements. Without this note, the criticism may
not have arisen because the situation would probably have
remained hidden. When our analysis took place many such
schemes probably existed. It is certainly a good way to help
improve the gearing ratio, which is such an important measure
for UK analysts.
Another method to influence the gearing ratio is the non-
capitalisation of finance leases. In such cases the
difference can be material and change the gearing ratio
substantially. Finance leases must therefore be capitalised.
However, the effect on the profit and loss account of the
non-capitalisation may be immaterial as the depreciation
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charge added to the interest charge may equalise the rent
paid. (SSAP 21 was only compulsory for accounting periods
commencing June 1987).
The above are probably the most important identifiable
(sometimes) schemes but there are also others of lesser
importance. Some of these involve stocks. A company can sell
its stock to a bank with a promise to repurchase it at a
given date at a price which includes the interest on the
original purchase price paid by the bank over the period.
When a company must conserve such stock for a long period
(e.g., ageing of whiskey) the firm may wish to hide the
financing costs during the period. Where such situations are
discovered during our analysis, we correct the accounts to
include the stocks and their financing costs in the financial
statements.
Finally, contingent liabilities are not always so contingent.
In cases where it is possible to determine the minimum level
of contingent liabilities that will crystallise, we add the
amount in question to the liabilities total and consequently
the gearing ratio is modified.
In the analysis of our sample of accounts, we restrict our
attention exclusively to the above issues.
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3.4 SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
To determine the level of window dressing in UK company
accounts, we had to test the preceeding definitions against
actual accounts. This step requires first the establishment
of an appropriate sample.
3.4.1 Sampling Procedure
Our focus is explicitly on the accounts of fully listed UK
industrial and distribution companies. Our sample of firms
was drawn from the Times 1000 for 1987-88 and companies were
omitted from further consideration using the following
screen:
1- companies currently non-alive
2- companies not UK based
3- subsidiaries, to allow focusing on consolidated or
group wide statements
4- public utilities, as they constitute a special sector
of activity
6- oil and gas companies, because of their specialist
accounting treatment
8- companies specialising in financial services
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A decision on the appropriate size of a sample is always a
delicate matter. Our purpose here was not just to abstract
some numbers from the financial statements selected but to
analyse these in great detail. Thus, we had to keep the
sample within manageable limits of size for analysis
purposes. However, the number of financial statements
examined had to be sufficiently large to allow statistical
analysis. A sample was drawn of one hundred sets of financial
statements from fifty different companies covering, in each
case, two consecutive accounting periods, including the
latest published when analysis commenced. This sample size
appeared to be a reasonable compromise fulfilling both
exigencies.
After eliminating all unwanted companies, every fifth firm
was selected up to 50 in number on the basis of descending
turnover.
A detailed list of the sample firms is provided in Appendix
2.
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3.4.2 Analysis Procedure
Window dressing, as we have defined it, excludes direct
fraud. Most of the time, it is a question of the choice of
inappropriate but advantageous accounting procedures.
In this chapter we seek to assess the degree of window
dressing present in UK company accounts and to relate this
statistically to the financial situation of the firm. To do
this we synthetise a single index of window dressing and
measure financial wealth by Altman's Z-score (1968) adapted
for the UK situation.
Our prior expectations are that we will discover 1) there is
a material level of window dressing present in our sample of
company accounts and 2) the level of window dressing present
will be inversely related to the firm's financial position as
expressed by the Z-score.
Section 3.3 above lists the window dressing areas we analyse
explicitly. The company accounts in our sample were analysed
in a consistent, systematic and structured way.
A pilot investigation of a separate sample of fifteen sets of
financial statements was used to test the investigative
124
CHAPTER 3 WINDOW DRESSING IN UK FINANCIAL STATEMENTS...
approach, refine the list of areas to be considered and
identify the most important issues.
The final version of this list was applied as consistently as
possible to the hundred sets of financial statements in the
main sample.
The analysis of each set of accounts was carefully tabulated
with the detail of the corrections made for every relevant
accounting item within each area of concern recorded.
All the analyses were conducted by the same analyst.
Inevitably, processing ability would be expected to improve
with experience leading to potential problems in terms of
disparity in results between firms. We tried to reduce this
tendency by starting with company number fifty, which was
very much smaller than number one, so that as experience
increased, the companies' financial statements became more
complex. A good illustration of this is that, among the last
five companies analysed in our sample, we find the highly
complicated and controversial cases of Guinness and Thorn-
EMI.
This analytical procedure results in differences between our
definition of the presentation of what is a true and fair
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view of the financial situation of the analysed firms and
what was actually presented in their financial statements.
This difference is exactly what we will term window dressing
in the remaining part of this chapter.
3.4.3 Key Accounting Numbers for Window Dressing Attempts
Some accounting numbers are referred to more often than
others by market participants. If we consider the forecasts
that are published by stockbroking firms, earnings per share
is always given. Also, stockbroking analysts, as we will see
in chapter 5, are very interested in the number of shares and
the dilution factor. This is inevitable given the nature of
their business in buying and selling shares. However, this
reductionist focus may lead to an overemphasis on the
earnings per share number in financial statements with
consequent attempts by firms generally to manipulate this.
Consequently, we will take earnings per share as the
principal target of window dressing in the profit and loss
account.
We derive a window dressing index for the profit and loss
account by recalculating the earnings per share figure (or
the profit after tax before extraordinary items) following
the guidelines enumerated earlier in the chapter and compare
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this to its presented equivalent. The percentage difference
is used as a measure of the degree of window dressing in the
profit and loss account (see below).
In the balance sheet, the most commonly referred to measure
by UK investment analysts and financial journalists is the
gearing ratio. Many potential manipulations of different
balance sheet numbers can impact on the gearing ratio.
We employ the gearing ratio as the key measure targeted for
window dressing activity in the balance sheet. The gearing
ratio is recalculated in accordance with our guidelines
above, and the percentage difference compared with the
presented gearing ratio is termed the balance sheet window
dressing index.
Our two window dressing indices are separately correlated
with the Z-Score, to establish if there is a systematic
relationship between the level of firm window dressing and
the financial situation of the firm. We also combine both
indices to obtain an overall index of window dressing and see
if it can be correlated in aggregate with the Z-score.
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3.4.4 The Measure of the Financial Situation of the Firm
As one of the purposes of our analysis is to compare the
level of window dressing found in a set of financial
statements with the financial situation of the firm, we must
first determine a means for evaluating this.
We employ a UK version of Altman's Z-Score. This measure is
developed from ratio analysis and multiple discriminant
analysis.
We use two UK-based Z-Score equations, each of four ratios
and with very high predictive power (e.g., Taffler, 1983 and
1984). Two models are required, one for the analysis of
industrial companies and the other for distribution firms.
This is because there are differences in financial
characteristics between companies in the two broad sectors.
For our purpose, the Z-Score is taken as a continuum (from
over 10 to below -4) indicating the financial strength of a
firm. If the Z-score is negative the firm is at risk of
financial distress. The industrial quoted model contains the
four ratios enumerated in Table 13.
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Table 13
Ratios of the Quoted Industrial Model
Measure	 Ratio	 Weighting(%) *
Profitability	 Profit before taxation	 53.0
Current liabilities
Working Capital	 Current assets	 13.0
Total liabilities
Financial risk	 Current liabilities	 18.0
Total assets
Short term liquidity No credit interval	 16.0
The no credit interval is defined as:
Current assets excluding stock less current liabilities
daily operating expenses
* Mosteller-Wallace percentage contributions to the power of the model.
The quoted distribution model also contains four ratios which
are detailed in Table 14.
Table 14
Ratios of the Quoted Distribution Model
Measure	 Ratio	 Weighting(%) *
Cash flow	 Cash flow	 34.0
Total liabilities
Working capital	 Debt	 10.4
Quick assets
Financial risk	 Current liabilities	 44.2
Total assets
Short term liquidity No credit interval 	 11.4
*Mosteller-Wallace percentage contributions to the power of the model.
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3.5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Before investigating the general relationship between window
dressing and the financial situation of the firm, we discuss
our findings regarding the overall level of window dressing
in UK company's accounts.
3.5.1 The Level of Window Dressing
Window dressing is supposed to be non-visible, by definition.
Thus, it would be expected that in certain cases, and
depending on the nature of the schemes considered (Craig and
Walsh, 1989), such creative accounting will remain
undiscovered even by the best analyst.
Therefore, the rate of occurence of window dressing schemes
picked up in our sample is not necessarily an indication of
their absolute frequency in the population, but a mixed
indication of their frequency mitigated by their degree of
visibility. As an example, a misclassified extraordinary item
is easy to discover given a good definition of what can be
extraordinary while, at the other extreme, off-balance sheet
financing schemes are very hard to find precisely because
they are kept off-balance sheet.
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Taking into account these limitations, Table 15 presents the
percentage each window dressing scheme represents in our
sample based on the 100 sets of financial statements
analysed. However, we may note that there is often a
dependency between both years analysed for the same company.
A company will not organise a non-subsidiary subsidiary
scheme only for one year. Table 15 presents the results for
the 19 distinct schemes analysed in the first stage of our
analysis, grouped according to the 9 areas described above.
One column refers the scheme to the area as enumerated in
Table 7. Comparison with coverage in Tweedie and Whittington
(1990) and Smith (1992) is also provided. These 19 schemes
were rearranged, merged or deleted for further analysis
purposes (see chapter 5) depending on their frequency, their
materiality and the possibility of replicating the scheme for
testing purposes.
131
CHAPTER 3 WINDOW DRESSING IN UK FINANCIAL STATEMENTS...
Table 15
Percentage of Companies with Window Dressed Items
in their Accounts by Type
Area TW Sm
1. Extraordinary items 	 69%	 3
2. Deferred taxation	 31%	 1
3. Non-depreciation of
tangible fixed assets	 20%	 4
4. Finance lease non capitalised 	 17%	 9
5. Large and unexplained increases
in stocks or provisions to
increase profits 	 15%	 4
6. Non-consolidated subsidiaries
	 8%	 9	 x x
7. Change in the exchange
translation method	 8%	 8
8. Creating profit via assets
disposal	 8%	 4
9. Off-balance sheet financing
in general	 17%	 9
10.Cost of debts charged directly
to the equity	 7%	 7
11.Sale and leaseback of assets
with large profit 	 5%	 4
12 .Non-depreciation of
intangible assets 	 4%	 6
13.Non-subsidiary subsidiaries 	 2%	 9	 x x
14.Misclassified contingent
liabilities	 2%	 9	 x x
15.Split depreciation	 2%	 4
16.Misclassified pension contribution
holidays	 2%	 2
17.False merger	 1%	 5
18.Debts presented as equity	 1%	 7
19.Hidden interests on off-balance
sheet debts	 0%	 7
TW: an x in this column indicates that the scheme was treated by Tweedie
and Whittington (1990).
Sm: an x in this column indicates that the scheme was treated by Smith
(1992).
It is clear that many of these items are associated (8 and
11, for example) and that others would be hardly visible (19
for example).
132
CHAPTER 3 WINDOW DRESSING IN UK FINANCIAL STATEMENTS...
Although in only 9% of the sample accounts could no window
dressed items be picked up it is not easy to use such results
to comment on the importance of the presence of window
dressing in UK financial statements more generally.
However, we can see that those schemes we might expect to be
easily detectable are heavily represented while, going down
the list, the more difficult to recognise schemes are far
more sparse. Consequently, we might expect that the
relationship of our results with reality decreases as our
percentages decrease.
Therefore, we can at least conclude from our analysis that a
large proportion of financial statements contains at least
one window dressed item, as defined here, and that our
results are most likely an underestimation of the true
position.
3.5.2 Window Dressing and the Financial Situation of the
Firm
There is more than one way to compare the level of window
dressing in a set of financial statements with the financial
situation of the firm.
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We have argued above that creative accounting is largely
designed to flatter the EPS and gearing measures which we use
to proxy for profit and loss account and balance sheet
effects.
We use three measures as our window dressing indices, the
first representing the relative degree of window dressing in
the P&L account, viz:- the percentage change in EPS, the
second the equivalent for the balance sheet, viz:- the
percentage change in the gearing ratio and the third a
composite of the two.
The exact definitions of the measures are as follows:
1) WD1 = (PEPS - CEPS) / CEPS
Where: WD1 = window dressing in the profit and loss account
PEPS = EPS as presented
CEPS = EPS as corrected for window dressing
2) WD2 = (PG - CG) / CG
Where: WD2 = window dressing in the balance sheet
PG = gearing ratio as presented
CG = gearing ratio corrected for window dressing
and
	 3) WD = WD1 + WD2 representing an
overall index of
window dressing.
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All three measures are regressed against Z-Score to evaluate
the influence of window dressing on the financial situation
of the firm.
We use the Z-score for the year under scrutiny and also for
the previous year, as a true ex ante measure of financial
risk.
3.5.2.1 Manipulated Earnings per Share and the Financial
Situation of the Firm
Table 16 provides summary statistics for the results of the
regression of Z-Score, at the date of the balance sheet and
at the beginning of the period, on WD1.
Table 16
The Change in the Earnings per Share
and the Z-Score
n	 r	 Sig.
Z-score at balance sheet date 100	 -.08	 .4193
Z-score at the beginning	 100 -.10	 .3284
of the period
We have no evidence that the Z-Score measure of financial
health is significantly related to the change in the earnings
per share figure due to window dressing activity. No attempts
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at elimination of outliers or other modifications of the
variables improved these results.
Therefore, our prior expectation that such a relationship
would exist is not sustained by our empirical results either
on an ex ante or an ex post basis.
3.5.2.2 Manipulated Gearing Ratio and the Financial
Situation of the Firm
This section compares the change in the gearing ratio with
the financial position of the firm. Table 17 shows the
results of the two regressions of Z-score, at the balance
sheet date and at the beginning of the period, on change in
gearing ratio due to window dressing, WD2.
Table 17
The Change in the Gearing Ratio
and the Z-Score
n r Sig.
Z-score at balance sheet date 100 .25 .0119
Z-score at the beginning
of the period
100 .22 .0271
The relationship is significant and positive in both cases.
The sign of the correlation coefficient is, however, positive
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implying that the greater the entent of balance sheet window
dressing the better the resulting Z-score. Such an
improvement in the final Z-score is supposed to be the goal
of such window dressing activity.
However, the significant positive coefficient we have at the
beginning of the period may suggest that companies having a
good Z-score are those who use more window dressing for the
gearing ratio. An explanation would be that window dressing
is a long term solution and that the firms in question have
already used it in previous years to keep their Z-score high.
An analysis covering a large number of years would be
necessary to reach further conclusion on these questions.
This analysis would be consistent with long term strategies
of presentation like those that are implicitely suggested by
the "big bath" accounting theory. Alternatively financially
weak companies may be subject to more detailed monitoring
both by their auditors and the City and may have a reduced
ability to window dress.
However, we may conclude that there is a significant
relationship between the window dressing of the gearing ratio
and the financial situation of the firm.
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Watts (1977) suggested that in the US, the presence of debt
covenants can influence the choice of accounting methods
toward those producing a higher income. Dhaliwal (1980) made
the point that these debt covenants allied with a high
gearing will produce such choices of accounting methods. In
Canada, Labelle (1990) found that firms close to covenant
constraint limits have a tendency to make income-increasing
accounting changes. We can believe that the same phenomenon
exists in UK.
To test for this we correlate the reported gearing ratio with
the profit and loss account window dressing WD1. However, the
correlation coefficient of .06 is not significant at a level
of a = .05.
3.5.2.3 Total Window Dressing and the Financial Situation of
the Firm
If the window dressing found in the profit and loss account
cannot be correlated significantly with the Z-Score, it is
possible that the combined effect with the window dressing in
the balance sheet will produce better results. However, the
multiple regression Z = f(WD1, WD2) added nothing to the
simple relationship between Z and WD2. To take an alternative
approach we add both measures to produce the overall index
WD3 as described earlier and conduct simple regressions
138
Dressing and
of the Firm
100	 -.08
100	 -.10
Sig.
.4160
.3259
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between Z and WD3. Table 18 shows the results of the
regressions of the overall index of window dressing on the Z-
Score both at the balance sheet date and at the beginning of
the period.
Table 18
Overall Index of Window
the Financial Situation
Z-score at balance sheet date
Z-score at the end
of the period
The regressions are not significant. Consequently, our
hypothesis that the overall level of window dressing as
defined here and the financial situation of the firm as
expressed by the Z-Score may be correlated is not sustained
by our results. Nonetheless, there is a positive relationship
between firm financial health and the degree of window
dressing affecting the gearing ratio.
3.6 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
This chapter is in two parts. In the first we explore the
existence and to a certain extent the degree of window
dressing in a large random sample of UK company accounts. The
main purposes are to confirm empirically that window dressing
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is an important issue and then to identify crucial schemes to
work with in later parts of this thesis.
With regard to the definition of window dressing used, we
find evidence of the prevalence of many different window
dressing schemes with significant impact on key accounting
numbers and ratios. These findings are independent of the
hypothesis that such window dressing may be related to the
financial situation of the firm.
However, we did not find any significant relationship between
the level of overall window dressing and the financial
situation of the firm. Nonetheless, there was a strong
statistical relationship between Z-Score and the impact of
window dressing schemes on the gearing ratio.
Some observations may be made at this point. The absence of
a significant relationship both for profit and loss account
window dressing manipulations and the overall window dressing
index compared with the balance sheet may be due to the scope
of such manipulations which are often greater in the balance
sheet even if more difficult to detect. Another disturbing
result is the unexpected positive relationship between Z-
score and the balance sheet window dressing index discussed
above.
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We can suggest several reasons for the absence of an overall
relationship. First it is possible that such a relationship
does not exist. However, if what we have termed window
dressing is viewed in the same way by most people, such an
explanation cannot be possible because another goal for
window dressing will have to be found and we can see no other
than trying to improve the appearance of the financial
situation of the firm.
Consequently, the absence of a relationship in this context
may reside in the definition of window dressing itself. If
what we consider as being window dressed numbers are not
viewed as such by the firm, their use will not be indicative
of any systematic attempt to manipulate accounting
information in an organised and premeditated way. In such a
case what we consider to be window dressing may not be
correlated strictly with the financial situation of the firm
as expressed by its Z-Score.
Another possibility, perhaps more likely, is that the absence
of window dressing as defined by us, would have produced a
deterioration of the Z-Score. Therefore, the use of such
accounting procedures may have the goal of conserving the
level of Z-Score, not improving it. To test such an
hypothesis, it would have been necessary to calculate the Z-
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Score with the corrected financial statements, then to
compare these results with the Z-Scores calculated on the
presented financial statements. Such complex Z-Score
calculations would go far beyond the limits and objectives of
this thesis, even if it may have been the only way to reach
an appropriate answer.
A third possibility may be that the situation of the firm is
not really expressed by the Z-Score. Therefore, when managers
use window dressing they modify financial statements elements
which have no significant impact on the Z-Score. However,
this possibility is weak as we have considered window dressed
elements having an impact on the earnings per share and on
the gearing ratio and profitability and balance sheet
equilibrium are very important elements in the Z-Score
definition. Note however that the conventional gearing ratio
appears nowhere in either model and was not found to be
significant discriminant variable when the models were
developed (Taffler, 1984).
It is more probable that even if the Z-score is a good
measure of the financial health of a firm per se, it is a
poor proxy for how managers perceive the financial situation
to be. Therefore, window dressing may be organised to change
the image of the firm not to improve the Z-score.
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It is also possible, and even probable, that all the creative
accounting present in our sample of accounts was not
discovered despite our in depth analysis (see Craig and
Walsh, 1989). Therefore, our window dressing indices are
lower than what they would have been if all the window
dressing schemes had been accounted for. Such undervaluation
may also potentially explain for the weak relationship we
found between window dressing and Z-Score.
3.7 SUMMARY
We have discovered that window dressing is prevalent in UK
company acounts and a phenomenon potentially able to mislead
investors, providing that accounting numbers are of
importance in their investment decision or used by investment
analysts, for instance.
In the next chapter, as we are ultimately interested in
testing how investment analysts deal with window dressed
financial statements, we seek to evaluate the extent to which
such accounting information as the earnings per share and
gearing figures, is important for investment analysts in
their day to day activity. This evaluation will be done
through a content analysis of stockbrokers' circulars.
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CHAPTER 4
THE USES OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION BY
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS: A CONTENT ANALYSIS
This thesis seeks to explore whether accounting manipulations
impact on the stockmarket by observing the reactions of
investment analysts.
The preceding chapter established the presence of creative
accounting in company financial statements. However, before
exploring the extent to which financial analysts manage to
see through such window dressing of financial statements we
have to establish the importance of published accounting data
generally for financial analysts when assessing investment
opportunities.
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Despite several research studies to date, the relative
importance of accounting information for investment analysts'
decisions is still unclear.
Every ranking of analyst information sources (e.g., Arnold
and Moizer, 1984; Lee and Tweedie, 1977; Chang, Most and
Brain, 1983) confirms the importance of accounting
information for investment analysts. However, other
researchers, using questionnaire or direct observation (e.g.,
Day, 1986; Gniewosz, 1990), produce conflicting results which
suggest that the annual report and accounts may be useful
only for corroborative purposes and contains no price
sensitive information.
To overcome the problems inherent in such methodological
approaches as those of Day and Gniewosz, we focus here on
stockbroker circulars, which are the products of the
investment analysts' work. Because these documents make
formal recommendations to investors e.g. to buy, to hold or
to sell, and present the underlying reasoning supporting
their recommendations, they should reflect the essential
factors used by investment analysts to discriminate between
investments of different quality. We adopt a content analysis
approach to textual analysis as the most appropriate
methodology to identify both the relative importance of
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different information sources and the reasoning underlying
analyst judgements.
The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the
method of content analysis and how it will be applied to meet
our specific needs. The following section reports on the
analysis of two pre-samples of data, used to formulate our
underlying models. In the next sections the data and
statistical methods are described and hypotheses laid out.
The fifth section reports the results of the main analysis
and is followed by the findings. The chapter finishes with
some conclusions.
4.1 CONTENT ANALYSIS
Whereas traditional linguistics is limited to the study of
sentences or elements appearing within the limits of the
sentence, content analysis can be viewed as a form of textual
linguistics. Any structure larger than the sentence, a
paragraph or the whole text for example, is, from the
linguistic point of view, only a concatenation of sentences.
This traditional view implies that a detailed analysis of
each sentence in a text will uncover the essential structures
or meaning of this text. Other schools see a text as more
than a series of sentences and as a complete structure in
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itself that can and must be studied as a whole. A new
linguistic approach to the study of texts is thus needed.
Content analysis is based on the idea that communication is
a complex activity and that messages are not simple but
compound, their understanding being influenced by all of the
source, receiver, vehicle and social environment in which
they occur.
Gibbins (1976) classifies these components into five
essential categories:
1- Source: influences the communication process by its
credibility, attractiveness, power, etc...
2- Message: this is not straightforward but its style,
organisation, etc... influences the way it is
perceived,
3- Channel: this is sometimes called the "medium" and
influences the communication process through its
own characteristics such as the degree of noise
added to the message, the prestige it is perceived
to carry (an article in an academic journal
compared with one in a professional magazine),
4- Receiver: is influenced by personality variables,
degree of understanding of the question, perception
of the source characteristics, etc... (the ability
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of institutional investors to interpret accounting
information contained in company accounts, for
example),
5- Destination: (situation), this encompasses the
environmental and social factors in the
communication process and relates to the social
state of mind and the "weltschauung" of the group
to which the receiver belongs.
Thus, the source is probably as important to the overall
content of a message as the individual words themselves. In
communication theory in general, and more specifically, in
financial information (e.g. Bailey, 1981: Smith, 1972), the
source's credibility is a major component in the
communication process.
Consequently, an exhaustive analysis of a communication
process will require an investigation at many different
levels. The source's influence on the perception of message
by a receiver is not only recognised by scientists but is
also part of the conscious or unconscious understanding of
the source by itself. Therefore, we can expect that the
source will seek to influence the text (or speech) in order
to make it more easily or more strongly received. Such
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effects are, to a great extent, described by rhetoric and
widely used, inter alia, in the advertising industry.
We can partition the communication process into two parts: 1)
denotation or what is basically said in the message (if it
can be isolated) and 2) connotation or all that is conveyed
through the message.
This fundamental distinction is representative of the idea
that meaning is an aggregated construct which consists of two
parts viz:- a strong nucleus representing the essence of what
a term means or denotes (the unavoidable part) and all that
the term suggests, or connotes, according to the context of
the communication, the receiver's characteristics, etc.
Parry (1967) describes the function of a word (sign) as
denotation while connotation is related to the attributes of
the word. The distinction is also made, though more simply,
by Vestergaard and Schroder (1985) who use the labels of
meaning and of content. For them, meaning is the complete
sense of a word given by the context, the structure, the
rhetoric, etc..., while content refers to a word in its
limited sense.
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4.1.1 Manifest Content Analysis
There are two basic types of content analysis. The first
concerns itself with the discovery of the "non-said" in a
text, the underlying system of ideas which tends to influence
more than inform. This is where modern content analysis
started, by analysing the underlying ideology of newspapers
(Simpson, 1934) and propaganda during the war.
This perspective places the essential meaning outside of the
text:
"Clearly, the way in which a particular man uses a
word may not tell very much about the word. But it
can tell a lot about the man." (Carney, 1972, p. 87)
Often this approach is not defined as a description of the
manifest content (denotation) of the communication but, as a
discipline where, more than the content per se, the larger
process and affects of communication (connotation) are of
interest to the analyst.
The other kind of content analysis focuses more precisely on
what Berelson (1952) terms the manifest content. This relates
more to the argument rather than the qualities of the source,
context and receiver. This method is more convenient for
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certains type of language or expression, notably for
technical language. The emphasis here is on the analysis of
denotation.
4.1.2 Accounting Language
There is a fundamental difference between a technical and a
natural language. Highly specialised languages, like computer
ones, have only denotative and limited meaning. In a computer
language, a word can have only one meaning and such a word
employed in a wrong context will be rejected by the machine.
Therefore, no approximation is possible. To construct such a
language, even if it uses words borrowed from natural
language (e.g. English) all possible meanings are reduced
down to just one e.g. commands COPY or DELETE in the DOS
language have only one use. The same words used in a natural
language will be more or less tolerant to different meanings.
Accounting language may be defined as a semi-technical one.
Even though a word is not exclusively limited to a single
meaning, as in a completely technical language, in accounting
communication the meaning of a word is still more limited
than in a natural language. For example, we normally
understand the general term "profit", but without being
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specific, we can use it to mean profit before tax, operating
profit, net profit. In a computer environment, the word
profit has to have only one identified meaning. In social
intercourse the word profit would have a far more general
meaning.
The more the proliferation of meanings is controlled in a
language, the less the use of this language will express the
source's characteristics: the words used are purely
functional and they possess no non-functional attributes.
Financial analysts use a specialised semi-technical language.
Therefore we focus, in our analysis, on the logic and nature
of their arguments and what is said explicitly.
4.1.3 Texts and Methods
A scientific procedure must be replicatable in the same
experimental conditions and always lead to the same results.
This reproducibility of results is the characteristic that
best defines the scientific method. In content analysis, this
is ensured by repeated codification of text (Krippendorf
1980) with all differences being investigated. When working
with a computer, uniformity of coding by pre-defined
categories is ensured.
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However, such codification (unitization) requires first the
development of an underlying analytical structure that will
depend on the questions the researcher wishes to ask of the
text. Different questions will imply different frameworks of
analysis and, consequently, different ways to define the
units of analysis in the text. No general procedure can be
applied to all texts.
Each content analysis exercise must first define its
parameters. These "rules" will express how the data collected
from the text will relate to the goal of the analysis. This
target notionally constitutes the dependent variable; the
data being organised will become the independent variables.
The need for such organisation stems from the fact that the
basic goal of any content analysis is to make inferences
(Krippendorf, 1980; Carney 1972).
In practice content analysis is composed of a hierarchy of
units. First, the sampling unit must be defined (Krippendorf
1980). The sampling unit is composed of recording units which
become the basic units for the analysis.
Krippendorf (1980, pp. 60-61) suggests five recording unit
categories:
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"Despite their functional differences, most content
analyses use one or more of five different ways of
delineating and identifying these units:
.physical units
.syntactical units
.referential units
.propositional units (and kernels)
.thematic units."
Physical units are the most easily recognizable among those
mentioned by Krippendorf: a book, a report, a letter.
Syntactical units are defined by the grammar. In this
category the word is the simplest and smallest recording
unit.
Referential units are defined according to referents. The
analysis classifies together items relating to the same
object: England, Mrs Thatcher's country (ignoring connotative
association), etc.. Creating propositional units is a way of
restructuring sentences into a simple standardized form.
Thematic units, finally, are identified by their relationship
with pre-determined ideas. They are, however, difficult to
use although often very useful.
"Thematic units require a deep understanding of the
source language with all of its shades and nuances of
meaning and content. While it is often easy for
ordinary readers to recognize themes, it is generally
difficult to identify them reliably. Although the
purpose of the research is important in judging which
kind of units are most meaningful, for many content
analyses thematic units are probably the most
preferable." (Krippendorf, 1980, p.63).
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Bardin (1977) suggests a number of different content analysis
methods including evaluative analysis. This evaluative
assertion hypothesis was investigated notably in Osgood,
Saporta and Nunnally (1956) and Osgood (1959).
Measurement of attitude is conducted on two axes: direction
and intensity. Direction measures the attitude toward an
object or a situation; it may be represented by a scale going
from totally unfavorable to totally favorable with a certain
number of intermediary positions. Intensity measures the
strength of this attitude towards the object: from totally
negative to totally positive.
Evaluative analysis differs from thematic analysis in terms
of its goal: while thematic analysis focuses on the presence
of themes, measurement of attitude focuses on the evaluative
content of themes.
We are only interested here in denotation, i.e., the
different logical arguments leading to the buy/sell/hold
recommendations on stocks made by stockbroking analysts. The
sampling unit is the stockbroking circular. We are not
interested in the source per se (the analysts who write the
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circulars) even if we are interested in differences between
the collective sources, different stockbroking firms.
For this reason, methods of content analysis which are mainly
psychoanalytic or which focus mainly on the source of the
communication will be discarded (Bardin, 1977).
We are interested in the manifest content not in the hidden
one; thus a thematic analysis is appropriate. Our approach to
content analysis is first to classify the elements of the
circulars' content, measure their importance in terms of
their frequency of occurence in the text and, then,
investigate the statistical relationship between such
frequencies and the different analyst recommendations made.
4.1.4 Theme and Rheme
The theme is usually the subject of a sentence, and what is
said about the theme can be termed the rheme (Vestergaard and
Schroder, 1985). In the sentence: "Accounting is an art and
a science", the theme is "accounting", which is also the
subject of the verb, and the rheme, what is said about the
theme, is "is an art and a science".
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Therefore, the theme will usually be a noun placed at the
beginning of the sentence, before the verb. Any other
sentence structure is viewed as changing the focal point in
the sentence and consequently, as 'marked' (Halliday, 1985).
Duchastel, Paquin and Beauchemin (1989) found 83.3% of
sentences, in their sample, unmarked. If the texts they
studied are representative for our purposes it may be that
recognition of the theme of a sentence by its syntactical
position is possible. By corollary, that a theme is marked,
may be an indication of the importance given to this
particular theme by the source. Such quasi-constant
syntactical patterns lend themselves to computerised analysis
of thematic structure.
In essence, the noun carries the thematic content of the text
while the verb and adjective carry the rhematic one. In our
analysis, when profit is the theme, there may be many rhemes:
profit can be equal, better or worse than what it was in the
past and it can be expected to be of one of these three
categories in the future. That is why it may be possible, in
the kind of texts we are interested in, to reduce all the
possible rhemes into three categories: positive, negative and
neutral.
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Two alternative approaches to content analysis are adopted
here, one with evaluative categorization of the rhemes and
one focusing only on themes with, as an addition, a
thematisation of two rhemes: positive and negative.
4.2 CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CIRCULARS: PRE-SAMPLE ANALYSIS
Pre-samples are used in content analysis to develop the set
of categories to be used in the analysis of the main sample
of texts (Bardin 1977, Krippendorf 1980). Such samples must
come from the same population, but can be limited in size.
Two separate pre-samples were used to explore two different
content analysis strategies. The first pre-sample consisted
of 12 summary sections of stockbroker circulars from three
randomly selected stockbroking houses, with either clear
"buy" or "hold" recommendations. The second consisted of 12
sets of complete circulars from the same stockbroking houses
providing us with the sample of circulars employed in the
main analysis.
4.2.1 Pre-sample 1: Manual Analysis of Recommendation
Sections
All stockbroker circulars are similar in format with the
first page providing a summary of the full document and
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encapsulating the arguments underpinning the recommendation.
Consequently, it was pertinent to focus on this section of
the circular in the initial stage of our analysis.
The first pre-sample was used for exploratory purposes and
was selected without any sophisticated sampling procedure.
The criterion for selection was to use circulars, available
at the British Science Library, originating from three
brokers: Alexander, Laing and Cruickshank (ALC), Sheppards
(Sh) and Barclays de Zoete and Wedd (BZW). Thirty one were
found; none had an explicit sell recommendation. Only 12 had
straightforward recommendations, 6 'buy' and 6 'hold'. We
worked with these twelve circulars.
The 12 companies with circulars retained for analysis are
listed in Table 19 with recommendations
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Table 19
Firms in the First Pre-Sample
Name Recommen- Stockbroking
Firmdation
1- G.E.C. hold ALC
2- Foseco Minsep hold ALC
3- Avana hold BZW
4- Sainsbury hold BZW
5- W.M. Low hold BZW
6- Matthew Hall hold ALC
7- Sainsbury buy BZW
8- Hillsdown Hldg. buy Sh
9- Hillsdown Hldg. buy BZW
10- Plessey buy Sh
11- Plessey buy ALC
12- G.E.C. buy Sh
The method of analysis adopted followed Krippendorf (1980)
and consisted of the following steps:
1- cutting of the text into recording units containing only
one theme and its corresponding rheme
2- extraction of themes
3- weighting of themes appearing in the text in terms of
their importance in the complete sentence (Smith, 1990)
4- assessing the relationship between the themes and the
recommendations.
The first phase of this analysis consisted of cutting the
texts into thematic units containing only one theme. Every
word in the text is included within a unit, nothing is left
out.
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Then, following Smith (1990), each unit was attributed a
weight depending upon the number of themes contained in the
originating sentence.
In this type of analysis, the sentence is viewed as the basic
constituent of the discourse. So, if there is only one theme
in a sentence, this theme is attributed a weight of 1; if
there are two themes, their value will be .5 each, and so on.
This weighting system is congruent with normative grammar
which prescribes that only one idea be carried in a sentence.
If the idea being conveyed in a sentence is simple, the
sentence will have only one theme; if the idea is complex,
the sentence will contain many related themes (propositions).
The average sentence contained 2.12 themes.
Five thematic categories were sufficient to classify all the
units created by this procedure. These thematic categories
were:
- GROWTH
- MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGY
- FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
- PROSPECTS AND CONTRACTS
- TRADING CONDITIONS
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If, for analysts, such general headings are essential
considerations in their judgemental process of companies, we
would expect to find these themes in every circular, whatever
its recommendation. But, in order to describe the content in
a more precise manner, we need then to add some qualities to
these categories. In an evaluative context, three broad
'qualities' can be associated with a theme: positive, neutral
or negative. For example, for the theme FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
we could assign qualities.
QUALITY	 RECORDING UNIT (examples) 
Positive	 "Profits rose this year"
Neutral
	
"The profit figure was
released yesterday"
Negative	 "Profit was down by 20%"
We are in an evaluative situation with stockbroking analysts
seeking to determine the value of a possible investment. In
such a situation we would expect that the qualities
associated with the theme (financial performance) will differ
depending on the situation of the company, and that expected
financial performance will have a direct relationship with
each recommendation: positive-buy, neutral-hold and negative-
sell. An examination of these frequencies broken down by
quality and recommendation suggested that such an approach to
analysis on an extended sample might prove fruitful.
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4.2.2 Pre-sample 2: Computerised Analysis of Complete
Circulars
Our second pre-sample analysis had three purposes (1) to test
out the feasibility of working with complete circulars; (2)
to explore the use of a computerised content analysis
approach and (3) to try out alternative methods of thematic
analysis. The analysis was conducted using a computer program
called S.A.T.0.. Stockbroking circulars analysed were
selected on an ad hoc basis from four of the five
stockbroking firms providing the main data sample. Each firm
provided us with three circulars, a long, a medium length and
a short one. Table 20 lists the firms covered by the
circulars analyzed with the recommendation, the size, the
length and the number of words.
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Table 20
Firms in the Second Pre-Sample
Name	 Recommen- Size Length Number Date Ref*
dation	 of Words
1- Christies Intl. hold L 16p. 5,288 12-89 C5
2- MB Group hold M 12p. 1,634 11-89 C6
3- Amersham sell S 4p. 1,352 11-89 C10
4- Argyll buy L 17p. 7,234 01-90 Cl
5- Ferranti hold M 10p. 3,287 01-90 C7
6- Godfrey Davis buy S 4p. 1,573 02-90 C2
7- GEC Plc buy S 4p. 1,290 01-90 C3
8- Next sell M 6p. 2,651 10-89 C11
9- ICI sell S 4p. 1,872 11-89 C12
10- Unilever buy S 4p. 1,260 02-90 C9
11- Marley buy S 3p. 1,744 08-88 C8
12- BBA Group buy M 6p. 1,681 05-89 C4
Ref* Reference to circulars in Table 21.
It was impossible in practice to find a long circular
produced by each firm. We may also notice that the difference
between a medium length and a short circular, which is
obvious in term of number of pages, is very much less in
terms of the number of words because of the space occupied by
additional tables, graphics and layout considerations.
4.2.2.1 The S.A.T.O. Programme
S.A.T.O. ("Systeme d l analyse de textes par ordinateur" or
System for Analysing Texts by Computer) is a computer
program specially written for content analysis purposes
(Daoust, Dupuy and Paquin, 1989).
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There are 6 basic routines in SATO. Daoust, Dupuy and Paquin
(1989) describe these as follows:
"Lexicon generation, compiling each occurence of each
form in the text or parts therein.
Concordance listings, i.e. the listing of textual
segments in which appear one or several words.
Word counting, i.e. the tally of words in a sequence
of textual segments: sentences, paragraphs, etc.
Automated analyzers applied to the text in order to
generate several interpretations of said text:
LISIBILITE supplies various indexes of reading
fluency/difficulty of the text;
PARTICIPATION allows the user to evaluate the
importance a given class of words in a
body of sub-texts.
DISTANCE gives a measure of lexical contrasts
between various texts. This algorithm
can also help in locating words or
class of words that contribute most to
distinguishing these texts
DECRIRE can ascertain the distribution of a
property on the text or lexicon.
Finally, the user can create his own analyzers
by combining the latter primitive tools. The
analytical sketch produced could then take
the form of a procedure summoned by the
EXECUTER command.
Categorization commands can assign values, (...), to
the words or forms of the text:
PROPRIETE allows the user to define a new
property, delete or modify an existing
one. SATO is equipped with a legacy
mechanism: a new property can inherit
values from the mother property; a
lexical property can be "projected" onto
the text; the textual (symbolic)
property can be "abstracted" at the
lexical level;
VALEUR assigns a value to one or several words
or forms;
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DICTIONNAIRE allows the user to consult a
thesaurus already on file:
CONCORDANCE can also assign values to words
in a given context of phrases or co-
occurences.
Last, there is a full-screen categorizer that can
easily annotate any word or lexical form." (Daoust,
Dupuy, Paquin, 1989)
These are the facilities provided by the program used in the
course of our analysis.
4.2.2.2 Analysis Procedure
In this phase, we sought to develop some simple strategies to
analyse such texts by computer.
Sentences, or part of sentences (recording units), are
separated into two elements: a theme and a rheme. The theme
in the unit is normally carried by the noun placed in the
subject position (before the verb and the object).
Consequently, a general theme, in a text, will be manifest by
a series of nouns, a paradigm in the etymological sense of
the term. For each general theme, the nouns are listed. For
example, the theme: PROFITABILITY might be represented by:
PROFIT, PROFITABILITY, OPERATING MARGIN, etc.
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By itself, and most of the time, a noun does not carry any
positive or negative denotation; however, it can carry
positive or negative connotations depending on the context.
Therefore, if we only use words representing themes, it will
not be possible to say if, in the above example,
profitability is negative or positive.
But, it may be possible that reference, per se, to specific
themes, regardless of their positive or negative aspect,
might be enough to discriminate between the different
recommendations.
However, to ensure that potentially important positive or
negative ideas are not lost, we add to the analysis two
specific themes: "positive" and "negative", to convey such
ideas. Since positivity and negativity are part of the
rhemes, the words representing these themes will obviously be
verbs and adjectives.
Words like 'collapsed' in a financial context, will always be
associated with profits, margins or share prices, but never
with costs. Therefore, we classify this word within the
negative theme.
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A priori we would expect that a circular carrying a sell
recommendation would be differentiated, inter alia, by a
greater number of overall negative mentions.
Using such an approach, it is possible to use the computer
program directly to analyze word frequencies without, in most
cases, the need to look at the word in its context to
identify its meaning. If this approach proves to be
operational, we would have a relatively simple computerised
model for analysing circulars without the need for detailed
textual analysis by the researcher.
4.2.2.3 Thematisation Process
All words in the text were listed by SATO. From this listing,
the researcher selected and appropriately grouped together
into common themes every word, as broadly determined,
relating to business or finance. Words related in general
with the ideas of positivity and negativity were also
included under these labels.
This manual procedure generated a series of themes:
Ti: COMPANY DESCRIPTION: group, company, division
T2: FINANCE: equity, gearing, share, capital
T3: REPORT: pre-tax, accounting, assets, charge
T4: PROFIT: margin, benefit, contribution, return
T5: GROWTH: development, expand, investment
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T6: MARKET: clients, customers, sales, demand
T7: FUTURE: forecast, new, expectations
T8: MANAGEMENT: productivity, competitive, restructuring
T9: POSITIVE: improvement, raised, health, strong
T10:NEGATIVE: lower, discount, difficult
In this way, we are able to index the words in each text with
the label corresponding to the theme they represent.
The next stage is to calculate for each circular the theme
participation rates to constitute the dependent variables in
our analysis. Each variable (the ten themes) is derived as
the number of mentions of the theme divided by the total
number of words in the circular.
Table 21 gives the thematic frequency rates for each circular
separately, derived using the PARTICIPATION routine of SATO.
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Table 21
Rates of Participation of Themes
in Stockbroker's Circulars by Recommendation
Ti T2 T3 T4 TS T6 T7 TS T9 T10
Buy Cl .007 .010 .005 .002 .003 .013 .011 .021 .002 .008
C2 .030 .016 .001 .004 .001 .006 .015 .028 .004 .007
C3 .019 .007 .005 .009 .002 .022 .007 .017 .007 .008
C4 .018 .020 .001 .007 .001 .013 .017 .010 .006 .008
Average .019 .013 .003 .006 .002 .014 .013 .019 .005 .008
Hold CS .023 .021 .005 .009 .005 .028 .007 .018 .008 .005
C6 .009 .008 .010 .015 .001 .045 .030 .021 .003 .006
C7 .017 .014 .003 .005 .001 .029 .012 .021 .004 .003
CS .005 .010 .003 .002 .003 .014 .015 .019 .003 .006
C9 .014 .009 .009 .002 .002 .026 .013 .021 .005 .009
Average .014 .012 .006 .007 .002 .028 .015 .020 .005 .006
Sell C10 .009 .005 .002 .005 .006 .022 .005 .018 .006 .010
C11 .009 .003 .002 .002 .012 .034 .010 .016 .014 .006
C12 .013 .012 .004 .004 .005 .040 .013 .025 .008 .003
Average .010 .007 .003 .004 .008 .032 .009 .020 .009 .006
Despite the limited number of observations, we applied one-
way ANOVA to test for differences in average theme
participation rates across the recommendations. Table 22
provides the resulting F statistic and the level of
significance for all the 10 themes. The null hypothesis in
each case is that there is no difference between the
recommendations.
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Table 22
Results of Analysis of Variance of
Theme Participation Rate by Recommendation
Theme Significant
at a = .05
Tl:Company description 1.15 .36
T2:Finance 1.48 .28
T3:Report 2.08 .18
T4:Profit 0.47 .64
T5:Growth 7.43 .01
T6:Market 4.17 .05
T7:Future 0.80 .48
T8:Management 0.05 .96
T9:Positive 3.31 .08
T10:Negative 0.89 .45
Two themes: GROWTH and MARKET, appear to have different
frequencies across the three different recommendations. These
two themes are associated with the future prospects of the
firm (GROWTH) and the present trading environment (MARKET),
two elements often referred to as important by investment
analysts on a conversational basis. These results suggest
that some of the themes we have isolated may be useful as
variables in a model discriminating between the content of
circulars carrying different recommendations.
4.3 HYPOTHESES, DATA AND STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY
Given the results of our pre-sample analyses, we were then
able to conduct the main analysis.
171
CHAPTER 4 THE USES OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION...
4.3.1 Hypotheses
A casual examination of stockbrokers circulars reveals that
the same sentences are taken from earlier circulars even if
the recommendations differ. Because of this we are forced to
question whether logical analysis drives the recommendation
or if analysts come to a recommendation intuitively and then
write the text to accompany this. We would expect that if
markets are efficient, analysts must use different reasoning
and thought processes to arrive at their investment
recommendations. To identify the principal information items
used by analysts when evaluating a company, we test whether
these differ across different recommendations.
Our first hypothesis is:
Hl: INFORMATION ITEMS APPEARING WITH HIGH FREQUENCY IN
STOCKBROKERS' CIRCULARS DIFFER ACROSS DIFFERENT
RECOMMENDATIONS
Having explored the underlying structure of analyst reasoning
in this manner, we want to know if accounting information
plays an important part. Consequently, our second hypothesis
is:
H2: ACCOUNTING INFORMATION PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN
INVESTMENT ANALYST DECISIONS
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Both previous hypotheses are based on the assumption that
different stockbroking firms' circulars will use common
approaches in coming to a particular recommendation. We
finally test this assumption explicitely and assess the
possibility that firms use information in different ways and
build their conclusions around different information items.
The third hypothesis is thus:
H3: STOCKBROKING FIRMS DO NOT PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE SAME
INFORMATION ITEMS IN COMING TO THE SAME RECOMMENDATIONS
4.3.2 Sampling Procedure
The main sample was drawn from the circulars of five London
stockbroking firms with a clustered random sample of
circulars selected within each firm.
The firms, were selected on the basis of 1) their being
located in the City of London 2) their size and 3) their
willingness to participate in our study. The six largest
London stockbroking firms were contacted and five
participated in this study by letting us sample their
circulars. These firms are the same ones as those where we
conducted the experiment reported in Chapter five.
Circulars were sampled according to the following criteria:
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(1)	 straightforward	 'buy',	 'hold'	 or	 'sell'
recommendation, or, in a few cases, a more complex
recommendation equivalent, according to the head of
research of the respective stockbroking house, to one of
the three basic recommendations. For example a 'buy below
a certain price' may be a disguised 'sell'
recommendation.
(2) A minimum of five circulars for each of the three
recommendations from each participating house. This was
for meaningful statistical analysis purposes and
circulars were selected randomly, independently of firm
or circular size.
(3) Industrial or distribution firms, not financials, to
ensure a degree of comparability.
Circulars meeting these three criteria were sampled from the
summary lists of recommendations on firms followed published
monthly by each stockbroking house. The books used were dated
between December 1989 and February 1990, except for one house
which was restructuring its research department at that time
and where we had to wait until June 1990.
Recommendations are not distributed equally across
categories. In fact if we consider only the clearly defined
recommendation categories across the 5 books (an average of
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430 companies per book) the frequencies of each
recommendation are:
BUY	 29%
HOLD	 60%
SELL	 11%
The circulars selected were of all lengths, from two pages,
in which two houses are now specialising, to 20 pages,
produced sometimes when a full and detailed report is
necessary to account for all important events impacting on a
particular firm in a particular period.
The 105 circulars are distributed by firm as follows:
1- James Capel	 19
2- Kleinworth Benson Securities 	 22
3- S.G. Warburg Securities
	 22
4- Barclays de Zoete Wedd 	 21
5- County NatWest	 21
The following distribution of the recommendations, for the
105 circulars in our final sample, are as follows:
BUY	 38	 (36.2%)
HOLD	 37	 (35.2%)
SELL	 30	 (28.6%)
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4.3.3 Data Input
The circulars were entered into the computer by an Optical
Character Recognition system (OCR). Tables were removed
before presenting the texts to the machine. Although strictly
speaking tables are part of a text and contain lexical
elements, they are usually only provided to support the
underlying arguments in the text. Thus including them in the
analysis, apart from requiring a separate and parallel
treatment, may well reduce the efficiency of the content
analysis by introducing tautology and noise.
Having been scanned by computer, the texts were revised
manually and the reading errors duly corrected.
4.3.4 Model Variables
The results of our pre-sample analysis suggested two
different models for the analysis of our main sample.
The first model was established manually and categorised
themes on a tripartite basis: positive, neutral and negative.
Such an evaluative analysis has the advantage of considering
themes in context.
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To automate this analysis, we took advantage of the linking
possibilities offered by the content analysis program. SATO
considers hyphenated words as a single word; so, by adding
hyphens between the theme and the words surrounding it, we
are able to create expressions containing both the theme and
the part of the rheme relevant to its categorisation. This
procedure generated our first series of variables (Model 1)
as listed in Table 23.
Table 23
Potential Discriminant Variables
in Model 1
V1 : profitability positive
V2: profitability neutral
V3: profitability negative
V4: financial position positive
V5: financial position neutral
V6 • financial position negative•
V7 : trading conditions positive
Vs: trading conditions neutral
V9: trading conditions negative
V10:growth positive
growth neutralV":
Vu: growth negative
Vu: management and strategy positive
Vu: management and strategy neutral
Vn: management and strategy negative
The list of variables in Table 23 differs, to some extent, to
the themes in pre-sample 1 and reflects the better
categorisation possible using the fuller set of circulars,
sell recommendations and a larger number of cases. The pre-
sample 1 categories 'Growth' and 'Prospects and contracts'
are merged under the single label GROWTH, as both categories
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are weakly represented by themselves, and we have split
'Financial performance' into two separate components,
PROFITABILITY and FINANCIAL POSITION, the latter representing
financial risk.
The second model was already computerized but needed some
adjustments. SATO allow the indexation of the words from one
text to be saved in a dictionary and then applied to a second
text.
Our second pre-sample was used to build such a dictionary.
But this dictionary was not fully adequate to cover every
relevant word in the 105 circulars forming the main sample.
Consequently we had to index, using the same grouping
categories already defined with the second pre-sample, all
words not covered by the existing dictionary. This procedure
provides the second series of variables (Model 2) which is
listed in Table 24.
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Table 24
Potential Discriminant Variables
in Model 2
V1 : company description
V2: report
V3: positive
V4: growth
V5: market and products
V6: finance
V7: future and prospects
V8: profitability
V9: management and strategy
Vm: negative
For both models, as with the pre-samples, the independent
variables are given by the ratio of respective theme mentions
to total text word count, to overcome problems of different
circular lengths. In addition an extra discriminant variable
was added in both models to reflect firm size, given by
company turnover, an important criterion (e.g. Tonkin and
Skerrat, 1987).
4.4 DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
Multi-group discriminant analysis is the appropriate
statistical tool for our purposes since, as opposed to
cluster analysis, we are not seeking to classify or group
cases from scratch, but to identify the key variables driving
a specific classification, i.e. explicating the analyst's
intuitive recommendation model.
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Discriminant analysis is basically a parametric statistical
method to study differences between groups (Klecka, 1980)
using several variables simultaneously. However,like any
parametric statistical technique, discriminant analysis has
a number of basic assumptions that need to be satisfied
(Klecka, 1980):
1) Groups must be mutually exclusive. This is the reason
why we have chosen well specified recommendations
instead of using the complete spectrum with the hold-hy
type of confounding advices.
2) Predictor variables must be multivariate normal
(Tatsuoka, 1970) which means (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1%3,
p. 300).
"(...) the predictor variable scores are
independently and randomly sampled from a
population's scores and that the sampling
distribution of any linear combination of predictor
variables is normally distributed."
3) Covariance matrices must be equal. If not, the model
will have a propensity to classify outliers in the most
widespread category (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1983).
Predictor variables, by virtue of their formulation, will be
truncated at 0 and may be skewed to the right, impacting
adversely on their univariate normality. This problem of
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skewed variables has been recognised by several other finance
researchers (e.g. Eisenbeis, 1977).
Eisenbeis (1977, P. 875) remarks that non-compliance with the
normality assumption is not rare:
"In practice, deviations from the normality
assumption, at least in economics and finance, appear
more likely to be the rule rather than the exception.
(...). In the applied literature, the problem of
testing for the appropriateness of the distributional
assumption has been largely ignored."
To treat this problem all predictor variables were
transformed leading to inability to reject the assumption of
normality in the second model using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test for all variables.
Because of a large percentage of 0 values in the first model,
no transformation would achieve univariate normality, a
necessary but not sufficient condition for multivariate
normality. However, the important issue in discriminant
analysis is the presence of outliers and despite the
normality problems an analysis of the distributions of the
transformed variables indicated outlying observations were no
longer a problem. For Tabachnik and Fidell (1983) "A sample
size that would produce 20 df (...) ensures robustness." In
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addition the discriminant analysis technique is robust to
departures in many cases from the underlying statistical
assumptions.
"Several authors (...) have shown that discriminant
analysis is a rather robust technique which can
tolerate some deviation from these assumptions. In
addition, not all of the aspects of discriminant
analysis require these assumptions" (Klecka, 1980, p.
61).
Equality of covariance matrices is usually tested for using
the Bartlett-Box M test (Norusis, 1985), however it is very
sensitive to departures from multivariate normality. In
addition as Taffler and Abassi (1984) conclude, the quadratic
discriminant analysis model rarely performs better than the
linear model when used on data other than that from which the
function is derived. For Norusis (1985), the quadratic
discriminant model must be applied only on very large
samples. Despite some problems in complying with the
underlying assumptions of the model, we have no reason to
adopt a quadratic discriminant approach, inter alia, given
our low degrees of freedom.
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4.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.5.1 Discrimination Between Recommendations
To assess the classificatory ability of a discriminant
function the rate of chance classification is required.
This rate depends on the proportion of each group in the
population from which the sample is taken. From the books of
recommendations which provided our samples, and which
contained each several hundred recommendations on companies,
the prior probabilities of each recommendation are given by:
BUY 29%
HOLD 48%
SELL 23%
Following the method of Morrison (1969), the probability of
a correct classification at random is .37 ((.29) 2 + ( . 48) 2 +
(.23) 2). This provides the appropriate benchmark against
which to compare the discrimination rates obtained from the
application of our two models.
Our goal in this analysis is to seek to understand certain
characteristics of the underlying model used by analysts when
they make company recommendations. Two sets of predictor
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variables are used and two different models run, the first
based on a thematico-evaluative analysis approach and the
second theme based only.
4.5.1.1 First Model - Thematico-evaluative Analysis
Adopting a stepwise discriminant approach generates a single
significant function according to Wilk lambda. As such only
this one function is retained for analysis.
Sixteen variables were submitted to the SAS package (version
6.03). These were V 1 to V15 in Table 23 plus ln(turnover), V161
as a proxy for firm size. Three were retained by the final
function. They are characterized as presented in Table 25.
Table 25
Variables Included in Model 1
Order* Variables	 Coef.**	 F	 Sign.
1	 V9 Trading conditions
negative	 -0.678	 5.566	 0.005
2	 Vu Management and strategy
positive	 0.666	 7.004	 0.001
3	 V2 Profitability neutral	 0.108	 3.340	 0.039
* In order of selection by the stepwise procedure
** Total canonical structure representing the strenght of the
relationship between the variable and the function (Klecka, 1980, p. 31)
The linear discriminant function is:
D = -6.364 + 16.36 V9 "- 81.39 VD 	 93.60 V2	 Significant at a = 0.001
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The pooled within-groups correlation matrix, provided in
Appendix 4 shows the three component model variables
essentially to be uncorrelated.
As we can see from Table 25, two variables have about the
same importance in the function and are far more important
than the third one. The variables are trading conditions
negative, having a negative sign, and management and
strategy, with a positive sign. The better the trading
conditions and the stronger the company's management the
greater are the chances of a buy recommendation.
The importance given to a good management team to
counterbalance adverse market situations seems to confirm the
belief of Johnson (1971), a renowned financial analyst, that
the quality of management is the most important factor in
assessing an investment in a particular company's shares.
The data were submitted to the cross-validation procedure
elaborated by Lachenbruch and Mickey (1968). This validation
technique produces a correct classification rate of 47.6%
weighted by group membership: ((13/26x38/105) +
(24/63x37/105) + (9/16x30/105)). Table 26 provides the
classification of cases for each group on this basis.
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Table 26
Classification Results:
Lachenbruch Hold-Out test
Model 1
Actual Groups No. of
Cases
Predicted Group Membership
Buy	 Hold	 Sell
Buy 38 13 22 3
34.2% 57.9% 7.9%
Hold 37 9 24 4
24.3% 64.9% 10.8%
Sell 30 4 17 9
13.3%
	
56.7%
	
30.0%
Total misclassified cases: 59/105.
The best defined group is number two (hold) and it is also
the group receiving almost all of the misclassified cases
from the other two groups. This may be expected, not only
because it is the middle group, but also because it has the
highest prior probability, which will tend to make the
program classify the more litigious cases into this group.
Also we may note that group two is unspecified: a hold
recommendation is less demanding than a buy or sell and
implies no direct action. The misclassification pattern
cannot be attributed to differences in dispersion matrices as
the Bartlett-Box M test does not permit the rejection of the
null hypothesis of equality of these matrices.
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The probability of correct classification (47.6%) is
significantly higher than by chance (37%) using the binominal
test of Morrison (1969).
Where: p = .476, It = . 37 and n = 105. tcaic = 2.24, significant
at a = 0.05, two-tail test. The model would appear to have
some classificatory ability on a statistical basis.
4.5.1.2 Second Model - Thematic Analysis
In this second model again only one function is significant
at the .05 level (a = 0.02). The variables submitted to the
stepwise procedure are V1 to V10 in Table 24 plus
in (turnover), VII , as a proxy for firm size. The two variables
retained in the model are given in Table 27.
Table 27
Variables Included in Model 2
Order* Variables Coef.** F Sign.
1 V10 Negative -0.914 6.835 0.001
2 V4 Growth 0.492 1.987 0.142
In order of selection by the stepwise procedure
** Total canonical structure
The function is given by:
D = 7.15 + 13.13 Vm + 29.49 V4	 Significant at a = 0.001
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The pooled within-groups correlation matrix provided in
Appendix 4 shows variables V10 and V4 to be uncorrelated.
The number of negative mentions in a circular is important in
leading to a sell recommendation, conversely, although with
weaker impact, mention of growth shifts the recommendation in
the other direction.
The Lachenbruch hold-out procedure when weighted by group
membership produces a rate of correct classification of
49.5%: ((5/7x38/105) + (29/83x37/105) + (6/15x30/105).
Table 28, however, shows the total number of misclassified
cases in fact higher than with the previous model.
Table 28
Classification Results:
Lachenbruch Hold-Out Test
Model 2
Actual group No. of
Cases
Predicted Group Membership
Buy	 Hold	 Sell
BUY 38 5 30 3
13.2% 79.0% 7.9%
HOLD 37 2 29 6
5.4% 78.4% 16.2%
SELL 30 0 24 6
0.0%
	
80.0%	 20.0%
Total misclassified cases: 65/105.
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As with the previous model, for groups 1 and 3, more cases
were classified in group 2 than in their original groups.
Consequently, this model can hardly be considered as
providing a very adequate level of discrimination despite
the fact that the probability of correct classification
(49.5%) is apparently significantly higher than by chance
(37%) using the binominal test of Morrison (1969).
tcalc = 	 p — 71
11 	 71 ( 1-71)
n
Where: p = . 495, 71 = . 34 and n = 105. tcatc = 3.43, significant
at a = 0.05, two-tail test. Our results question the validity
of this statistical test.
Both models seem to imply that the number of negative
references is the crucial factor in distinguishing between
different recommendations. In the second model, it was
negativity by itself and in the first model, negativity
associated mainly with trading conditions. This is consistent
behaviorally with analysts starting with a positive bias
towards a company and a predisposition towards a hold or even
a buy recommendation and then, if negative factors are
important, the recommendation becomes a sell. This position
is reinforced if we consider that sell recommendations are
very much less frequent than both other categories implying
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that analysts hesitate for longer before giving such a
recommendation.
The model built using themes without qualification, model 2,
performs less well than the model with qualifications added
to themes. Such qualifications are seemingly better able to
convey the richness of the data and considerations of the
authors of the circulars.
We may conclude that thematico-evaluative analysis, with
themes placed in context, is a more valid approach to content
analysis for our purposes here.
4.5.2 Discrimination Between Stockbroking Firms
In our final stage of analysis, we explore whether there is
a significant difference in (stockbroker) house style. We are
interested in whether there is a firm specific approach to
analysis that it might be possible to isolate, separate from
the recommendation effect. Such an independent evaluation is
possible because the proportion of circulars in each category
of recommendation is essentially the same for each
stockbroking firm; consequently, the differences in the
recommendations may not bias materially the results of this
analysis.
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The same variables and model formulation are used as in the
preceding analysis.
4.5.2.1 First Model - Thematico-Evaluative Analysis
When discriminating between firms, we assume that a circular
has the same probability of coming from any stockbroking
firm. Therefore, for our purposes, prior probabilities will
be equal for the 5 firms even if we do not have, in our
sample, exactly the same number of circulars provided by
each. Consequently the probability of a correct
classification by chance will be .20 [5(.20)2].
Applying stepwise discriminant analysis again the thematico-
evaluative model gives a rate of correct classification of
67.6%. Three significant (a < 0.01) discriminant functions
are retained compared with a theoretical maximum of four.
Table 29 provides the characteristics of the variables
retained in the model (significant at a = .01).
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Table 29
Variables Included in Model 1
Order* Variables F Sign. Coefficients**
Fl	 F2	 F3
1 V2 Profitability neutral 15.923 0.0001 0.83 -0.17 -0.25
2 Vg Trading conditions negative 8.386 0.0001 0.49 0.52 0.21
3 Vo Management and
strategy negative 6.045 0.0002 0.17 -0.36 0.59
4 Vu Growth negative 4.042 0.0045 0.08 -0.32 0.45
5 Vn Growth neutral 3.743 0.0071 -0.12 0.35 0.39
* In order of selection by the stepwise procedure
** Total canonical structure coefficients
The three significant functions are given by order of
importance with their level of significance:
D1=-24.36	 +	 84.28	 V2	 +	 59.36 V9 + 56.41 Vo +	 6.73 Vn -	 29.71 Vn
Significant at a = 0.001
D2=-20.10	 -	 19.85	 V2 +	 72.45 V9 - 98.38 Vo - 47.33 Vu +	 37.61 Vn
Significant at a = 0.001
D3=-12.84
	 -	 20.16	 V2 +	 6.32 V9 + 131.95 Vo +	 65.93 Vu +	 48.18 VII
Significant at a = 0.001
The pooled within-groups correlation matrix provided in
Appendix 4 shows the variables to be uncorrelated.
The data were again submitted to the Lachenbruch procedure.
This validation technique produces a correct classification
rate of 59.6% weighted by group membership: ((9/17x19/105) +
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(13/24x22/105) 	 +	 (16/20x22/105)	 +	 (11/20x21/105)	 +
(13/24x21/105)). Table 30 provides the classification of
cases for each group on this basis.
Table 30
Classification Results:
Lachenbruch Hold-Out Test
Actual Group No. of Predicted Membership
Cases Fl F2 F3	 F4 F5
Firm]. 19 9 2 1	 2 5
47.4% 10.5% 5.26%	 10.5% 26.3%
Firm 2 22 2 13 2	 3 2
9.1% 59.1% 9.1%	 13.7% 9.1%
Firm 3 22 2 1 16	 0 3
9.1% 4.6% 72.7%
	
0.0% 13.6%
Firm 4 21 3 5 1	 11 1
14.3% 23.8% 4.8%	 52.4% 4.8%
Firm 5 21 1 3 0	 4 13
4.8% 14.3% 0.0 %	 19.1% 61.9%
Total misclassified cases 43/105
Firms 2, 3 and 5 have similar proportions of correctly
classified cases. Firms 1 and 4 are less well separated with
correct classification rates of 47.4% and 52.4%.
The Lachenbruch hold-out test gives a rate of correct
classification of 59.6%, which is better than the by chance
rate of 20% using the binominal test of Morrison (1969).
tcalc	 p —IT
IT (1-IT)
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Where: p = .596, 7T = . 201 and n = 105. t 
caic = 10.13,
significant at a = 0.01, two-tail test. On this basis, the
model appear to have a relatively good classificatory
ability.
In this section, we seek to distinguish between the
analytical methodologies of the different stockbroking firms.
If these differ then different information items will appear
with different frequencies in the circulars of different
firms. Table 31 provides the firm means across the first
three variables in Table 29 separately most significant in
the three respective functions according to their canonical
structure coefficients.
Table 31
Firms Means Across Significant Variables
V2 V9 V15
Fl 482.01 380.28 464.14
F2 384.05 387.29 164.47
F3 252.07 320.09 107.80
F4 387.56 537.05 227.03
FS 500.48 512.65 106.12
The first variable 'profitability neutral' indicates profit
is referred to, but such mention is not accompanied by
positive or negative connotations. If we consider the
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position of the firms on this variable, we see that Firm 3
very rarely mentions profitability in a neutral manner while
at the other extreme, Firm 5 does this frequently. Firm 4 and
Firm 2 have similar means on this dimension. It may be a
matter of house style to focus on profit even when it is
neutral (i.e., it is neither better nor worse than expected
etc...). However, this focus is an important difference
between firms.
Firm 3 does not appear to emphasise the second variable
'trading conditions negative', while Firm 4 finds this very
important. Firms 1 and 2 view this factor in much the same
way.
Finally, Firm 1 is alone in placing a great emphasis on the
variable 'management and strategy negative'.
We conclude that different information items are
significantly differently weighted by stockbroking firms when
assessing investment opportunities.
The first and the second information items (variables)
weighted differently by stockbroking firms are among the
three variables figuring in our model discriminating between
recommendations. Therefore, the rate of discrimination
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obtained for recommendations, which is not very high, may be
partially explained by the potential heterogeneity of the
stockbroking houses in the information items they consider
important. A further analysis should focus on potential
interaction effects.
4.5.2.2 Second Model - Thematic Analysis
In this case, the model generates a rate of correct
classification of 52.4%. Two functions are significant (at a
= 0.05). Table 32 lists the four variables retained in the
model (at a = 0.05) with some of their characteristics.
Table 32
Variables Included in Model 2
Order* Variables	 F	 Sign. Coefficients**
Fl	 F2
1	 V8 Profitability	 8.40 0.0001	 0.70 -0.28
2	 V10 Negative	 4.39 0.0026	 0.65	 0.06
3	 V1 Company description 3.23 0.0155 -0.26 	 0.34
4	 V9 Management
and strategy	 2.73 0.0333	 0.08	 0.52
* In order of selection by the stepwise procedure
** Total canonical structure coefficients
The significant functions can be written as follows:
D1 = -86.14 + 22.99 Vil + 17.87 Vw - 10.39 V I + 9.56 V9
Significant at a = 0.001
D2 = -63.13 - 12.69 V8 + 3.93 vw + 10.13 vl + 17.04 V9
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Significant at a = 0.003
The pooled within-groups correlation matrix provided in
Appendix 4 shows the variables to be uncorrelated.
Table 33 presents the Lachenbruch hold-out test
classification results. The correct classification rate is
36.7% weighted by group membership: ((9/20x19/105) +
(13/27x22/105) + (7/20x22/105) + (3/16x21/105)
+(8/22x21/105).
Table 33
Classification Results:
Lachenbruch Hold-Out Test
	
Actual Group No of	 Predicted Membership
	
Cases	 Fl	 F2	 F3	 F4	 F5
Firm 1	 19	 9	 1	 3	 3	 3
47.4%
	 5.3%	 15.8%	 15.8% 15.8%
Firm 2	 22	 2	 13	 5	 2	 0
9.1%	 59.1%	 22.7%	 9.1%	 0.0%
Firm 3	 22	 1	 7	 7	 4	 3
4.6%	 31.8%	 31.8%	 18.2% 13.6%
Firm 4	 21	 3	 5	 2	 3	 8
14.4%	 23.8%	 9.5%	 14.3% 38.1%
Firm 5	 21	 5	 1	 3	 4	 8
23.8%
	
4.8%	 14.3%	 19.1% 38.1%
Total misclassified cases 65/105
Firm 4 is very much misclassified by the model having more
cases placed in both groups 2 and 5 than in its own group.
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Nonetheless the Lachenbruch rate of correct classification of
36.7% is far better than the by chance rate of 20% using the
binominal test of Morrison (1969).
tcalc	 p - 7r
r (1-r)
Where: p = .367, r = .206 and n = 105. tcatc = 4.26,
significant at a = 0.01, two-tail test. On this basis, the
model appear to have a relatively good classificatory
ability. Despite this apparent ability, based on the fact
that the chance classification rate is very low, this model
performs less well than the preceding one suggesting again
that a model with qualified themes is more apt to reflect the
richness of the data
Table 34 provides the stockbroker house variables across the
three measures with reasonable loading on factors 1 and 2.
Table 34
Firms Means Across Significant Variables
V8 V10
Fl 193.09 79.40
F2 142.50 39.51
F3 165.35 35.35
F4 184.26 60.62
FS 205.95 68.17
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The variables 'profitability' and 'negative' have almost the
same canonical structure coefficient values in the first
function. As both signs are positive, they increase in the
same direction. Firm 1 and Firm 5 place a great emphasis on
the concepts of both profitability and negativity, while Firm
2 finds both these areas least relevant to its analysis. Firm
The second function is best described by the variable
'management'. Firm 1 focuses more heavily on company
management, while Firms 2 and 3 seem to find such factors
least important. Firm 4 is in the middle for both variables.
Consequently, we may expect the correct classification rate
for this stockbroking house to be lower than for the other
houses. This is confirmed by Table 33.
4.6 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The theme based (second) model is neither able to
discriminate well between the different firm recommendations
nor stockbroking firms. As its variables are constructed
without the double articulation of theme and rheme that
characterize the variables of the thematico-evaluative
(first) model, we believe that themes with qualifications are
better for describing the content of stockbroker circulars.
199
CHAPTER 4 THE USES OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION...
The fact that the stockbroking firms are heterogeneous and
well differentiated may explain the moderate discrimination
rates obtained between recommendations. To discriminate
better between recommendations may necessitate a certain
level of homogeneity across different firms, but such
homogeneity appears to be lacking for the firms in our
sample.
Hypothesis one states that there is a difference in the
arguments driving different recommendations (i.e.,
buy/hold/sell).
Our results provide only weak support for this hypothesis.
Our first model does however provide statistically
significant results and therefore suggests the possibility of
differences in underlying factors existing. However, our
results are not conclusive on this and will necessitate
further investigation.
A continuation of this study would try to discriminate
•between recommendations within firms as we have indications
that differences in the underlying analytical approaches
between firms leading to different recommendations may exist.
Such a study would necessitate a far greater number of
circulars from each firm. Alternatively we may formally test
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for interaction effects using an appropriate multivariate
methodology.
Hypothesis two states that there is a difference in the
analytical approaches used across firms regardless of the
recommendations appearing in the circulars.
This hypothesis is supported by our findings. The rates of
correct classification, obtained from both models, in
particular the first, confirm that there is a difference in
the items focused upon by different firms when assessing
investment opportunities.
Emphasis on profit is the main element that differentiates
between our stockbroking firms. Some firms appear to be
focusing more heavily on the notion of profitability, while
others remain more balanced, considering other elements, such
as quality of management and strategies. This latter argument
is also the most important one in differentiating between the
recommendations.
Negativity appears to be very important in both models for
distinguishing between firms. This corroborates the previous
findings that negativity may be more important than
positivity for investment analysis.
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Surprisingly, the financial structure and position of the
firm does not seem to impact on recommendations made and such
variables enter none of the discriminant functions developed.
In fact there was no mention whatsoever of the word gearing
in any of the texts of the 105 circulars!
Another consequence of our findings may be lack of support
for a specific authorship effect. The fact that there is a
relatively strong firm effect implies that analysts in the
same firm write along common lines and share a common style.
In fact casual empiricism suggests that the same sentences
are taken directly from one circular to another within the
same firm thus increasing the degree of homogeneity of firm
house style. Even if the circulars from the different firms
share a common structure (e.g., recommendation, summary,
tables, results by sectors, prospects, etc...) to a degree,
each firm has clear personalised characteristics. This may
not be surprising considering that when an analyst starts to
write a new circular he already has the previous ones on the
company, the firm's standard framework and the training and
experience he has received in his particular firm.
We must, however, underline some caveats to the research of
this chapter. The definition of the variables, in both
models, is open to amelioration by a better system for
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grouping the terms contained in the circulars. However, one
must remember that the more refined the classification
groupings (themes) are, the more groups there will be. If we
multiply the groups, we reduce the number of occurences in
each group and therefore diminish their discriminating
potential.
A more homogeneous sample in terms of industry groups or in
terms of company sizes may have produced a better
characterisation of the reasoning underlying the different
recommendations. However, in practice, such a sample would be
very difficult to obtain because of the many factors that
would have been to be controlled for simultaneously: the
recommendations, the presence of a circular on such or such
company for a given period, industry grouping and company
size, etc.
Our goal in this chapter was to evaluate the use of financial
and mainly accounting information by stockbroker analysts.
This use of accounting information is not equal across firms
as the main criterion separating them is profitability. This
implies that profitability is referred to more often by some
firms than by others. This information item is provided by
the accounting system, therefore we may conclude that some
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accounting numbers are of prime importance for firms when
evaluating investment opportunities.
On the other hand it would appear that other accounting
measures including balance sheet based ones do not play a
significant role in the circulars we have examined. Also, we
may notice, that consideration of cashf low, derived from
financial statements or otherwise, is almost absent from our
sample of circulars contrary to what would have been expected
according to the efficient market hypothesis.
4.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the existence of
distinct but relatively weak differences in the reasoning
determining different recommendations in stockbrokers'
circulars. However, there is also some indication that these
differences may be greater than what we have observed as they
may be obscured to a certain extent by differences between
stockbroking firm styles.
Each stockbroking firm exhibited significant differences in
the elements it focused upon when assessing investment
opportunities and this was independent of the recommendation
made. Such a thing as "firm style" would seem to exist.
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The prime objective of this chapter was to explore the
relative degrees of importance of different information items
for investment analysts when assessing investment
opportunities. Such information encompasses accounting-based
measures such as profit and financial risk.
Our results suggest in fact that certain accounting
information, in particular profitability, may have utility
for investment analysis but there are other more important
non-accounts based factors in differentiating between
recommendations.
Our findings, not surprisingly, demonstrate that profit is an
important element (even if not the only one) focused upon by
financial analysts. Our methodological approach may be
developed further to provide additional insight into the
financial analysis process and in particular to amplify what
accounting information is actually used.
This importance given to the profit number also relates to
the the controversy between the efficient market hypothesis
and the functional fixation hypothesis. According to the
efficient market hypothesis we would have expected financial
analysts to focus on cashf lows not on profits, however, no
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cashf low variables were derived due to lack of any mention in
any of the circulars.
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CHAPTER 5
INVESTMENT ANALYSTS' REACTION TO
WINDOW DRESSING OF FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS
Chapter three provides evidence on the presence of window
dressing in UK company financial statements. Such window
dressing is principally designed to influence two key
accounting measures: earnings per share and gearing.
In chapter four, we sought to establish whether accounting
information, in practice, influences the way investment
analysts assess investment opportunities. The results of the
chapter suggested that, despite the importance of other
factors, the profit figure is among the most important
factors in differentiating between recommendations. However,
There was another relevant finding. This is that stockbroking
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firms are not homogeneous in the information items they
consider most important in coming to a conclusion on company
prospects.
In this chapter, we seek to evaluate directly the impact of
window dressing on stockbroking analysts through examining
the way they treat window dressed accounting information as
part of their normal activities.
The first section reviews the literature relating to the
importance of accounting information for investment analysts.
The second states our hypotheses while the third section
reports on our pilot study. Section four describes the
experimental design for the full study, including the
sampling design, a description of the task set and the
statistical methodology. The fifth reports the results of the
main experiment and the final section discuss these results.
5.1 INVESTMENT ANALYSTS AND ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
As mentioned in chapter two, the way investment analysts
process accounting information is far from obvious. Books on
financial analysis often pretend that analysts perform some
transformation of accounting data to suit their particular
needs (e.g., Cohen, Zinbarg and Zeikel, 1987). However, the
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conclusions from our discussions with stockbroking analysts
are directly at variance with this normative model.
Such apparent contradictions may be due to the fact that
investment analysis is not a theoretically well established
profession. There are many conflicting views about how
investment analysis can be conducted. The conflict is not
only between fundamental and technical analysis, but also
between different conceptions of fundamental analysis and, at
the extreme, whether such an analysis is needed at all
(Arnold and Moizer, 1984).
In such circumstances, therefore, the use of a questionnaire
seems inappropriate. If the use of a questionnaire may, in
theory, reinforce the external validity of results (Abdel-
Khalik and Ajinkya, 1979), we believe it may also be prone to
generate answers that are more closely related with what the
respondents would like the situation to be than with what the
situation is. We believe that the negative effect on the
internal validity of the use of a questionnaire is far
greater than any advantage from enhancing the perceived
external validity. Consequently, we have opted for an
experimental design.
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The experiment is designed to test the reaction of investment
analysts to window dressing of financial statements assuming,
after the debate referred to in chapter two and the analysis
reported in chapter four, that accounting information may
have some relevance to investment analysis. The discussion,
in chapter two was about the reactions of market
participants. If the behaviour of market participants is more
in concordance with the functional fixation hypothesis, then
the role of financial analysts becomes very important in
disseminating and interpreting financial information.
If investment analysts are efficient at interpreting,
decoding and explaining financial information, then, one
condition for market efficiency is met even if other market
participants do not have the skill to interpret adequately
this financial information (Lee and Tweedie, 1977 and 1981).
If the market is informationally efficient, accounting data
manipulation will have no impact on investors. However, we
have also pointed out that efficiency is never perfect and
that analysts do play a role in enhancing market efficiency.
Such a concept is not to be viewed naively and there will
always be a "role for the expert to conduct research" (Pope,
Morris and Peel, 1990).
210
CHAPTER 5 INVESTMENT ANALYSTS' REACTION ...
Consequently, in the EMH environment, investment analysts
will not necessarily be expected to correct for window
dressing if the window dressed items have no impact on
expected future cashf lows. On the other hand, according to
the naive investor or mechanistic hypothesis (Foster, 1986),
investment analysts are supposed to be experts in decoding
financial information and, as accounting numbers are supposed
to have an effect on share prices, they will be expected to
correct adequately for window dressing.
5.2 HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
This experiment is in the tradition of Lee and Tweedie (1981)
into the ability of market participants to interpret
financial accounting information. But, we do not focus on
analysts' ability to interpret financial statement
information, per se, as we assume that experienced
stockbroking analysts can read financial statements if they
wish to. The question we are concerned with is what do
investment analysts do when these financial statements they
are analysing are window dressed? It is not their ability but
their willingness to correct that is questioned more
precisely here.
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The first hypothesis relates to the ability of financial
analysts to take into account window dressing in the accounts
of companies they are evaluating.
HYPOTHESIS 1: FINANCIAL ANALYSTS WILL CORRECT ADEQUATELY FOR
WINDOW DRESSING IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Two secondary hypotheses are also tested.
The second hypothesis relates to the difference in correction
rates for different window dressed items as we may expect
analysts to be better in detecting certain schemes or
combination of schemes. This hypothesis relies on the
assumption that there is a relationship between the window
dressing detected and the corrections made by participating
analysts.
HYPOTHESIS 2: DIFFERENT WINDOW DRESSED ITEMS WILL NOT BE
DISCOVERED WITH THE SAME RELATIVE FREQUENCY
BY INVESTMENT ANALYSTS
It would be expected that more complex schemes are less
readily identified and corrected for.
The third hypothesis relates to possible explanatory
relationship between analysts' characteristics and their
correction of window dressed accounting numbers.
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Window dressing recognition may be a matter of practice.
Therefore, we would expect more experienced analysts to be
more skilled in this very practical activity. We also would
expect those having less confidence in financial statement
information or viewing window dressing as a more serious
problem to be more likely to pick up window dressing schemes.
HYPOTHESIS 3: THERE WILL BE A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CERTAIN ANALYSTS' CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR
PROPENSITY TO CORRECT
5.3 PILOT STUDY
In summary the experimental task consists of asking subjects
to calculate a set of key ratios incorporating adjustments to
the accounting numbers provided on the face of the accounts
of the two companies in an appropriate manner.
If the participants adjust their calculations to take account
of the window dressed schemes then we have evidence
supportive of our first hypothesis.
A preliminary study was conducted to help refine our
experimental materials and the nature of the research task.
This was not conducted in the same way as the main
experiment. To increase the level of feedback we used a
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protocol analysis procedure asking the subjects constantly to
verbalize their analytical processes and registering all
their comments (Bouwman et al., 1987).
The use of a protocol analysis procedure may have affected
the results of the pilot as discussed in many papers (e.g.,
Anderson, 1985; Biehal and Chakravarti, 1989). This may be in
terms of slowing down the analytical process (Dansereau and
Gregg, 1966), distracting the participating analysts (Russo,
Johnson and Stephens, 1987), making such subjects much more
cautious about their procedures and perhaps to change their
nature to make them appear more rational (Smead, Wilcox and
Wilkes, 1981).
Our protocol analysis sample is limited, consisting of only
three analysts working for a major investment fund. They
differed in age, background and level of experience: the
first one being new in the firm, the second one having a
couple of years of experience and the third one having about
ten years experience as an investment analyst.
The subjects were requested by their director to participate
in this experiment and were interested in projecting a
favourable image of their abilities as investment analysts.
214
CHAPTER 5 INVESTMENT ANALYSTS' REACTION ...
Only one correction for window dressing was mentioned by the
three analysts.
Their principal focus of interest was clearly related to the
structure of equity. None ever mentioned the possibility of
conducting a cashf low analysis or any kind of evaluation of
future cashf lows.
Based on our experience with the pilot study the same
potential window dressing schemes were retained for the main
analysis, inter alia, as only one correction was made, not
permitting any choice among the schemes. However, we reduced
from 6 to 4 the maximum number of window dressed items to be
included in any one set of financial statements.
Because of the time constraint associated with the experiment
(around one hour) we decided to reduce the number of ratios
to be calculated from the original 9 to 7.
Finally, the very low (almost zero) number of correction in
the pilot led us to doubt whether there might be large number
of corrections made in the main experiment. Such an absence
of corrections may be difficult to interpret potentially
being attributed to a failure in the design of the
experimental materials and/or a true absence of correcting
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behavior by the subjects. Therefore, we decided to separate
our main task subjects into two groups in each firm: an
experimental group, working under the same conditions and
with the same instruction set as the subjects in the pilot
study and a control group. Such participants would be told
specifically in their instruction set to be aware of the
existence of window dressing schemes in the case study
financial statements.
Such modifications to the original procedures were designed
to improve the relevance of the task and ease the
interpretation of the results.
5.4 THE EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
The experimental material consists of (1) a case study
containing two sets of accounts (2) a set of instructions (3)
answer sheets with an example of a completed question for
illustrative purposes, and (4) personal questionnaire to be
filled in only at the end of the main task and given out to
the participants only when their case study material was
returned duly completed. A full set of the experimental
materials is provided in Appendix 5.
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The two sets of accounts are drawn from the sample of
financial statements analysed in chapter three and are
selected as being materially clean of the window dressing
schemes we wish to test. The case study materials include the
directors' report, full accounts including all footnotes and
the auditors' report, as presented in Appendix 5.
Footnotes are provided as we believe that accounting
statements are almost unusable without such notes contrary to
Biggs (1984). Biggs believed that adding footnotes would
increase unduly the quantity of data to be processed by his
subjects rendering his experiment unworkable and justified
his decision on the basis that only one of his analysts
complained about lack of information. On the other hand,
Bouwman et al. (1987) believe that professional analysts are
able to process a great quantity of information within a
limited period of time. They used complete sets of financial
statements plus other information for a task that lasted
between 20 and 75 minutes.
The first set of accounts is that for Dawson International
and the second is for John Laing. The accounts of John Laing
are not adjusted and serve as a control. The accounts of
Dawson International, however, are modified in different ways
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to incorporate different combinations of window dressing
schemes.
5.5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
5.5.1 Window Dressing Schemes Tested
In order to test the ability of financial analysts to
recognise and deal with "window dressing", we need first to
establish a list of potential schemes to be tested.
In chapter three we reviewed the literature to identify
potential window dressing schemes already discussed by
different authors in UK books or magazines and newspapers.
Examples of such schemes were searched for in a sample of 100
sets of financial statements belonging to 50 UK companies to
establish their relative frequency and importance.
Following this analysis, we retained a subset of the more
common and tractable schemes to incorporate in our
experimental materials. Table 35 gives a list of these window
dressing possibilities.
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Table 35
Window Dressing Schemes Tested
1- Deferred taxation
2- Pension plan contributions
3- Extraordinary items
4- Sales of assets
5- False merger
6- Non-subsidiary subsidiaries
7- Finance leases not capitalised
8- Hidden interests
9- Non-consolidated subsidiaries
(5 of our 9 window dressed items tested (1,4,5,6 and 7) are also treated
by Terry Smith in Accounting for Growth, 1992).
Deferred taxation
The Dawson International based set of financial statements is
window dressed according to the experimental design to show
a very low provision for deferred taxation accompanied by
very large potential liabilities constituted by reversible
differences. Some illustrations of this situation were found
in the accounts of W.H. Smith, William Baird, Wm Low and
Dobson Park among other firms.
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Pension plan contributions
Appropriating a pension funds surplus is truly an
extraordinary event as it seldom happens in a company's life.
Therefore, if a surplus materialises as a contribution
holiday, its effect ought to be presented as an extraordinary
item so that earnings per share will reflect normalised
profits. One such example can be found in Dobson Park
Accounts.
Extraordinary items
Our review of the accounts of 50 large UK companies
identified large numbers of different items which are treated
as extraordinary but which should be included in the
calculation of the profit before tax figure, and conversely
a smaller set of items which are taken in trading profit but
are really extraordinary in nature. The window dressed set of
accounts contained 9 different examples of such items all
which were treated as extraordinary:
- goodwill written off,
- US subsidiary pre-production expenditures written
off,
- foreign currency deficit arising on
consolidation,
- reorganisation and rationalisation
- anticipated loss on disposal of certain US
operations
- loss on cessation of certain activities
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- loss on early redemption of quoted loan stock
- cost of proposed acquisition (failed bid) net of
the gains on disposal of shares in the target
company
The 9 items in total represent a highly material amount
relative to the stated profit before tax figure in the case
study. However, it should be pointed out that clearly not all
of these items are likely to be equally important in practice
or clear-cut as regards interpretation. The company accounts
from which the items used were selected included Argyll
Group, Y.J. Lovell, Hepworth Holdings, Gestetner Holdings,
Fine Art Developments, Portal Holdings and Dobson Park.
Sales of assets
On its own, the disposal of assets cannot be classed as
window dressing, but when the accounting effect of the
transaction is to create a book profit of such magnitude that
a net loss becomes a net profit, or the net profit is
doubled, analysts need to make an adjustment to reflect the
underlying profitability or normalised profit of the firm.
Among the companies using sales of assets or sale and
leaseback to create book profits we can find Fine Art
Developments and Wm Low.
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False merger
According to SSAP23, a vendor placing can be accounted for as
a merger. However, this treatment does not reflect the
substance of the transaction. The purpose of such a scheme is
essentially to appropriate the profit of the acquired company
from the beginning of the preceding financial year while
acquisition accounting allows consolidation of the profit of
the acquired firm earned only after the acquisition date.
Non-subsidiary subsidiaries
Even if many such arrangements in the real world are not
disclosed in a company's financial statements, we added a
footnote to the accounts of our case study example,
describing how an exactly 50% owned related company accounts
for a major portion of the borrowing of the group. In fact,
when such sums are included in the gearing calculation, the
apparent relationship between debt and equity collapses. This
example was taken from Burton's accounts which, at least,
disclosed what many other firms keep hidden. (The Companies'
Act 1989 effectively prohibits such activities).
Finance leases not capitalised
In our example of such a practice, a substantial amount of
assets acquired under finance leases was not included among
the tangible assets on the face of the balance sheet, with
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the matching corresponding liabilities also ignored. This
leads to the gearing ratio appearing lower than it is in
reality. Our example was built around Thorn EMI's accounts.
(SSAP21 now prevents the non-capitalisation of finance
leases, although the main impact appears to have been on a
restructuring of such contracts so they can be accounted for
as operating leases.)
Hidden interest
In this more subtle case, the problem revolves around a
convertible bond issued at a low coupon rate (less than half
the market rate), but convertible at such a price that an
equivalent capital profit accrues to bond holders. As a
result, the annual interest charge is paid for by the company
receiving a lower sum than the market price at the conversion
date. This latter will have the effect of reducing the
company's capital base on conversion, counterbalanced by the
increased profits earned during the life of the bond. In this
way, the company can reduce its interest charges during the
life of the bond thereby inflating its profit before tax
figure. Hillsdown Holdings provided the basis for the example
we used.
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Non consolidated subsidiaries
It is common practice for large groups to set up a separate
subsidiary to finance their credit sales. At the end of the
year, because of a so-called dissimilarity in activities,
such subsidiaries are not consolidated with consequential
positive impact on gearing.
In our case study, we set up such a subsidiary with very
substantial liabilities, impacting materially on the gearing
ratio. This situation is disclosed in a note to the accounts,
which is required practice. Our example was modelled on such
schemes as those shown in the accounts of BAT Industries,
Thorn EMI, Bunzl and Pearson among others in our sample.
5.6 THE MAIN EXPERIMENTAL TASK
The main experimental task consists of calculating 7 standard
ratios for each of the two companies included in the case
study using numbers taken from the accounts to produce the
most relevant results for the analysts. Table 36 lists the
ratios used.
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Table 36
Ratios Calculated by Stockbroking Analysts
1- Sales margin (operating profit)
2- Return on equity
3- Return on total assets
4- Price/earnings ratio
5- Gearing
6- Liquidity ratio (acid test)
7- Book value of net assets per share
Of these seven ratios, four are more oriented towards
profitability and three towards the balance sheet.
Possibilities to adjust for manipulations of both profit
figures and balance sheet numbers appear many times.
Ratios, at least theoretically, are widely used in financial
analysis. Many books in finance refer to this method as an
important one.
Johnson (1971) notes that analysts tend to concentrate on
ratios analysis and that "financial analysis depends to a
great extend on the use of ratios".
Lassy (1979) believes that ratio analysis is a "powerful"
tool for financial analysts and managers while Finnerty
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(1986) indicates that financial analysts "find it helpful" to
calculate ratios.
Higgins (1984) concludes that ratio analysis is "widely used"
by managers, creditors and investors. Lustzig and Schwab
(1983) also believe that despite of the lack of theoretical
foundations, ratio calculation may be the most widely applied
technique for analysing financial statements (Holmes and
Sugden, 1990; Rees, 1990).
Finally, Foster (1986) presents ratio analysis among the two
most frequently used cross-sectional techniques for financial
statements analysis.
When analysts analyze financial statements, ratio analysis
appears to be the most generally used analytical technique
(Cohen et al., (1987); Rees, (1990); Bouwman et a/., (1987).
Therefore, this is the one we use for our purposes here.
Theoretically, analysts may be aware of potential accounting
number manipulation by firms. Paish and Briston (1982) note
that the measurement of return on capital has become confused
because of the many existing ways of calculating profit. They
stress particularly the calculation of the provision for
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deferred taxation which allows all possibilities from nothing
to a 100% provision.
Norby and Stone (1972) believe that financial analysts are
not only aware of potential manipulations, but that they
correct their figures to take this into account.
"In the order to gain an understanding of the
company, he generally adjusts reported earnings to
reflect actual earnings from ordinary operations on
a consistent basis." (Norby and Stone, 1972, p. 45.)
They also believe that market prices in the long run tend to
reflect more the normalized than stated earnings.
Therefore, if Norby and Stone are right and nothing has
changed, and US analysts are not materially different from UK
ones, we can expect that our participating analysts will make
some adjustments to accounting numbers in calculating the
proposed ratios as stated in our first hypothesis.
The set of instructions for participants used in the
preliminary study was the same for each of the three
analysts. These instructions explained our research
objectives as being the improvement of accounting information
provided to the financial community. We instructed the
participants to calculate the financial ratios for each
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company, making any adjustments they thought appropriate to
the accounting numbers provided in the financial statements
to suit their needs best. By examining the subjects' answers,
we expected to discover the relative importance of different
information items to them and how the accounts might be
modified to suit their needs better.
However, given the results of the preliminary study indicated
above and following discussions with the directors of
research of the participating stockbroking firms, the
possibility that analysts might make few corrections for
window dressing emerged. Therefore, given the relatively
large size of our respondent sample, we decided to split our
subjects into two groups in each firm, an experimental group
and a control group.
The experimental group would be given the set of instructions
as described above. The control group members, however, were
specifically told in their set of instructions that we were
looking for window dressing schemes and that we expected them
to make corrections for those window dressed accounting
figures in calculating the ratios.
The assignment of the subjects into the two groups in each
firm was totally random. We distributed alternatively one
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experimental case and one control case. We did this both
because participants may tend to sit together when they are
similar in age and experience and to avoid the pooling of
analysts with similar characteristics into the same group.
5.7 WINDOW DRESSED ITEM EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Dr. Lynda White, Lecturer in Statistics at Imperial College
London and an expert in experimental design assisted with
designing an appropriate statistical model to meet our
research objectives and the author is indebted to her for her
contributions.
The 9 potential window dressing schemes of Table 35 are
combined in different ways in the case study financial
statements. Based on experience with the pilot study the
number of schemes appearing in any set of financial
statements is limited to 4 save that one case in every sixth
contained only two manipulated elements. This was done in
order to take into consideration the fact that real world
financial statements do not contain the same number of window
dressed items and we wanted to see if in reducing the number
of manipulations, the correction rate would differ. Thirty
different sets of window dressed accounts are generated.
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Table 37 shows the particular arrangement of window dressing
schemes contained in each of these 30 cases.
As we had, in total, 63 investment analysts from 5
stockbroking houses (see below), the same cases were used
more than once. Six different cases were used in each of the
5 participating firms and were repeated for all subjects in
excess of the first 6. In table 37 each subject is therefore
identified by the number of the firm he/she comes from, 1 to
5, then by the number of the case study he/she receives.
(Example: 1.1 to 1.6 and 1.13 to 1.15 are in the experimental
group while 1.7 to 1.12 and 1.16 are in the control group).
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Table 37
Distribution of the Window Dressing Schemes
Among the 36 Cases
Cases	 Window dressed items*
Ex.** Ct.*** Ex.	 Ct.
1.1	 1.7	 1.13	 1.16	 1,	 2,	 3,	 9
1.2	 1.8	 1.14	 1,	 4,	 5,	 8
1.3	 1.9	 1.15	 1,	 3,	 6,	 7
1.4	 1.10	 2,	 3,	 5,	 6
1.5	 1.11	 2,	 4,	 5,	 7
1.6	 1.12	 8,	 9
2.1	 2.7	 1,	 5,	 6,	 9
2.2	 2.8	 1,	 3,	 5,	 8
2.3	 2.9	 1,	 7,	 8,	 9
2.4	 2.10	 2,	 6
2.5	 2.11	 2,	 4,	 7,	 8
2.6
	
3,	 4,	 7,	 9
3.1	 3.7	 1,	 2,	 6,	 7
3.2	 3.8	 1,	 4,	 5,	 9
3.3	 3.9	 2,	 3
3.4	 3.10	 2,	 3,	 4,	 9
3.5	 3.11	 4,	 6,	 7,	 8
3.6	 3.12	 3,	 5,	 8,	 9
4.1	 4.7	 4.13	 1,	 9
4.2	 4.8	 4.14	 1,	 3,	 4,	 6
4.3	 4.9	 4.15	 2,	 4,	 5,	 8
4.4	 4.10	 2,	 6,	 7,	 8
4.5	 4.11	 3,	 5,	 7,	 9
4.6	 4.12	 4,	 5,	 6,	 8
5.1	 5.7	 1,	 4,	 6,	 8
5.2	 5.8	 1,	 3,	 5,	 7
5.3	 5.9	 2,	 3,	 8,	 9
5.4	 5.10	 2,	 4,	 7,	 9
5.5	 4,	 5,	 6,	 7
* The numbers refer to the schemes 1 to 9 in Table 35,
** Experimental group
*** Control group
This organisation is chosen for many reasons. First, if we
had used only a limited number of configurations, it would
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have been impossible to conclude anything about the relative
ease of discovery of different types of schemes, our
hypothesis 2. The fact that a scheme may be more easy to
discover and correct for we speculated might diminish the
confidence that an analyst might have in the particular set
of financial statements and make him search more deeply for
other problems and thus discover more hidden schemes.
5.7.1 The Participating Analysts.
Previous studies using nationwide methods of recruiting
respondents have often met with mixed results (Arnold and
Moizer, 1984). Whereas, selecting a sample from the UK
repertoire of financial analysts may be appropriate for a
mailed study designed around the answers to a questionnaire,
for what is essentially a laboratory experiment such as ours,
many restrictions make this method impracticable.
The first restriction is that a researcher must be present at
every session. It becomes difficult to organise sessions
everywhere in the country. A more important factor is the
necessity of organising group sessions in order to have the
experimental group and the control group subject to the same
environmental and control conditions.
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Also, we need analysts specialising in industrial or
distribution UK based companies, not in banks or other
financial institutions, and reasonably experienced, with a
minimum of 2 years as analysts. There are few stockbroking
firms in the country able to assemble on the same day in the
same room a minimum of twelve analysts satisfying all these
conditions and these firms are mainly situated within the
limits of the Square Mile.
These considerations led to a clustered sample approach. We
identified the six biggest stockbroking firms in the City, as
they form a group which is demarcated from the remaining
ones. Five of them kindly agreed to participate in our study
with, in principle, a minimum of twelve analysts each,
although in the end two of them were not able to come up with
the numbers requested. Table 38 shows the number of
participating analysts provided by each firm.
Table 38
Number of Analysts From Each Firm
Fl James Capel	 16
F2 Kleinworth Benson Sec. 11
F3	 S.G. Warburg Sec.	 12
F4 Barclays De Zoete Wedd 15
F5 County NatWest	 9
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The debriefing questionnaire reproduced in Appendix 5
contained a series of questions on the personal
characteristics of the participating analysts. Table 39
compares the analysts from different firms on these
characteristics.
Table 39
Personal Characteristics of Participating Analysts
n Age
Mean	 St.Dev.
Experience	 Number of
companies followed
Mean	 St.Dev.	 Mean	 St.Dev.
All (63) 31.6 6.7 5.3 4.2 19.1 4.8
Fl (16) 34.8 7.5 6.0 5.6 16.8 5.6
F2 (11) 30.5 6.8 4.7 3.1 18.0 9.6
F3 (12) 32.6 7.9 6.8 5.5 19.7 11.0
F4 (15) 29.5 4.1 4.5 2.2 22.2 2.3
F5 (9) 29.2 6.0 4.2 3.2 18.2 10.3
Firstly, we wanted to be sure that analysts from all firms
could be validly pooled and treated as part of the same
sample; i.e. that the mean values of their personal
characteristics do not differ significantly across firms. In
no case do pairwise t-tests permit rejecting the null
hypothesis of equality of means (at a = .05).
To be able to derive significant conclusions, it is important
that the subjects assigned to the experimental and control
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groups do not, on average, differ across personal
characteristics. Table 40 provides the relevant means and
standard deviations.
Table 40
Personal Characteristics of the Experimental
and the Control Group
Experimental	 Control
(n=35)	 (n=28)
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Age 30.6 5.4 32.7 8.1
Experience (years) 5.4 4.9 5.3 3.3
No. of companies
followed 19.7 11.6 18.3 7.0
In no case could the null hypothesis of difference in mean
characteristics be rejected using the t-test (at a = 0.05)
and therefore, we consider our experimental and control
groups as comparable in terms of subject characteristics.
5.7.2 The Scoring System
The manner in which the ratios are calculated provides the
basis for our experiment. Each ratio contains more than one
opportunity for correction. The exact number of such
opportunities depends on the particular window dressed
elements each set of window dressed accounts contain and is
thus not equal across ratios. In addition subjects receiving
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a case study containing only two window dressed elements
cateris paribus have fewer correction opportunities.
Therefore we decided to weight ratios for each set of
statements for each subject equally and then to attribute
scores on the basis of total number of potential corrections.
For example if there are 4 potential corrections in a ratio,
each is assigned a score of .25 and if there are 2
corrections each is scored .50.
An additional advantage of this approach is that it may be
easier to correct second and third elements in a ratio after
the need to correct first element is recognised. In addition,
such aspects are often related and therefore may be corrected
in series.
For the above reasons we believe that the scoring system
adopted will be able to measure better the correcting
performance of our subjects than simply adding together the
number of their corrections.
Looking in more detail at the potential for correction across
the 7 ratios provides the following:
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1- Sales margin
In this case, the operating profit is the sensitive item.
Pension contribution adjustments, extraordinary item
reclassification, the profit created by asset disposal and
the effect of merger on the profit number need to be
corrected for.
2- Return on equity
The definition of the term "return" may differ here from
one analyst to another. There are two possibilities: retained
profit before extraordinary items and net profit (after
extraordinary items). Considering the former definition
potential corrections would relate to deferred taxation,
pension contributions, extraordinary items, profit from sales
of assets, merger and hidden interest. The equity figure
remains the same except that, in the extreme, the effect of
all the corrections on the net profit may be deducted from
(or added to) the profit and loss reserve. The net profit
figure considerations are the same save for extraordinary
items.
3- Return on total assets
The numerator, in this case, may be taken before tax.
Therefore, the applicable corrections to the return term will
be the same as in the preceding case except for deferred
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taxation. Total assets will be modified by leased assets or
by the assets of the non-consolidated subsidiary or of the
non-subsidiary subsidiary.
4- Price/earnings ratio
There is nothing to change in the price, of course.
Earnings per share are calculated from the profit after tax
before extraordinary items which is the definition of return
we have use for the second ratio. Therefore all the
modifications applicable to the denominator are the same as
for the numerator in the second ratio.
5- Gearing
Gearing relates to measures of total or long term debt to
equity. The numerator is the term needing to be corrected in
the case of a non-consolidated subsidiary, a non-subsidiary
subsidiary or for the non-capitalisation of leased assets.
6- Liquidity ratio
The liquidity ratio involves only a few items in the
financial statements. We will not expect any modification of
the assets used. However, some of the liabilities may be
affected by consolidation of the non-consolidated subsidiary
or by the liabilities belonging to the non-subsidiary
subsidiary.
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7- Book value of net assets per share
It will include all the modifications undertaken on the
assets in the ratio three's denominator and in the
liabilities in ratio five's numerator. However, the number of
shares is taken straightforward or diluted and is not
affected by any of the window dressed items.
5.8 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.8.1 Ratio Definition
Although our experimental method tested the ability of our
financial analysts to conduct meaningful financial ratio
analysis, for reporting to the directors of research in the
5 participating firms, for their own purposes, this question
was not important for our purposes save as a hygiene factor
in our study. A wide spectrum of definitions was accepted as
valid as long as they related in some way to definitions
proposed by the literature and were logically consistent.
Table 41 shows the rate of success of participating analysts
in defining ratios.
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Table 41
Percentage of Correct Ratio Definition
Description	 Rate of Success
%
Price/earnings ratio 99
Sales margin 94
Gearing ratio 89
Return on equity 79
Book value of net assets per share 70
Return on total assets 66
Liquidity ratio (acid test) 60
Average: 81
The overall success rate suggests a fair degree of skill and
ability in this task. However, the range in performance is
wide, from 99% for the key price earnings ratio, down to only
60% for the liquidity ratio.
These results also demonstrate clearly that analysts are
generally better at handling profit based ratios than balance
sheet based measures and therefore indicate which items they
consider more important. Many of them admitted, in their
answer, not even to know any definition for a liquidity ratio
which implies that the liquidity situation may not be very
important for them when assessing the potential of a company
at the time the research was conducted.
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Also, the gearing ratio was strangely calculated. Analysts
took only the long term debt as numerator but they subtracted
the cash from this amount even if there were many short term
liabilities including borrowing, far more than the available
cash. We consider this calculation as illogical, but as we
were told by the directors of research that this was the way
the ratio is sometimes calculated in stockbroking firms, we
did accept this method as correct. However, from our point of
view, it is an indication that ratio analysis may be a little
bit too mechanically done in the day to day work of
stockbroking analysts.
5.8.2 Corrections for Window Dressing
The first hypothesis we wanted to test was about the
propensity to correct for window dressing exhibited by
investment analysts. Table 42 gives the rate of correction
for the entire sample broken down by firm and for the
experimental and the control groups
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Table 42
Rates of Correction
n	 Mean(%)
	
St.Dev.(%)
Total sample	 63	 2.6	 5.9
Experimental group	 35	 2.2	 5.8
Control group	 28	 3.1	 6.2
(The hypothesis of the equality of the means between experimental and
control groups cannot be rejected at a ‘ .05)
Neither of the rates of correction is significant at the .05
level which suggests that the observed rate of correction
cannot be distinguished from no corrections at all.
The actual correction rates for the two groups separately are
too low to be interpreted meaningfully. As such, they must be
taken together to indicate that the participating analysts
effectively did not correct for window dressed items in the
research instrument.
If we consider the corrections independently of the ratios
(more than one correction is possible in one ratio
calculation) 26 corrections were made by a total of 11
analysts.
Such low correction rates render useless the somewhat
sophisticated experimental design established to test
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differences between schemes. Therefore, the only evidence we
can bring to the second hypothesis is that the different
combinations seem to have no effect on the rates of
recognition as all combinations seem to produce the same low
results.
Another conclusion is that, in general, the experimental and
the control groups exhibit the same behaviour. Therefore,
specifying that we were looking for window dressed elements
in the financial statements had no effect on the
participating analysts' propensity to correct. In fact, from
the 11 subjects having made at least one correction, 5 were
from the experimental group and 6 from the control group
which implies that there is no significant difference in the
correcting behaviour of both groups.
5.8.3 Correctors and Non-Correctors
If we group all subjects together and compare the
characteristics of those 11 who had made at least one
correction to those who did nothing, the average correction
rate for correctors at 15% (s.d. 4.6%) then differs
significantly to 0 at a = .01.
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Since there is no relationship to group we must look at the
personal characteristics of participating analysts for an
explanation. Table 43 compares the personal characteristics
of correctors and non-correctors.
Table 43
Personal Characteristics of Correctors
and Non-Correctors
Correctors	 Non-Correctors
(n = 11)
Mean	 St.Dev.
(n = 52)
Mean	 St.Dev.
Age 33 7.6 31 6.6
Experience (years) 10.1 7.5 4.4 2.5
No. of companies
followed 20.7 10.2 18.7 9.7
The only significant difference between both groups is the
number of years of experience (at a < .05) with mean of 10.1
years for correctors and only 4.4 years for non-correctors.
We would have expected that a difference in terms of number
of years of experience would be accompanied by a difference
in the age. It is not the case, which suggests that analysts
do not all start at a similar age and come into investment
analysis via different routes. This is in fact supported by
the debriefing questionnaire responses with educational
background ranging from no degree to a Ph.D. (two cases).
There were two qualified accountants in our sample. If
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correcting is an example of the desirable behaviour from
investment analysts, our results may suggest that financial
analysis is not learnt at school but in practice and that
experience is the crucial factor to judge the quality of an
analyst.
5.8.4 Window Dressing Recognition
The debriefing questionnaire contained two questions taking
into account the possibility that a low rate of correction
may not be due to a weakness in the ability of financial
analysts to recognize window dressed elements but to other
factors.
These questions were: have you noticed any window dressed
item in the two sets of accounts? and, did it change
something in the way you have calculated the ratios?
An interesting, even if surprising, result related to the
relationship between answers to the questions concerning
window dressing recognition and the corrections analysts
believe they have made. Table 44 summarises the answers to
both questions for all participating analysts and with a
breakdown for experimental and control groups.
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Table 44
Window Dressing Noticed and Perceived Corrections Made
(% of analysts answering "yes")
n Noticed
(%)
Perceived
Corrections
Made (%)
Overall sample 63 67 61
Experimental group 35 68 61
Control group 28 65 60
(The hypothesis of the equality of the means for the experimental and the
control groups cannot be rejected at a 5 .05 for both questions).
Two-thirds of the subjects stated that they have seen window
dressed items in their case study material and, more
surprising, 61 percent believe such recognition changed the
way they have calculated their ratios.
If we consider the same questions answered by correctors and
non-correctors, we obtain the results showed in Table 45.
Table 45
Window Dressing Noticed and Perceived Corrections
Made by Correctors and Non-correctors
n	 Noticed	 Perceived
Corrections Made
Overall sample 63 67 61
Correctors 11 100 91
Non-correctors 52 56 46
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All correctors admit having seen window dressed elements and
91% (10 out of 11) of them admit having made corrections. The
difference between correctors and non-correctors for these
two questions is significant (a ^ .05).
We can easily believe that more window dressed items were
recognised than those for which corrections were made. This
is corroborated by examples given by participants in the
margin to their answers to this question. Table 46 lists the
items mentioned in the answer making the distinction between
those which were corrected and those which were not.
Table 46
List of Window Dressed Items
Given by Respondents
Mentioned in Corrections No Corrections
the answers made	 made
Extraordinary items 3 1 2
Profits on sales
of assets 4 3 1
Merger 2 0 2
Leased assets 3 0 3
Non consolidated
subsidiary 3 1
15 5 10
From table 46 we see that an additional 10 schemes were
correctly identified but not corrected for, by a total of 8
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participants, 3 who were in the correction group and 5 who
had made no formal corrections. However, we are not able to
use such margin entries to generalise about the degree of
recognition but non-correction because of the voluntary
disclosure basis. Nonetheless, taking into account the high
percentage of perceived corrections compared with actual
corrections, we are forced to doubt that 67% of participants
had really observed the presence of window dressed items in
their case study material.
A possible explanation for the belief of 61% of the subjects
that they had corrected for window dressing while only 17.5%
(11/63) of the sample actually had, may reside in the
definition of what is window dressing. Do analysts really
understand what it means?
Participating analysts may have made corrections relating to
other elements which were not tested and, in our opinion, not
clearly window dressed (even if their accounting treatment
may have been questionable) considering such items to be
window dressed; e.g., we found a number of adjustments made
for equity dilution factors which may have been so viewed.
Obviously, this apparent contradiction necessitates further
research to be explained.
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5.8.5 The Seriousness of Window Dressing for Analysts
The debriefing questionnaire also asked analysts their degree
of confidence in financial statements and how seriously they
viewed the problem of window dressing.
Table 47 reports the scores on these two somewhat related
questions for the overall sample and for the experimental and
the control group separately. For confidence in financial
statements, the scale goes from 1 = total confidence to 6 =
no confidence and for the seriousness of window dressing the
scale goes from 1 = very serious to 6 = not serious at all.
Table 47
Confidence in Financial Statements
and Seriousness of Window Dressing
n	 Confidence	 Seriousness
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Overall sample 63 3.1 1.0 3.1 1.0
Experimental group 35 3.1 1.2 3.0 1.3
Control group 28 3.1 0.8 3.2 1.3
Table 47 shows a high degree of centrality in the answers
given. There were no significant differences between firms in
general on these questions and no significant differences
between the 11 correctors and the 52 non-correctors (at a
level of confidence of a < .05). These results would be
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consistent with a general lack of interest and of concern
about these issues.
5.9 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Rates of correction for window dressing in our study do not
differ significantly from zero. Therefore our null hypothesis
that analysts do correct appropriately for window dressing
cannot be supported by our results which suggests that
analysts may not change the results of their analysis to take
into account window dressing in financial statements.
However, as we have some indications that analysts may have
seen more schemes than they had corrected for, it may not be
their ability to pick up window dressed items that is
necessarily in question, but their subsequent actions.
We submitted our results to the directors of research in the
firms who helped us. In general, they were not surprised by
our results. Two explanations were given. Firstly, the level
of expertise in financial analysis of certain of their
younger financial analysts may have been below that desired
by the research directors reflecting the fact that they might
have been in a bull market for much of their working life
when it was not necessary to investigate company finances
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very deeply. This is consistent with our finding that those
who made at least one correction had, on average, more than
10 years experience, while those who did not correct had just
over 4 years experience as investment analysts.
They also pointed out that an analyst's (valid) reaction,
when facing window dressed financial statements, may not be
to correct their forecasts but to call the company's
financial director to seek an explanation. They may also have
to protect their principal source of information, company
contacts, so they are very careful before correcting for any
window dressed items in print.
We should also note that stockbroking firms are competing in
the information market and must thus respond to the demands
of their clients, principally institutional investors. To a
great extent investment analyst performance is evaluated by
the accuracy of their forecasts. This accuracy is not judged
by their forecasts of what might be termed 'real' profit but
the presented profit. This gives analysts a great incentive
to forecast the window dressed profit. At least when the
research was conducted, there was no market for creative
accounting adjustments.
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Moreover, as pointed out by one director of research,
analysts basically are concerned with predicting correctly
the future share price, not the "real" future profit.
Table 6, page 86, shows that firms' published financial
statements are very important for analysts. However, we may
wonder why they rank accounts so highly if they apparently
have problems processing such information in an unbiased way.
A number of reasons can be proposed. Firstly, we may consider
that analysts tend to work with intangible and incomplete
information, sometimes mere rumour and gossip. The annual
report and accounts is the only complete document that will
figure in their file. Also, financial statements, as they are
audited supposedly by independent professionals, offer some
guarantee of objectivity. Such advantages of the financial
statements, on the other hand, may not overcome their
perceived lack of timeliness. When the accounts are finally
released almost all the effect they may have is already
impounded in share prices (Firth, 1980; Rippington and
Taffler, 1993). In addition we should note that skilled
financial analysis requires substantial technical expertise
and knowledge and a lot of time. Such reasons may perhaps
provide some explanation why a firm's accounts are not
necessarily always analysed in depth.
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This study took place in the first half of 1990 before the
recession had fully started to impact. It may be that now
stockbroking analysts view financial analysis as of more
fundamental importance and were we to repeat our research our
conclusions would be very different. In fact soon after we
reported our results to the participating firms, at least
three instituted rigorous revision courses in financial
analysis for all their analysts.
In a bull market, window dressing may not matter as much.
However, in a bear market, with companies experiencing
trading difficulties, profit falls and financing problems, it
becomes crucial for investment analysts to understand clearly
the company's true financial position. Also, in such
difficult markets, stockbroking firms may seek to
differentiate themselves by offering high quality financial
analysis to attract business which was not necessary when
returns were appealing by themselves.
Other caveats relate to the nature of the experiment itself:
1- the study was conducted within set time limits, which may
have hindered participating analysts from completing the task
fully. However, the very low rate of correction raises doubts
as to whether more time would have produced better results.
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2- participating analysts may not have read the instructions,
relying on the introductory verbal presentation alone, and
then not have picked up what the experiment was about.
However, the verbal presentation, even if never mentioning
the words window dressing directly, which appeared only in
the control group's instructions, insisted on the fact that
the research was specifically about the way analysts
manipulated accounting numbers taken from published accounts
to suit their particular needs.
3- potential lack of motivation of participants and
consequent lack of interest in the task. However, in each
case we were introduced by the relevant head of research who
selected the participants, stressed the importance of the
research and his personal interest in their results. In
addition, it was clearly evident the subjects treated the
exercice in a serious and careful manner.
4- potential lack of verisimilitude of the case studies.
However it would be difficult to envisage any more realistic
research instrument than real accounts and conventional ratio
computations.
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Thus, we believe that although such factors could potentially
have lowered the correction rate, it is not likely that they
could explain alone such a low rate overall.
Therefore, we may conclude from our results that at least at
the time the research was conducted stockbroking analysts
were not tending to make adjustments for window dressing in
the accounts they analysed, which may have implications for
market behaviour.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis is concerned with the potential impact of firm
manipulation of accounting information on investment analyst
information processing behaviour.
Such window dressing of company accounts is often denounced
but rarely codified in a financial statement text (Smith,
1992, is probably the only example).
Our analysis highlights the presence of a fair degree of
creative accounting in UK company financial statements.
However, we must be aware that our discovered rate of window
dressing schemes is only an indication of the real position
because a number of schemes are almost impossible to detect
if not directly disclosed. Therefore, UK company accounts are
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more likely to be more heavily window dressed in practice
than our results indicate.
We were unable to establish any relationship between the
financial situation of the firm, as measured by a UK Altman
Z-Score equivalent, and the rate of window dressing found in
the accounts save relating to the gearing figure. This result
was unexpected and remain partly unexplained.
We do not believe, however, that our findings are really
conclusive on this question. If window dressing exists, it
must have a specific goal which has to be to improve the
image the firm presents to investors, actual or potential.
Therefore, we believe that further work is required to
explore the issue.
The potential effect window dressing might have on investors
is dependent on the importance of financial statement
information in their judgmental process. We chose to focus on
the key information intermediaries, investment analysts,
because of their crucial role in ensuring market efficiency.
To evaluate the importance given to accounting information by
them a detailed content analysis of stockbroking circulars
was conducted.
257
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis sought first to identify the principal factors
driving the different types of stockbroker recommendation.
Accounting numbers, in particular profit, may have a certain
role in this process but would appear to be less important
than current trading conditions, the quality of management
and its future strategy. However, the rates of
differentiation between recommendations although
statistically significant, were not as good as expected,
principally due to a lack of homogeneity between firms in the
methods of analysis they used to make their buy/sell/hold
recommendations.
This heterogeneity was apparent when we tried to discriminate
between stockbroking houses and found good rates of
discrimination. One of the principal elements distinguishing
between stockbroking firms was the emphasis or otherwise on
profitability which had a very different degree of importance
depending on the firm concerned.
Further work will need to take into account statistically
interactions between recommendation criteria and firms and in
addition work explicitely at the individual firm level using
a large data sample. Nonetheless, it is clear that accounting
information does not have the same importance for different
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investment analyst firms with the corollary that window
dressing will thus not have the same effect on all analysts.
We may expect that some of them will make corrections to take
window dressing into consideration as profit is very
important for them and some will do nothing as intangible
factors such as management and trading conditions are far
more important to them in coming to a view of the firm.
Chapter five explores the extent to which a relatively large
sample of experienced City-based stockbroking investment
analysts was able to deal with window dressing of financial
statements using a novel methodological approach. This
involved monitoring the extent to which they adjusted for
creative accounting in a special designed research
instrument.
Key results were that the degree of correction differed
insignificantly from zero but those analysts who did correct
were more experienced, also that published accounting
information is important but less so than company contacts
etc...
As laboratory experimental methodology was used there are
problems of generalisation to the investment analyst
community generally. Also our results may be time specific.
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Nonetheless the detailed discussion in the chapter suggests
our findings are very unlikely to be experimental artefacts.
At least, two conclusions are possible: 1) investment
analysts have no idea how to detect and correct for window
dressing 2) window dressing is not relevant for investment
analyst purposes.
From the lack of homogeneity found across firms in our
analysis of circulars, we may believe that both explanations
are partly appropriate. On the one hand, many investment
analysts are relatively new to the profession and have
limited skill in dealing with accounting manipulations. On
the other hand, stockbrokers are in the business of selling
shares and are consequently interested not in predicting the
"true profit" or even next year's reported profit, but in
predicting the future share price.
Investment analysis is a young and heterogeneous profession
that is not yet strictly formalised. For example other
researchers have underlined the wide spectrum of methods used
in different stockbroking firms to appraise equity. Our
results raise the question of whether investment analysts in
fact play the important role they are supposed to assume in
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making the stockmarket more efficient, whether you subscribe
to the naive investor or the efficient market hypothesis.
Market efficiency is no more the absolute notion it was in
the seventies. Investment analysts have an important role to
play even if the market is basically efficient. This role
encompasses the interpretation of accounting information
before and after the accounts are published. Our results show
no evidence that analysts are generally active in this
direction. More research is needed in this area.
If investors are not able to decode financial information by
themselves and have a tendency to place too much emphasis on
the reported profit figure (the functional fixation
hypothesis), then investment analysts on our evidence are not
able or motivated to redress the situation and interpret the
firm's accounting information appropriately for them.
The question of the role investment analysts play is crucial
in the understanding of market behaviour. If in fact
accounting information is not of deep relevance to the
stockmarket, which is satisfied with soft, informal sources
of information, however much lip service is paid to the idea,
then how has the accounting system managed to survive in its
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present form so well? Is in fact the idea of user needs in
this context something of a shibboleth?
Our negative results, on their own, can only hint at one
aspect of the relationship between investment analysis and
accounting information and its implication for market
efficiency. Further research is needed to understand more
exactly the nature of this relationship. It would probably be
a good idea not to base such future work on an initial
assumption of the market as being informationally efficient,
because this can so easily prove tautological. It is
necessary to integrate the findings of related disciplines
such as psychology and sociology in establishing a more
complex but more representative model of the stockmarket and
the manner in which information is processed by it.
262
APPENDIX 1 OPINIONS OF UK BIG EIGHT TECHNICAL PARTNERS...
OPINIONS OF UK BIG EIGHT'S TECHNICAL PARTNERS
ON THE WINDOW DRESSING OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1. WINDOW DRESSING
1.1 How seriously do you see the problem of window
dressing?
i) Serious	 ii) Serious
iii) Moderate	 iv) Moderate
v) Very serious
1.2 How do you evaluate the quality of investment analysts
in general?
	
i) good	 ii) bad
	
iii) good	 iv) very good
v) very bad
1.3 Do you believe that investment analysts can be fooled?
i) sometimes	 ii) often
iii) rarely	 iv) sometimes
v) all the time
1.4 Do you believe that the market in general can be
fooled?
i) no	 ii) fairly
iii) not really	 iv) a little
v) very much
2 DEFERRED TAXATION
2.1 Do you believe the liability method is the best?
	
i) yes	 ii) yes
	
iii) yes	 iv) yes
v) yes
2.2 Would it be possible to fix a minimum rate of
provision?
	
i) no	 ii) no
	
iii) no	 iv) no
v) yes
2.3 Do you believe the direct payments method to be a
solution?
i) yes	 ii) no
iii) no	 iv) no
v) no
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2.4 Is there any window dressing in deferred taxation?
i) possibly	 ii) possibly
iii)	 iv) not really
v) a lot
3 PENSION SCHEMES
3.1 Do you see the pension to be difficult to standardize?
i) very	 ii) very
iii)	 iv) very
v) very
3.2 Do you believe that a use of a surplus through a
contribution holiday must be presented as an
extraordinary item?
i)	 ii) --
iii)	 iv) yes
v) yes
3.3 Are pension surpluses from closure extraordinary
items?i)	 ii)
iv) yes
v) yes
4 EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS
4.1 Are investment analysts fooled by extraordinary items?
i) not fooled	 ii) no
iii) no	 iv) no
v) yes
4.2 Should the extraordinary items remain or be abolished?
i) remain
	 ii) abolished
iii) remain	 iv) remain
v) remain
4.3 Are Extraordinary items misused?
i) no issue	 ii) misused
iii) not so misused 	 iv) misused
v) very misused
4.4 Do you believe it possible to produce a statistical
definition of what is an extraordinary item (based on
the frequency)?
i) no	 ii) no
iii) no	 iv) no
v) no
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5 DEPRECIATION
5.1 Should depreciation be taken on every tangible fixed
asset?
	
i) yes	 ii) yes
	
iii) yes	 iv) yes
v) yes
5.2 Can depreciation be split?
	
i) yes	 ii) no
	
iii) yes	 iv) no
v) no
5.3 Is 2% of depreciation on buildings a proper rate?
i) --	 ii) low
iii) low	 iv) low
v) depend
5.4 Would reducing balance be a better depreciation
method?
	
i) --	 ii) better
	
iii) --	 iv) not better
v) --
5.5 Do you believe that any revaluation must be clearly
stated?
	
i) --	 ii) yes
	
iii) --	 iv) yes
v) yes
5.6 Do you believe that amount in the revaluation reserve
must balance with the amount added to the assets?
i) -- ii) no issue
iii)
v)
must balance
Must balance
iv) don't know
6 MERGER AND ACQUISITION
6.1 Do you believe merger accounting to be the best
method?
i) matter of assets movement ii) no vendor placing
iii) no clear views	 iv) --
v) best method in substance
6.2 Do you believe acquisition accounting to be the best
method?
i) form	 ii) --
iii) --	 iv) best method
v)--
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6.3 Do you agree that the use of a merger reserve is a
problem?
i) --	 ii) no
iii) no issue	 iv) no
v) no
6.4 Is goodwill real?
i) real	 ii) wind
iii) --	 iv) real
v) real
6.5 Must goodwill be written off against reserves?
	
i) no	 ii) yes
	
iii) no	 iv) no
v) no
6.6 Can we fix a maximum time limit for the amortization
of goodwill?
i) no	 ii) no
iii) 10 years (in a way)	 iv) --
v) yes
6.7 Must the goodwill be left in the balance sheet?
i) yes	 ii) no
iii) no	 iv) no
v) no
7 INTANGIBLE ASSETS
7.1 Must intangible assets be depreciated?
i) --	 ii) yes
iii) mostly	 iv) yes
v) yes
7.2 Is it possible to fix a relatively short period for
depreciation purposes?
	
i) --	 ii) no
	
iii) no	 iv) no
v) no
7.3 Do you believe intangibles can be revalued?
i) dangerous	 ii) ---
iii) --	 iv) ---
v) --
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8 CAPITAL AND RESERVES
8.1 Are capital and reserves important?
i) an accounting difference 	 ii) --
iii) --	 iv) --
v) --
8.2 Do you agree that the share premium must be
abolished?
	
i) --	 ii) non issue
	
iii) --	 iv) no
v) non issue
8.3 Can the revaluation reserve be used for writing off
anything?
i) --	 ii) limited uses
iii) limited uses	 iv) ---
v) limited uses
8.4 Is there some reserve against which no goodwill may
be written off?
i) ---	 ii) revaluation
reserve
iii) revaluation reserve 	 iv) --
v) revenue reserve
9 FOREIGN CURRENCY
9.1 What is the best rate for translating accounts?
	
i) --	 ii) depend on currency
performance
iii) -- iv) balance sheet date
rate for balance
sheet.
v) cannot change so often
9.2 What do you think about splitting the effect of the
rate choice between the profit and loss account and
the reserves?
	
i) --	 ii) no issue
	
iii) --	 iv) --
v) --
10 OFF-BALANCE SHEET FINANCING?
10.1 Do investment analysts can see it?
i) very good analysts can 	 ii) no
iii) --	 iv) yes
v) no
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10.2 Is it seeable in the notes to the accounts?
i) yes	 ii) no
iii) often	 iv) often
v) no
10.3 Do the substance must prevail over the form?
i) yes	 ii) yes
iv) yes
v) yes
10.4 Which are the worst schemes?
i) non subsidiary subsidiaries ii) non subsidiary
sub.
iii)	 iv) non subsidiary
sub.
v) non subsidiary sub. -sales & repurchase of assets
10.5 How serious is the problem?
i) serious	 ii) serious
iii) moderate	 iv) serious
v) serious
10.6 Do you reject these practices?
i) not necessarily	 ii) fairly
iii) yes but softly	 iv) yes
v) yes
11 OTHERS
11.1 Do you see any other important issues relating to
window dressing?
	
i) no	 ii) no
	
iii) no	 iv) revenue
recognition
v) equity-debt issue, bonds and discount loans
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LIST OF THE COMPANIES ANALYSED
1. B.A.T. INDUSTRIES PLC
2. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
3. J SAINBURY PLC
4. THORN EMI PLC
5. GUINNESS PLC
6. Gni PLC
7. REED INTERNATIONAL PLC
8. ARGYLL GROUP PLC
9. HILLSDOWN HOLDINGS PLC
10. HAWKER SIDDELEY GROUP PLC
11. PLESSEY COMPANY PLC
12. BOWATER INDUSTRIES PLC
13. W.H. SMITH GROUP PLC
14. BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL PLC
15. BUNZL PLC
16. PEARSON PLC
17. JOHN LAING PLC
18. IMI PLC
19. COSTAIN GROUP PLC
20. ENGLISH CHINA CLAYS PLC
21. UNITED NEWSPAPERS PLC
22. DAVY CORPORATION PLC
23. POWELL DUFFRYN PLC
24. FOSECO MINSEP PLC
25. MATTHEW HALL PLC
26. B.S.G. INTERNATIONAL PLC
27. DIXONS GROUP PLC
28. TOOTAL GROUP PLC
29. GESTETNER HOLDINGS PLC
30. HEPWORTH CERAMIC HOLDINGS PLC
31. DAWSON INTERNATIONAL PLC
32. RUGBY GROUP PLC (THE)
33. POLLY PECK INTERNATIONAL PLC
34. Y.J. LOVELL (HOLDINGS) PLC
35. WILLIAM BAIRD PLC
36. MORGAN CRUCIBLE CO. PLC
37. WM LOW & COMPANY PLC
38. DOBSON PARK INDUSTRIES PLC
39. PORTALS HOLDINGS PLC
40. AVON RUBBER PLC
41. AVANA GROUP PLC
42. COATES BROTHERS PLC
43. HAZLEWOOD FOODS PLC
44. BURTON GROUP PLC (THE)
45. MEGGITT HOLDINGS PLC
46. LOOKERS PLC
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47. FINE ART DEVELOPMENTS PLC
48. BRYANT GROUP PLC
49. RUSH & TOMPKINS GROUP PLC
50. M.K. ELECTRIC GROUP PLC
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SOURCES OF THE CIRCULARS USED IN THE CONTENT ANALYSIS
NAME OF THE COMPANY	 RECOMMENDATION
FIRM 1
1- Aaronson Brothers	 hold
2- Marley	 buy
3- Cala	 sell
4- Boots	 sell
5- De La Rue	 sell
6- Racal Telecom	 sell
7- Scottish Metropolitan	 sell
8- Compass Group	 hold
9- FKI	 hold
10- IMI	 hold
11- Greenall Whitley	 hold
12- Jeyes Group	 hold
13- Weir Group	 hold
14- Mecca Leisure Group	 buy
15- Lamont Holdings	 buy
16- Hays	 buy
17- MB Group	 buy
18- Stakis	 buy
19- Spring Ram	 buy
FIRM 2
1- Pentland Group	 buy
2- IMI	 buy
3- Tyne Tees Television	 buy
4- Yorkshire Chemicals	 buy
5- Bowthorpe Holdings	 buy
6- Ladbroke	 buy
7- Tesco	 buy
8- Asw Holdings
	 sell
9- Wimpey	 sell
10- Beazer	 sell
11- Marley	 sell
12- Lucas Industries	 sell
13- GKN	 sell
14- Tomkins plc	 hold
15- Glynwed
	 hold
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16- Vickers	 hold
17- John Laing	 hold
18- Cambridge Electronic Industries	 hold
19- Ratners	 hold
20- ICI	 hold
21- Boots	 hold
FIRM 3
1- English China Clays hold
2- George wimpey (add) hold
3- Brammer sell
4- British Gas sell
5- Johnson Matthey sell
6- TI (add) hold
7- FKI (add) hold
8- Misys hold
9- Morgan Crucible hold
10- Yellohammer hold
11- Nurdin & Peacock hold
12- Storehouse hold
13- Costain Group hold
14- Butler Cox buy
15- Abbott Mead Vickers buy
16- Grand Metropolitan buy
17- Ladbroke Group Plc buy
18- Cable & Wireless buy
19- TI buy
20- NSM buy
21- The Rugby Group Buy
22- Hanson buy
FIRM 4
1- CH Industries
2- Schroders
3- Hambros
4- Scottish & Newcastle
5- Richemont
6- Hestair
7- Attwoods
8- Greycoat
9- FR Group
10- BSS Group
11- Rolls Royce
12- Fairey Group
hold
sell
sell
sell
hold
buy
buy
buy
buy
buy
buy
hold
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13- Wellcome hold
14- M.L. Holdings hold
15- Huntingdon International Holdings hold
16- Pilkington buy
17- London International (wh) sell
18- Smith and Nephew (wh) sell
19- Whatham Reeve Angel (wh) sell
20- Brown & Tawse (wh) sell
21- Rotork (wh) sell
22- The Boddington Group hold
FIRM 5
1-
2-
3-
4-
Provident Financial Group
P & 0
Lonrho
Nurdin & Peacock
hold
hold
hold
hold
5- Unilever hold
6- Whitbread hold
7- Eurotherm International hold
8- British Airways sell
9- Blue Circle Industries sell
10- Burmah Castrol sell
11- ASW Holdings sell
12- Glynwed International sell
13- Llyods Bank sell
14- Dixons Group sell
15- Fairey Group buy
16- Rolls-Royce buy
17- Wilson Bowden buy
18- Willis Faber buy
19- British Petroleum buy
20- Bardon Group buy
21- Logitek buy
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POOLED WITHIN-GROUPS CORRELATION MATRICES
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN RECOMMENDATIONS
MODEL 1
V1
V1	 1.00
V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9
V2 .13 1.00
V3 .23 .41 1.00
V4 .01 -.15 -.08 1.00
V5 -.18 -.04 -.10 .11 1.00
V6 -.07 -.01 -.04 .09 .33 1.00
V7 .01 -.13 -.16 .16 -.12 -.17 1.00
V8 -.03 -.08 -.28 -.09 .00 -.14 .15 1.00
V9 .04 .08 .34 .11 -.30 -.01 -.03 .07 1.00
V10 .13 -.20 -.01 -.01 .14 .12 -.04 -.12 -.29
V11 .19 .04 -.12 -.02 -.04 .07 -.01 .08 .11
V12 .07 .05 .15 -.05 .16 .17 -.03 -.13 .07
V13 -.02 -.07 -.01 .05 .12 -.04 .06 .11 .17
V14 -.09 .03 -.17 -.09 .07 -.02 -.05 -.08 -.12
V15 -.04 -.10 .06 -.00 .00 .13 .12 .07 .12
V16 -.12 -.01 -.10 .06 -.08 .19 -.07 -.06 .09
V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16
V10 1.00
V11 .04 1.00
V12 -.20 -.11 1.00
V13 -.02 .08 .09 1.00
V14 -.11 .14 -.15 .15 1.00
V15 -.00 -.01 .00 .07 -.16 1.00
V16 -.07 .01 -.13 -.25 .05 .03 1.00
(Variables are presented in the order given in Table 33, from
V1= profitability positive, to V15 = management and strategy
negative. V16 is ln(turnover) and was added as a proxy for
the size.)
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MODEL 2
V1
V1 1.00
V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10
V2 -.15 1.00
V3	 .15 .12 1.00
V4	 .15 -.08 -.06 1.00
V5 -.01 -.20 .17 -.23 1.00
V6 -.19 .30 -.10 -.02 -.31 1.00
V7 -.03 .05 .11 .12 -.05 -.14 1.00
V8	 .06 .30 .47 -.06 -.09 .12 .12 1.00
V9	 .18 -.13 -.03 .19 -.06 -.00 .02 -.02 1.00
V10 .00 .00 -.02 -.04 .20 -.06 .10 .27 -.01 1.00
V11-.12 -.02 .05 -.13 -.10 -.03 -.01 -.13 -.20 -.05
(Variables are presented in the order given in Table 34, from
V1= Firm, to V10 = Negative. V11 is ln(turnover) and was
added as a proxy for the size.)
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN FIRMS
MODEL 1
V1
V1	 1.00
V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9
V2 .09 1.00
V3 .10 .14 1.00
V4 -.06 -.18 -.09 1.00
V5 -.18 .07 -.06 .09 1.00
V6 -.08 .04 .03 .08 .31 1.00
V7 .06 -.17 -.13 .23 -.15 -.22 1.00
V8 -.02 -.10 -.28 -.05 .00 -.13 .13 1.00
V9 -.14 -.13 .22 .07 -.33 .02 .07 .15 1.00
V10 .24 -.16 .01 -.05 -.12 .01 -.02 -.12 -.33
V11 .21 .18 -.14 -.14 -.05 -.02 .03 .11 -.01
V12 .01 -.00 .15 -.01 .14 .16 -.07 -.13 .12
V13 .02 -.03 -.05 .00 .13 -.13 .04 .09 .11
V14 -.01 .16 -.15 -.13 .07 -.05 -.04 -.10 -.14
V15 -.15 -.18 .08 .02 -.00 .10 .05 .09 .17
V16 -.04 .00 -.07 .08 -.08 .21 -.06 -.08 .15
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V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16
V10
V11
V12
V13
V14
V15
V16
1.00
.02
-.15
.01
-.12
-.01
-.13
1.00
-.12
.12
.17
-.04
.02
1.00
.05
-.11
-.15
-.03
1.00
.21
.00
-.24
1.00
-.12
-.03
1.00
.17 1.00
(Variables are presented in the order given in Table 33, from
V1= profitability positive, to V15 = management and strategy
negative. V16 is 1n(turnover) and was added as a proxy for
the size.)
MODEL 2
V1
V1 1.00
V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10
V2 -.13 1.00
V3	 .22 .05 1.00
V4	 .10 -.08 -.05 1.00
V5	 .02 -.26 .14 -.26 1.00
V6 -.18 .25 -.12 -.03 -.35 1.00
V7 -.04 .03 .05 .05 -.09 -.17 1.00
V8	 .20 .21 .44 .01 -.20 .04 .10 1.00
V9	 .15 -.16 -.06 .15 -.07 -.04 -.05 -.03 1.00
V10 .11 -.12 -.11 -.09 .14 -.12 .03 .08 -.07 1.00
V11-.14 .01 .14 -.08 -.06 -.01 .09 -.08 -.15 .04
(Variables are presented in the order given in Table 34, from
V1 = Firm, to V10 = Negative. V11 is ln(turnover) and was
added as a proxy for the size.)
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CASE STUDY MATERIAL
This appendix reproduces an example of the case study
material given to the participants to the experiment reported
in chapter 5.
First, we have a complete set of instruction given to the
members of the experimental group. Then, we have the first
two pages of the set of instructions given to the control
group. The differences between both sets of instruction are
all there in the first page. Finally we have a set of
financial statements from Dawson International manipulated to
contain some window dressing schemes.
277
APPENDIX 5 CASE STUDY MATERIAL
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS
Stockbroking analysts use financial ratios as an important
tool in interpreting a company's performance and financial
position and as a basis for forecasting future performance.
Analysts need to be able to rely on the accounting numbers
provided by companies in their financial statements and
footnotes as being both relevant and accurate.
Our research is designed to identify areas where the
provision of accounting information to the investment
community can be improved.
To meet this objective we ask you to calculate seven widely
used accounting ratios in the same way you would normally do
if you were preparing a report on a company for clients. This
will help us understand which are the key accounting numbers
as far as you are concerned and your particular accounting
information needs.
The ratios are:
1- Sales margin (operating margin)
2- Return on equity
3- Return on total assets
4- Price/earnings ratio
5- Gearing
6- Liquidity ratio ('acid test')
7- Book value of net assets per share
You have the accounts for two different UK quoted industrial
companies and we would like you to calculate the above ratios
for each, A and B, for the latest year only, using the
information provided alone. So we can follow your
calculations and the particular numbers you have used, please
provide descriptions of the items you have included in your
numerators and denominators on the appropriate part of the
attached sheets for each company as well as the actual
numbers. An example is attached.
Please note we are particularly interested in the way you
adjust and correct the accounting numbers appearing in the
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two sets of financial statements and footnotes to derive your
ratios, rather than the arithmetic values of the ratios
themselves.
Keep notes of the times you take to complete the calculations
for company A and company B separately and include these at
the foot of the respective ratio calculation sheets. The
total exercise should take no more than one hour.
This exercise is being conducted for academic research
purposes only and your participation is on a strictly
confidential basis.
A brief questionnaire is attached at the end of the answer
sheets and we would ask you to complete this as well. Thank
you in advance for your assistance.
The share prices, at the date of publication of accounts,
were:
Company	 : 320p
Company	 : 395p
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ANSWER SHEET (example)
ASSET TURNOVER RATIO
= 	 turnover 	 (Accounting
tangible assets + current descriptions)
assets + leased assets
= 	 285,184 	 (Accounting
78,467 + 224,370 + 10,214
	 numbers)
= 285,194	 = .911	 (Ratio)
313,051
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ANSWER SHEET
Company A: year ending 03-31-1987 	 RATIOS COMMENTS
1- SALES MARGIN (operating margin)
	  = 	  (Accounting
descriptions)
= 	  (Accounting
numbers)
. 	  .	 (Ratio)
2- RETURN ON EQUITY
= 	
 (Accounting
descriptions)
= 	  (Accounting
numbers)
= 	  (Ratio)
3- RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS
	  = 	  (Accounting
descriptions)
= 	  (Accounting
numbers)
. 	
 (Ratio)
4- PRICE/EARNINGS RATIO
	  = 	  (Accounting
descriptions)
= 	
 (Accounting
numbers)
= 	
 (Ratio)
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5- GEARING
= 	  (Accounting
descriptions)
= 	  (Accounting
numbers)
= 	  (Ratio)
6- LIQUIDITY RATIO (acid test)
	  = 	  (Accounting
descriptions)
= 	  (Accounting
numbers)
= 	  (Ratio)
7- BOOK VALUE OF NET ASSETS PER SHARE
= 	  (Accounting
descriptions)
= 	  (Accounting
numbers)
= 	  (Ratio)
TOTAL TIME
--
 MINUTES
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QUESTIONNAIRE
1- Brief background data
1.1 Age
1.2 Degrees and/or professional qualifications 	
1.3 Number of years of experience as an investment analyst
1.4 Which sectors do you currently cover 	
1.5 Number of companies followed in detail on a regular
basis
2- Rank the different sources of information you use in
writing your reports and recommendations for companies, in
order of importance (i.e. 1= most important) on the
following list:
- annual accounting statements (i.e. P&L, balance sheet,
sources and applications of funds, footnotes)
- interim statements
- subsidiaries' accounts
- annual report content, other than accounting statements
(eg. chairman's statement, review of operations) 	
- trade journals
- statistical/macroeconomic forecasts
- preliminary release of annual results
- chart services
- direct company contacts and visits
- company PR/press reports
- other brokers' circulars
- your previous work and market data already
collected
- other, please specify
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3- How confident are you generally in the reliability of the
accounting numbers companies provide in their annual
reports and accounts?
1- totally confident
2
3
4-
5-
6- not confident at all
4- How serious a problem do you feel window-dressing
currently to be as far as you are concerned?
1- a very serious problem
2-
3-
4-
5-
6- not a problem at all
5- Have you noticed any window-dressed items in the sets of
financial statements submitted to you?
6- If you have noticed such window-dressed items, did it make
any difference when forming ratios?
7- Would you like a summary of our research results?
(If so, please complete the next sheet and detach it from
the rest of the documents)
8- Any additional comments?
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS
Stockbroking analysts use financial ratios as an important
tool in interpreting a company's performance and financial
position and as a basis for forecasting future performance.
Analysts need to be able to rely on the accounting numbers
provided by companies in their financial statements and
footnotes as being both relevant and accurate.
Our research is designed to show how financial analysts
respond to the presence of window-dressed items in accounting
statements and then to permit the elaboration of
recommendations to improve the provision of accounting
information to the stockmarket.
To meet this objective we ask you to calculate seven widely
used accounting ratios in the same way you would normally do
if you were preparing a report on a company for clients. This
will help us understand which are the key accounting numbers
as far as you are concerned and your particular accounting
information needs.
The ratios are:
1- Sales margin (operating margin)
2- Return on equity
3- Return on total assets
4- Price/earnings ratio
5- Gearing
6- Liquidity ratio ('acid test')
7- Book value of net assets per share
You have the accounts for two different UK quoted industrial
companies and we would like you to calculate the above ratios
for each, A and B, for the latest year only, using the
information provided alone. So we can follow your
calculations and the particular numbers you have used, please
provide descriptions of the items you have included in your
numerators and denominators on the appropriate part of the
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attached sheets for each company as well as the actual
numbers. An example is attached.
Please note we are particularly interested in the way you
adjust and correct the accounting numbers for any window-
dressed items you can identify in deriving your ratios rather
than the arithmetic values of the ratios themselves.
Keep notes of the times you take to complete the calculations
for company A and company B separately and include these at
the foot of the respective ratio calculation sheets. The
total exercise should take no more than one hour.
This exercise is being conducted for academic research
purposes only and your participation is on a strictly
confidential basis.
A brief questionnaire is attached at the end of the answer
sheets and we would ask you to complete this as well. Thank
you in advance for your assistance.
The share prices, at the date of publication of accounts,
were:
Company A: 320p
Company B: 395p
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DIRECTORS' REPORT
The directors submit the Balance Sheet of the
Company and the Consolidated Balance Sheet
at 31st March 1987 and the Consolidated
Profit end Loss Account for the year ended on
that date, together with supporting notes and
schedules.
Activities of the Group and Business
Review
The principal activities of the Group are in
industrial and commercial sectors. More
details of the activities and a full review of
the year are contained in the Chairman's
Statement and the Review of Group Activities.
Profits and Dividends
The consolidated profit for the year before
taxation was L42,129,000 (1986
135,123,000). The consolidated profit for
the year after taxation and extraordinary
items was L8,611,000 (1986
114,233,000). An interim dividend of 1.9p
per Ordinary share (1986 1.733p) was
paid and the directors recommend a final
dividend of 4.3p per share (1986 3.733p).
Subject to the necessary approval of the
members being given at the Annual General
Meeting to be held on 11th July 1987, the
final dividend on Ordinary sham will be
paid on 1st August 1987, to members on the
register on 26th June 1987.
Share Capital
On 12th June 1986, the authorised share
capital of the Company was increased from
131,250,000 to 147,000,000 by the
creation of an additional 63,000,000
Ordinary shares of 25p each.
An allocation of unissued capital is required
to cover options granted, but not exercised,
in the company's share option schemes
accounting in aggregate to L0.56m nominal
value.
Explanation of Resolutions Nos. 5 and
6
Under the Companies Act 1985, the Board
cannot allot shares without the authority of
the shareholders. In order to preserve the
Board's powers in respect of the unissued
Ordinary shares so that advantage may be
taken of any opportunity that occurs to effect
acquisitions on favourable terms without
delay, it is proposed that the Board's general
authority to allot the unissued Ordinary
shares of the Company which was agreed at
the 1986 Annual General Meeting, be
extended by a similar suthority valid until
the next Annual General Meeting. The Board
undertakes that no issue of shares will be
made that would effectively alter control of
the Company or the nature of its business
without the prior approval of the
shareholders.
The Companies Act 1985 also requires that
where shares are issued wholly for cash,
then they must first be offered to existing
Ordinary shareholders. Resolution no. 6
renews the Board's powers to allot Ordinary
sham for cash both in respect of shares
allotted by way of rights issues and in
respect on an additional 5% of the issued
share capital of the Company without first
offering them to existing Ordinary
shareholders. It also allows the Board to
overcome certain practical difficulties such
as to give shareholders resident in certain
oversees countries the money's worth of the
rights instead of the shares. This power
extend to the next Annual General Meeting.
Shareholders will be asked to renew annually
the powers given in resolution 5 and 6.
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Directors
The names of the Directors of the Company
are set out at the end of the annual report.
The Chairman retired on 31st March 1987
and did not seek re-appointement. Some non-
executive directors were appointed.
The interests of the directors and their
family in the shares of the Company are
stated elsewhere in the review of operations
sect ion.
Shareholdings
The Company is not a 'close company as
defined by the Income and Corporation Taxes
Act, 1970. So far as the directors are aware,
the only interest at 19th June 1987 in
excess of 5% of the issued Ordinary shares
was 8,406,374 shares in the name of
Merchant Navy Officers Pension Funds
Trustees Ltd.
Directors' Interest in Contracts
No contracts of significance in relation to the
Company's business in which Directors had
an interest subsisted at any time during the
year.
Fixed Assets
Details of the tangible fixed assets are given
in note 10 to the accounts.
Group owned and occupied property is
depreciated on a straight line basis. The
remainder of the properties are held for
invesment.
Donations
Charitable donations amounting to L67,012
were malt during the year. No political
donations were made.
Employee Involvement
The Directors recognise the need for
communication with employees at every
level and regular briefing meetings are held
in all areas of the Group. All employees
receive a copy of the annual report and
accounts. These, together with the bi-
monthly newspaper "Link" and frequent
internal notice board statements, form a
strong communications network.
Disabled Persons
It is the policy of the Group that, within the
limitations of the trading activities, disabled
persons are employed on equal terms. If
employees become disabled every effort is
made to continue employment with
retraining for alternative work, if
necessary. Opportunities for career
development are available to disabled
persons.
Auditors
Chartered Accountants have expressed their
willingness to continue as auditors. A
resolution will be proposed appointing tton
and authorising the Board to fix their
remuneration.
By Order of the Board
The Secretary
19 th June 1987.
CONSOLIDATED PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH 1987
L'000
Note
	
1987	 1986
Turnover
Operating costs
Profit from trading
Other operating income
Interest
Profit before taxation
Taxation
Profit after taxation
Extraordinary items
Profit for the financial year
Dividends
2 285,194 265,633
3 215.181 231.679 
	
40,013	 33,954
4	 1,996	 1,633
5 	 120	 (464)
	42,129 	 35,123
6	 15.091	 12.626
27,038 22,497
7	 18.427	 8 264
	8,611 	 14,233
8	 8.893	 7 743
Retained profit for the financial year	 (282)	 6,490
Earnings per share	 19Slp	 16.1p
The calculation of earnings per share is based on earnings of L27.036.000
(1966 L22.497.000) and a weighted average of 142.149,688 shares
(1966 139.668.275; adjusted for scrip issue) in issue during the year.
Statement of retained profits
Profit retained in earlier }mars	 70,302	 72,898
Retained profit for the year 	 (282)	 6,490
Exchange adjustments	 1	 (246)	 79
Oocdwill	 1	 (9,898)
Transfer (to) from revaluation reserve 	 21	 (640)	 733
Transfer (to) other reserve
Total retained profit 	 69,131	 70,302
BALANCE SHEET
AS AT 31 MARCH 1987
Note /987
L'000
/986
Fixed assets
Tangible assets 9 58,467 54,826
Investment in leased assets 11 214 509
Intangible assets 12 8.562 8.562
67.243 63 897
Current assets
Stocks 1 81,368 75,920
Debtors 13 46,728 41,718
Investments 14 24,576 15,457
Cash and deposits 12.338 24.915
165,010 158,010
Creditors - amounts due within one year 15 69.587 59.184
Net current assets 95 423 98 826
Total assets less current liabilities 162,666 162,723
Creditors - amonts due later than one year 15 (28,529) (31,394)
Provisions for liabilities and charges 17 (6.224) (3.439)
Net assets 127.913 127.890
Capital and reserves
Called up share capital 19 35,653 23,597
Share premium eccount 20 1,516 13,021
Revaluation reserve 21 21,312 20,672
Other reserve 301 298
Profit and loss account 69.131 70 302
127.913 127.890
SOURCE AND APPLICATION OF FUNDS
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st MARCH 1987
f.:000
1987	 1986
Funds generated by operations
Sources
Profit before taxation 42,129	 35,123
Depreciation 6,048	 4,875
Disposal of fixed assets 282	 478
Exchange adjustments (1.042) _221
47.417	 40.749
Applications
Capital expenditure, net of grants 11,017	 8,556
Increase in working capital 5.517	 13.379
16$34	 21.935
Surplus from operations 30,883	 18,814
Applied towards:
Redemption of debentures 26
Investment in leasing 348	 1,374
Tax payments 8,826	 10,070
Dividend payments 7.994	 7.079
17.194	 18.523
Net cash flow 13,689	 291
Other funds movements
Net consideration for shares issued 20,550	 14,385
Medium term US$ loan -	 20,072
Cost of subsidiaries acquired (15,370)(28,085)
Extraordinary items (8_,451.) (2.298)
Increase in liquid resources 10.418	 4,365
Movement in working capital 1987 1986
Stocks 5.448 11.724
Debtors 4.301 6.957
Creditors (6.360) (4.023)
3.389 14.658
Exchange adjustments 2.128 (1.279)
5.517 13,379
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NOTES TO THE ACCOUNTS
1- Accounting Policies
(a) Basis of preparation
The Group accounts comprise the consolidated accounts of the holding company and all its
subsidiaries, of which the principal companies are identified later. The Accounts have been
prepared under the historical cost convention supplemented by revaluation of certain properties.
Where changes in presentation are made, appropriate adjustments are made to comparative
figures.
A separate profit and loss account dealing with the results of the Company only has not been
presented.
These Accounts were approved by the Directors on 19th June 1987.
(b) Subsidiaries
Fair values are attributed to the net tangible assets of subsidiaries at the date of acquisition. The
excess of the cost of acquisition over the net assets attributed, so far as not previously written off,
is written off to reserves.
(c) Financial year end
Except for certain overseas subsidiaries subject to local requirements, the Group does not operate
to a calendar month end accounting timetable. These accounts are made up for a period of 52 weeks
ended on 29th March 1987 and the comparative figures are in respect of a period of 52 weeks
ended on 30th March 1986.
(d) Foreign currencies
Income and expenditure in foreign currencies are converted to sterling at rates approximating to
those ruling at the date of each transaction: assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies
are translated into sterling at the rates ruling at the balance sheet date. The results of overseas
subsidiaries are translated into sterling at average rates for the year. Exchange gains and losses
arising on the translation of the net assets of everseas companies have been dealt with in
accordance with SSAP 20.
(e) Turnover
Turnover represents the aggregate amount invoiced for goods supplied to customers and is stated
net of any value added or sales taxes.
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(0 Fixed assets and depreciation
Certain of the Oroup's properties are included in the accounts at valuation. Additions to these
properties and all other fixed assets are included at cost which is stated after deduction of Regional
Development and other capital grants receivable. With the exception of leased assets, depreciation
is provided on all property, plant and equipment on a straight line basis. Estimates of the useful
lives of plant and equipment cannot be made with precision and in practice a range of lives exists.
The Group has chosen shorter, rather than longer lives for its depreciation calculations and,
where assets are in use on a multi shift basis, these rates are doubled or trebled as appropriate.
The basic annual rates used are:
Freehold property	 2%
Leasehold property	 over the term of the lease, minimum 2%
Plant and machinery	 121/2%
Motor vehicles	 25%
(g) Intangible fixed assets
Patents and trade marks which have no finite life are stated at valuation. Provision is mecle for any
permanent diminution in value.
(h) Stock
Stock and work in progress is valued at the lower of cost, including appropriate manufacturing
overheads, and net realisable value. As the Group is vertically integrated, finished goods held try
one company may be sold outside the Oroup or may form the raw materials of other companies
within the Oroup. In these circumstances, stocks and work in progress have not been sub-
classified.
(i) Taxation
Deferred taxation is provided on timing differences which may increase taxation liabilities in the
foreseeable future. The amounts provided have been calculated at the Corporation Tax rates
expected to apply when the liabilities crystallise. Advance Corporation Tax to be offset against the
Corporation Tax liability of the following year is carried forward.
(j) Research and development
Expenditure on research and development is charged against profits in the year in which it is
incurred.
(k) Leasing
Tangible fixed assets acquired under finance leases are not capitalised. Rentals payable under both
finance and operating leases are written off as incurred.
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f:000
2 Turnover 1967 1986
The geographical distribution of turnover was as follows:
UK 117,127 98,576
Other EEC countries 76,702 71,687
Rest of Europe 10,723 10,762
USA/Canada/South America 66,049 68,713
Far East and others 14.593 15.895
285.194 265.633
3 Operating Costs
Operating costs comprise:
Cost of sales 202,469 193,991
Distribution costs 23,776 20,642
Administration expenses 18.936 17.046
and include the following items:
245,181 231.679
Depreciation 6,048 4,875
Hire of plant 346 245
Auditors remuneration 305 294
Employee numbers and costs:
The average number of persons employed by the Group during the
year was as follows:
1987 1.986
Production 8,759 8,184
Selling, administration 964 928
1,223_ 1,112
Aggregate employment costs were:
Wages and salaries 66,212 59,409
Social security costs 6,381 5,992
Other pension costs 1.566 1.329
74.159 66,730
Director's remuneration:
Fees 18 18
Other emoluments 325 296
Excluding pension contributions, remuneration of Directors and higher paid
UK employees was paid as follows:
Chairman L82,454 (1986122,472)
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Other directors
1987	 1986
Employees
1987	 /986
1.5,001 toL10.000 3 3 -
L30.001 to L35,000 1 6 9
L35.001 to LA0.000 1 - 7 5
1A0.001 to LA5,000 - 1 3 1
L45.001 to L50.000 1 2 2 2
L50,001 to L55.000 2 2 1
L55.001 to L.60.000 - 1 1
1.70.001 to 1.75.000 - 1
•
L•000
4 Other Operating Income 1987 1986
Income from leasing 340 343
Other income tan) 1 290
1,996 1,633
Income from leasing is stated after:
Depreciation 1,802 2,175
Interest received 7 9
Interest paid 542 312
5— Interest:
Interest Receivable
Investment income - listed UK 94 355
- listed oversees 924 917
- unlisted 11 8
Interest received on short term deposits 3.113 2.615
4.142 3.895
Interest Payable
Bank loans and overdrafts:
- wholly repayable within five years 3,743 4,078
- others 58 60
Debentures 221 221
4.022 .4.359
120 (464)
Cost or valuation
at 31st March 1986
Additions
Disposals
Exchange adjustments
At 31st March 1987
Depreciation
At 31st March 1986
Charge for year
Disposals
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E000
6- Taxation /987 /986
Based on the profits for the year
UK Corporation tax at 40Z (1985 45) 10,099 6,995
Oversees taxation 4,872 5,646
Transfer to deferred taxation 120 35
15,091 12.626
7 Extraordinary items
Costs of proposed acquisition (failed bid) net of the gain
on disposal of shares in the target company. 4,340
Loss on early redemption of quoted loan stock 1,257
Loss on cessation of certain activities 1,067 1,659
Anticipated loss on disposal of certain US operations 3,803 2,605
Reorgsnisation and rationalisation 2,450 1,865
Foreign currency deficit arising on consolidation 1,460 835
US subsidiary pre-production expenditures written off 1,250 600
Ooociwill written off 2.800 700
18,427 8.264
8 Dividends
Interim dividend 1.9p per share (1986 1.733p) 2,707 2,456
Proposed final dividend 4.3p per share (1986 3.733p) 6.132 5.287
8,839 7.743
9 Tangible Fixed Assets
Land and Buildings
Leasehold
Freehold Lone Short Plant Total
39,141 2,799 213 49,460 91,613
2,452 105 31 8,429 11,017
(5) - - ( 1,558) ( 1,563)
(1.180) 396 _17.) (456) (1.247)
40 408 3.300 _231 55.875 99.820
514 54 130 36,089
936 48 44 5,020
- (1,281)
36,787
6,048
(1,281)
Exchange adjustments	 .113.) 	 (173) 	 (201)
At 31st March 1987	 1.429	 IC&	 Inj.	 39.655 41.353
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Land and Buildings
Leasehold
Freehold Lona Short Plant Total
Net book value
At 31st March 1986 35.627 5.745 83 13.371 54.826
At 31st March 1987 38,979 3,192 76 16,220 58,467
Regional development and other grants receivable, L662.000. have been deducted in arriving at the cost
of eligible buildings and plant added during the year.
For land and buildings included above at a valuation carried out in 1986, the equivalent amounts
calculated under historical cost accounting rules are shown as follows:
Freehold
Valuation	 Cost
Long Leasehold
Valuation	 Cost
Cost or valuation
At 31st March 1986 25 294 11.783 5.334 2.595
At 31st March 1987 25 915 12.195 5.721 2.824
Accumulated depreciation
At 31st March 1986 3.959 1.165
At 31st March 1987 519 4.382 115 1.368
Net asset value
At 31st March 1986 25.294 7.824 5.334 1.430
At 31st March 1987 25.396 7.813 5.606 1.456
No provision has been made for taxation on chargeable gains estimated atL5.746.000 which would
become payable on a disposal of the properties at the values incorporated in the accounts.
L'000
10 Investments /987 /966
Shares in Group companies, at cast 38,627 31,789
Amounts written off 3.939 2.025
34,688 29,764
The changes in cost of shares In Group companies and amount written off arise from a
reorganisation of shareholdings within the Group.
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1.'000
11 Investment in Leased Assets
Fixed assets /987 /986
Leased to third parties at cost 16,467 17,252
Accumulated depreciation 8.168 6 952
8,299 10,300
Cash at bank 728
Debtors- amounts falling due within one year
Due by Group companies - 17
Other debtors 189 351
Creditors- amounts falling due within one year
Bank loans and overdrafts (3,200) (5,053)
Deferred income (1,523) (1,663)
Accruals (252) (41)
Taxation (784) -
Due to Group companies (490)
Provisions for liabilities and charges
Deferred taxation (2.753) (3.402)
214 509
The outstanding period of the leases vary from one to six years and the total of future rentals receivable
is L8.254,000 (1986 L10.879.000). There were no additions to leased assets in the year and disposals
amounted to 1284.000 on which accumulated depredation amounted toL586.000.
12 Intangible assets
Patents and trot marks	 8.562 8.562
13 Debtors
Company
/987	 /986 /987
Group
/986
Amounts due within one year:
Trade debtors - - 38,783 37,161
Due by Oroup companies 29,512 28,498 490 -
Other debtors 2,849 1,979
Prepayments and accrued income 24 1 3,478 1,669
Tax recoverable 694 1.128 909
30,230 28,499 46,728 41,718
Amounts due later than one year:
Advance corporation tax recoverable 2.199 2.266 -
32.429 30,765 46,728 41 718
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14 Investments Company
/987	 /986
G000
Group
/987	 /986
Listed: UK - - 10 3,035
Overseas - - 24,385 12,249
Unlisted 95 95 181 173
95 95 24 ,576 15 ,457
Investments are stated at cost or market value, If lower. In the case of investments held overseas, cost
in foreign currencies has been translated in accordance with the accounting policy set out in note 1(d)
The value of investments at 31st March was as follows:
1987	 1985
Listed- at market value: UK	 L15,000	 L3,035,000
Overseas £25,524,000	 L13,036,000
Unlisted- at Director's valuation	 L181,000	 L.173,000
15 Creditors	 Company
/987	 /986
Group
1987	 1986
Amounts due within one year:
Trade creditors	 - - 23,059 19,825
Accruals	 1,029 595 12,202 10,988
Current taxation	 2,499 2,725 12,126 7,359
Other taxation and social security costs	 - - • 2,836 3,895
Other creditors
	
- - 1,644 1,314
Due to Group companies	 5,461 1,800 - 17
Bank loans and overdrafts	 7,511
(secured Group [252,000-1986 L564,000)
6,173 11,588 10,499
Proposed dividend	 6.132 5.287 6.132 5.282
22.632 16.580 69.587 59.184
Amounts due later than one year:
_Accruals 390 451
Bank loans (secured L934,000-1986 L1,757,000)	 - - 20,433 24,919
Debentures (note 15) 	 2,325 2,351 2,325V 2,351
_Taxation - 5.381 3.673
2.325 2.351 28.529 31 394
Bank loans repayable In more than one year bear Interest at rates between 7/6R and 11X and include
loans of £764,000 repayable in instalments extending beyond five years of which £262,000 is repayable
In more than five years. Other repayments fall due as follows:
Between one and two years-1264,000
Between two and five years- L19,907,000
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L000
16 Debentures /96'7 /986
7% Debenture Stock 1985/90 (see a and b) 622 648
7 1 /2% Debenture Stock 1985/90 (see a) 186 186
103/4% Debenture Stock 1990/95 (see a and c) 1.517 1.517
2,325 2,351
a The debentures are secured by first floating charges on the undertakings of the Company and certain of
its subsidiaries under a trust deed.
b In each year ending on every 30th November the company is obliged to set aside L50,000 to a non-
cumulative sinking fund towards the redemption of the stock providing that in lieu of this the Company
may purchase stock for cash which will be accepted at the lower of par or the cost of purchase in
satisfaction pro ',aloof the obligation. During the year L23,000 was expended on purchases of stack.
No transfer to sinking fund Is required because of purchases In earlier years.
c In each year ending on every 30th November the Company is obliged to set aside L25,000 to a non-
cumulative sinking fund towards the redemption of the stock providing that in lieu of this the Company
may purchase stock for cash which will be accepted at. the lower of par or the cost of purchase in
satisfaction pro tentoof the obligation. No transfer to sinking fund Is required because of purchases in
earlier years.
17 Provision for Liabilities and Charges
Provision for exceptional fluctuation in raw material prices and
future losses on contracts 1,566 988
Reorganisation of Group activities 1,608 191
Other charges 956 924
Pension commitments (note 18) 2.364 1.689
6,494 3,792
Deferred taxation 200 80
Advance Corporation tax (470) (433)
6.224 3.439
Potential liability
Capital allowances 5,749 5,542
Other timing differences 2 460 L533
8 209 7 075
Provided 200 80
18 Pensions
The accounts contain a provision for the pension liability of a German subsidiary which has been
calculated in accordance with West airman statutory requirements.
The Group operates a number of other pension schemes, the assets of which are independent of the
Group. These schemes are regularly reviewed by actuaries and are funded in accordance with their
advice.
NOTES TO THE ACCOUNTS
L'000
19 Share Capital
Authorised:
188,000,000 Ordinary Shares of 25P
	
47,000	 31,250
Allotted, called up and fully paid:
142,611,404 Ordinary Shares of 25p 	 35.653	 23.597
Issued Share Capital increased by 47,209,335 ordinary shares as a result of a scrip issue in September
1985 to existing shareholders of one new share for every two shares held.
Since 31st March 1986 options In respect of 1,012,900 ordinary shares have been exerciced at prices
between 52p and 83.33p per share for a total consideration of L555,517.
Options to subscribe for ordinary shares in the Company granted to certain Directors and employees were
outstanding at 31st March 1987 as follows:
Number of	 Exert-ice
	price	 Period during tenth
ordnery shores per orenory shire	 oplions may normelly be exercised
	
1,056,350	 52p	 By August 1987
	
207,850	 83.33p	 By December 1989
	
212,400	 118p	 Between December 1987 and December 1990
	
604,500	 172p	 Between January 1988 and January 1995
	
173,500	 212p	 Between January 1989 and January 1996
20 Share Premium Account
At 31st March 1986 13,021
Premium on shares issued during the year 308
Costs of issue written off (6)
Capitalisation (11 807)
At 31st March 1987 1,516
21 Revaluation Reserve
At 31st March 1986 20,672
Exchange adjustments 645
Release on disposal of property (5)
At 31st March 1987 21,312
Lease commitments 1957 1985
There were net obligations under finance leases at 31 March
1987 as follows
Payable in the first year 13,822 11,276
Payable in the second to fifth year inclusive 16,674 10,321
Payable after the fifth year 2 851 4.499
33.347 26.096
NOTES TO THE ACCOUNTS
L'000
22 Commitments	 Group
1.987	 1986
Commitments not provided in the accounts:
Capital expenditure contracted	 6,482
	 1,759
Capital expenditure authorised but not contracted
	 4,179
	 2,263
23 Contingent Liabilities
In respect of documentary credits, indemnities
and bills discounted
24 Related company
The principal related company is:
2,305	 2,472
Country of	 Country of	 Shares in Group
operation	 registration	 issue	 shareholdino
ABC Financial Services (Hldg) plc UK England	 2001.1 "A" ord. 100%
2001.1 "B" ord.
2000 LI pref.	 100%
This company was formed during the year to acquired the interests previously held by the Group
and by third parties in the issued share Capital of Group Financial Subsidiary Plc and Group
Personal Accounts Limited, the principal companies which provide financial services for the
Group.
Equity interest in related companies.
The Group's interests in the net assets of ABC as at 31st March 1987 are set out below:
1987
Fixed assets
tangible assets 5,150
Other assets 1.832
6,982
Current assets
Receivables 70,825
Cash and bank balances 5.834
76.659
83.611
Liabilities
Bank and other borrowings 68,164
Creditors 7,473
Loans from the Group 6.728
82.365
Net assets 1 276
REPORT OF THE AUDITORS
To the Members of the Group plc
We have audited the accounts in accordance with approved Auditing Standards.
In our opinion the accounts which have been prepared on the basis of the accounting policies set out
in note 1, give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Company and of the Group at 31st
March 1987 and of the profit and source and application of funds of the Group for the year to that
date and comply with the Compu3nies Act 1985.
Chartered Accountants
London
19th June 1987
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